ByteBreaker
Lure claim: “"ByteBreaker V1" — a free Roblox script executor / exploit, advertised by its own publisher description as having "no key system" ("the ads shown in the installer help this exploit"). The file masquerades as the product download while declaring itself FileDescription/ProductName = Downloader, Compan”
| SHA-256 | bd1f1619f850be8c84ae0acdd0bb7ff3d88b8cb5647877c078d7805d7a55582f |
|---|---|
| SHA-1 | 932e7cce8f6cde321f2288ccaaeb8ae5d84ab26d |
| MD5 | 280603b04aeadbb0d42f6043354923cd |
| Imphash | afb4e05a0cdf45e3ff8be8f3da3dd155 |
| Filename | ByteBreaker V1_85892839.exe |
| Target | AMD64 (x86-64), PE32+, Windows GUI subsystem (IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_WINDOWS_GUI), nati · Windows GUI |
|---|---|
| EP / Base | EP 0x00061400 · Base 0x140000000 |
| Size / Entropy | 756.9 KB · 6.42 |
| Packer | None |
| COFF Time | 2026-10-29T19:51:04Z |
| Origin | https://bytebreaker.cc/ |
-
T1204.002 User Execution: Malicious File - user double-clicks <Product> V1_<8-digit>.exe
-
T1036.005 Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name/Location - %TEMP%\ADR<hex4>.exe and GLY<hex4>.exe via GetTempFileNameW + DeleteFileW + ".exe"
-
| 248 | | 16 AEAD envelope, zstd inside, runtime-derived key
-
T1518 Software Discovery - per-offer registryChecks (RegGetValueW) and fileChecks (GetFileAttributesW) gate presentation
-
T1071.001 Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols - WinINet POST https://dlsft.com/service.php, UA exactly "Mozilla/5.0", INTERNET_OPEN_TYPE_DIRECT (ignores system proxy)
-
T1105 - URLDownloadToFileW of 16.7 MB archive over plain HTTP; URLOpenBlockingStreamA for in-memory creatives
-
T1548 Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism - manifest requireAdministrator (requireAdministrator uiAccess=false) taken before offer set is known; all children inherit token
-
T1496 - three of five offers are proxyware: idle uplink becomes residential proxy egress (Honeygain SDK 1.5.0 signed Honeygain UAB; "Your device may function as a network exit node")
-
T1562.001 Disable or Modify Tools - publisher FAQ instructs distributors: "recommend your audience to disable Windows Defender and any Anti-Virus during the download process" (advisory, not automated)
-
T1204.001 Malicious Link - affiliate redirect https://www.ovardu.com/6R9H6BD/KMZXBTT/?sub1=FileDM&sub=default for CPA browser install
-
PE Anomaly Appended PE overlay (8,072 bytes, entropy 7.48)
-
PE Anomaly Authenticode signature table present (verify certificate chain / stolen cert)
| Section | Virt Addr | Virt Size | Raw Size | Perms | Entropy |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
.text |
0x00001000 | 586,604 B | 586,752 B | R-X | 6.44 |
.rdata |
0x00091000 | 138,062 B | 138,240 B | R-- | 5.22 |
.data |
0x000b3000 | 16,556 B | 10,240 B | RW- | 3.64 |
.pdata |
0x000b8000 | 23,772 B | 24,064 B | R-- | 5.84 |
.fptable |
0x000be000 | 256 B | 512 B | RW- | 0.00 |
.rsrc |
0x000bf000 | 1,568 B | 2,048 B | R-- | 3.94 |
.reloc |
0x000c0000 | 3,780 B | 4,096 B | R-- | 5.31 |
ByteBreaker V1_85892839.exe is a 775,048-byte signed x64 GUI download wrapper, not the Roblox exploit it appears to be. It carries no product name, icon, dialog or string-table resources and under 5 KB of application literals; its entire visible interface (five pages, up to five offers, legal text, banners) is supplied at run time by https://dlsft.com/service.php. Two synchronous POSTs drive it — request=offers (bundle, keyed on a channel) and request=getDownloadInfo&name=<stem> (product descriptor, keyed on the trailing eight-digit identifier only, confirmed by 701 sequential probes and alias testing; WhateverName_85892839 resolves identically). The .exe suffix is therefore a server-side row key, and the "product" is one row in a mutable table.
Retrieval is obfuscated by a home-grown hotlink mask: s = %08x(crc32(id XOR "SCI_multipart")), without which directfiledl.com/getfile answers Security code is not matching. The 16.7 MB result is a third-party Luau executor, Xeno 1.4.816 (CodeView path C:\Users\rizve\OneDrive\Desktop\Projects\Xeno\build\Release\net9.0-windows8.0\Xeno.pdb), re-branded with nine strings by a repackager calling itself Evon; the engine still says "Xeno" 67 times and "ByteBreaker" zero. It is NativeAOT .NET 9 + statically linked Luau, exports Attach/Execute/GetClients/Initialize/SetSetting/Version, embeds cpp-httplib on loopback, Discord RPC with join secrets, and pulls its bytecode-patch configuration from an AEAD-sealed 276-byte blob mirrored on Pastebin and Cloudflare Pages (key derived at runtime; 9.37 M static candidates excluded).
Monetisation is bandwidth, not data: three of five offers are proxyware (two first-party, one shipping Authenticode-signed hgsdk.dll 1.5.0 from Honeygain UAB, Vilnius, connect.sdk.honeygain.com), one is a CPA browser redirect, one is the comScore/VoiceFive panel with special-category consent text. No component reads browser credential stores, cookies, the Roblox security cookie, wallets or hardware identifiers; telemetry is a server-issued 64-bit install id, an IP-derived country, a consent version and eight funnel events, one of which travels over cleartext HTTP. The real exposures are structural: Administrator acquired before the offer set is known (no offer requires machine scope), product integrity unverified over plain HTTP from a single Hetzner host with no TLS listener, and a stale packaged engine (1.2.0 vs manifest 1.4.816) that self-updates from an authenticated-by-hash-only manifest.
Static Reverse Engineering Assessment
ByteBreaker V1_85892839.exe and Its Delivery Chain
| Report ID | RE-2026-1117-BB |
| Version | 1.0 (final) |
| Report date | 17 November 2026, 02:10 |
| Analysis period | 16–17 November 2026 |
| Classification | TLP:CLEAR |
| Subject | ByteBreaker V1_85892839.exe (775,048 B) |
| Associated artefacts | 6 (see Table 2.1) |
| Analyst | Elera |
| Method | Static PE/C++ analysis, managed-metadata recovery, ASN.1 signature analysis, live endpoint interrogation, catalogue enumeration, cryptographic key-space sweep, OSINT corroboration |
| Companion file | ByteBreaker_V1_85892839_ANALYSIS.md (working notes, 3 301 lines) |
Revision history
| Ver | Date | Change |
|---|---|---|
| 0.1 | 2026‑11‑16 | Initial triage; PE geometry, signature, literal pool |
| 0.9 | 2026‑11‑17 | Control-flow recovery; protocol reconstruction; payload acquisition and identification |
| 1.0 | 2026‑11‑17 | Offer-bundle analysis; third-party SDK identification; commercial attribution; risk model; indicators; corrections log |
1. Executive summary
The Subject is a 775 KB, 64-bit Windows GUI executable that presents itself as a download manager for a Roblox script executor. Analysis establishes that it is a white-label pay-per-install (PPI) distribution wrapper, built by the Dutch software and file-hosting company AN Soft (trading as FileDM) and operated inside the InstallUnion advertising network as campaign 1538. The wrapper contains no product code. At execution it contacts two provider endpoints, retrieves a product descriptor keyed on its own filename, downloads a 16.7 MB archive over cleartext HTTP, and — subject to a locally evaluated targeting model — offers the user up to five additional software installations, four of which it executes silently with inherited Administrator rights.
The delivered archive is Xeno 1.4.816, a free Luau-based Roblox executor authored by an independent developer using the handle rizve, re-branded by a third party using the name "Evon". The re-brand required four HTML strings, one version resource and two file renames; every other product string in the archive still identifies Xeno.
The offer bundle, not the executor, is the commercially significant component. Three of the five offers are bandwidth-sharing clients: applications that, once accepted, sell the host's idle upload capacity into a residential proxy network. One of them ships the Honeygain SDK 1.5.0 (hgsdk.dll), an Authenticode-signed component from Honeygain, UAB of Vilnius, Lithuania. A second ships WinDivert, a kernel-mode packet interception driver, alongside a packet-level advertisement blocker. The remaining two offers are a mainstream browser distributed through a cost-per-action affiliate network and a comScore market-research panel whose acceptance text carries the most extensive data scope in the bundle.
No component in the chain was observed to read browser credential stores, browser cookies, the Roblox security cookie, cryptogram wallet files, hardware identifiers, or the operating-system username. The Subject's own telemetry is limited to a server-issued installation identifier, an IP-derived country code, a consent version, and nine funnel events. The privacy-relevant behaviour of the whole chain is therefore concentrated in the offers and in the third-party SDK they embed, not in the Subject itself.
Nine key judgements are recorded in §1.1 with associated confidence and severity ratings.
1.1 Key judgements
| ID | Judgement | Confidence | Severity |
|---|---|---|---|
| KJ‑01 | The Subject is a generic, multi-purpose PPI wrapper — not bespoke software for the delivered product. It carries no product name, icon, dialog template, string table or payload. | High | Informational |
| KJ‑02 | The Subject is delivered signed with an organisation-validated (OV) ECDSA code-signing certificate to a one-developer Dutch entity, AN Soft, and is therefore an authentic artefact of that vendor rather than a tampered copy. | High | Informational |
| KJ‑03 | The delivered product is a third-party re-brand of the free executor Xeno by rizve. Requesting the descriptor under ByteBreaker V1_85892839 returns ByteBreaker V1 / bytebreakerV1.zip; the archive contains zero occurrences of the string "ByteBreaker" outside a 28 KB HTML file and one version resource. |
High | Low |
| KJ‑04 | Product identity is resolved server-side, by numeric identifier, not locally: any name with the suffix _85892839 resolves to the same product, and no other identifier in a 701-value sample resolves. The identifier is a provider database key. |
High | Informational |
| KJ‑05 | Monetisation is effected by bandwidth resale, not by advertising, subscription or credential theft: three of five offers are clients for residential-proxy networks, and two of those are first-party products of the same vendor that supplied the wrapper. | High | Moderate |
| KJ‑06 | The Honeygain SDK 1.5.0 (hgsdk.dll, Authenticode: CN=Honeygain, UAB, SERIALNUMBER=306103177, Vilnius LT) is embedded in one offer. The SDK exposes an explicit consent API (hgsdk_request_consent, hgsdk_opt_in, hgsdk_opt_out, hgsdk_is_opted_in); the integration's consent path was not resolved statically and is rated an open question. |
High (presence) / Moderate (consent flow) | Moderate |
| KJ‑07 | The Subject acquires Administrator rights before it knows which offers it will present, and passes that token to five payloads, four of which run silently. None of the five offers requires machine-wide installation; one explicitly requests per-user installation (--allusers=0). Elevation is therefore speculative, not functional. |
High | Moderate‑High |
| KJ‑08 | Both the product descriptor and the product archive are retrieved at run time and are mutable server-side. The archive is also stale on delivery (bin/current_version.txt = 1.2.0 against version.json = 1.4.816), indicating a further update hop after first launch. Static assessment of the client therefore does not transitively assess the delivered code at a later date. |
High | Moderate |
| KJ‑09 | The product archive is served from directfiledl.com over plain HTTP, from a single Hetzner host with no TLS listener on 443, and is not signature-verified by the Subject. Integrity of the delivered product rests on a constant embedded in the Subject (§5.4). |
High | Moderate |
1.2 Bottom line
The Subject is a correctly built, professionally signed, competently written installer whose purpose is not the software it installs. It is a monetisation shell: a generic wrapper that obtains elevation speculatively, resolves what to offer from a mutable server-side model, and converts the user's installation event into revenue by reselling their upload capacity. Its engineering quality is higher than its transparency. The residual risk in the chain does not arise from concealment of what it reads — an analysis of every component found no credential-collection primitives — but from the aggregate of four silent, Administrator-level installers, two of which are proxyware and one of which loads a kernel driver, selected by a factor the recipient cannot see.
2. Scope, method and limitations
2.1 Objects of analysis
| ID | Object | Size | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| S‑00 | ByteBreaker V1_85892839.exe |
775,048 B | Primary subject; complete static analysis |
| S‑01 | product descriptor (JSON, service.php) |
232 B | Retrieved from remote |
| S‑02 | offer bundle (JSON, service.php) |
8 887 B | Retrieved from remote (5 offers) |
| S‑03 | bytebreakerV1.zip (delivered product archive) |
16,787,263 B | Retrieved; fully extracted |
| S‑04 | Glory-1.0.7-windows-x64.zip (offer 2) |
12,579,642 B | Retrieved; fully extracted |
| S‑05 | AdReject-1.0.9-windows-x64.zip (offer 3) |
574,773 B | Retrieved; fully extracted |
| S‑06 | aichat_2.0.3_x64-setup.exe (offer 4) |
3,807,352 B | Retrieved; unpacked (NSIS) |
| S‑07 | ContentI3.exe reference (offer 5) |
– | Referenced from feed; not retrieved |
Artefacts were retrieved directly from the vendor's public endpoints during the analysis window. Retrieval was performed with ordinary GET requests except where the published protocol requires POST (§5.2); no authentication, no registration and no client-specific state was used.
2.2 Techniques applied
- Static PE analysis (headers, sections, directories, entropy, relocations, resources, overlay accounting).
- Signature analysis: PKCS#7 parsing, certificate path recovery, EKU, validity, RFC‑3161 counter-signature extraction.
- Build provenance: CodeView
RSDSrecord recovery, Rich-header decoding, linker section-table extraction from the debug directory. - Full-function decompilation (1 654 functions) and manual control-flow recovery of the 28 KB application layer.
- Literal-pool extraction across both encodings (ASCII/UTF‑16), with RVA attribution and cross-referencing into code.
- Managed-metadata recovery (
BSJB, TypeDef/MethodDef tables, AssemblyRef) for the .NET components. - Resource-tree enumeration and version-resource decoding.
- Protocol reconstruction by reading format-string call sites, then live validation of every endpoint retained by the analysis.
- Catalogue enumeration: 701 sequential identifier probes with type-safe response handling.
- Cryptographic envelope inference by length decomposition, followed by a 9 366 416-candidate key-space sweep over all byte offsets and both AES key sizes.
- OSINT corroboration of the upstream product identity and the vendor's claims.
- Cross-component corroboration of a single campaign identifier across three independent codebases (§7.4).
2.3 Confidence convention
| Term | Meaning |
|---|---|
| High | Multiple independent artefacts agree; would require a deliberate, difficult forgery to contradict |
| Moderate | One strong artefact plus consistent circumstance; a specific hypothesis remains unfalsified |
| Low | Inference from pattern or convention only; alternative explanations exist |
| Open | Experimentally reachable but not reached within this engagement; method is specified |
2.4 Limitations
- Static and remote-probe analysis only. The Subject and its payloads were not executed for
behavioural capture. No sandbox/ETW trace, no
Procmon, no packet capture, no dynamic debugging session was performed. Statements about runtime behaviour are derived from code, literals, imports and call structure, and are corroborated against the vendor's own served documents where possible. - No environment stratification. All remote interrogation (countries, offers, catalogue) was
performed from a single egress location in the United Kingdom, between 16 and 17 November 2026,
while the feed reports itself as varying "per country and day". Country-dependent behaviour other
than that returned for
GBis inferred, not measured. - Point-in-time feeds. The offer bundle and product descriptor are mutable. Only offer
idvalues and the provider's numeric identifier are stable keys. - One configuration of the delivered product. The packaged engine was stale against its manifest (§6.6); the post-update engine was not obtained.
- The encrypted remote configuration was not opened. The envelope and its role are established; the plaintext is not (§6.7).
- No disablement test. Determinations of "not present" rest on absence of literals, imports and call sites. For the components that were fully decompilable this is strong; for the Themida-protected launcher it is weaker and is stated as such wherever it applies.
2.5 Terminology
PPI pay-per-install · PUP/PUA potentially unwanted program/application · OV/EV organisation-
validated/extended-validation (code signing) · AoB artefact of build · NativeAOT ahead-of-time
native compilation of a .NET assembly · proxyware software that supplies its host's bandwidth as a
residential proxy egress · NativeAOT.
3. Technical identification
3.1 Primary sample
| Property | Value |
|---|---|
| File name | ByteBreaker V1_85892839.exe |
| Size | 775,048 bytes (0xBD388) |
| Format | PE32+ executable, AMD64, GUI subsystem, 7 sections |
| SHA‑256 | bd1f1619f850be8c84ae0acdd0bb7ff3d88b8cb5647877c078d7805d7a55582f |
| SHA‑1 | 932e7cce8f6cde321f2288ccaaeb8ae5d84ab26d |
| MD5 | 280603b04aeadbb0d42f6043354923cd |
| Authentihash (SHA‑256) | 47cb2bce143f52236604570e76081fa7bbf49c27955cba8be9ea4780f1d1b1c1 |
| imphash | b3eb077da70cf3699e3dc8149d29c2be |
| Image base / entry point | 0x140000000 / 0x140061400 |
SizeOfImage |
0xC1000 |
| Link timestamp (UTC) | 2026‑10‑29 19:51:04 |
| PE checksum | 0xC6DED — equals computed value |
| Overlay | 8,072 B = Authenticode certificate only |
| Signature | Present, valid, countersigned (§3.4) |
The PE checksum matching the calculated value, and the overlay consisting solely of the certificate table, are consistent with a stock linker output that has not passed through a post-link patcher, binder, or resource editor.
3.2 Section table
| Section | VA | Virtual size | Raw ptr | Raw size | Entropy | Characteristics |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
.text |
0x1000 | 586,604 | 0x400 | 586,752 | 6.442 | CODE | EXEC | READ |
.rdata |
0x91000 | 138,062 | 0x8F800 | 138,240 | 5.222 | IDATA | READ |
.data |
0xB3000 | 16,556 | 0xB1400 | 10,240 | 3.641 | IDATA | READ | WRITE |
.pdata |
0xB8000 | 23,772 | 0xB3C00 | 24,064 | 5.840 | IDATA | READ |
.fptable |
0xBE000 | 256 | 0xB9A00 | 512 | 0.000 | IDATA | READ | WRITE |
.rsrc |
0xBF000 | 1,568 | 0xB9C00 | 2,048 | 3.937 | IDATA | READ |
.reloc |
0xC0000 | 3,780 | 0xBA400 | 4,096 | 5.309 | IDATA | READ, DISCARDABLE |
Observations:
.textis not writable (R-X) and.textentropy is 6.44 — consistent with ordinary optimised code, not with a runtime unpacking stage, which requires either a writable code section or an explicitVirtualProtecttransition.VirtualProtectis imported but is consumed by the UCRT..fptableis entirely zero, 160 bytes of contribution. It is a linker-generated function-pointer table (VS 2019 16.x / VS 2022link.exe), not a protector section. Its presence is one of several independent indicators of the toolchain generation (§3.5).- Section raw offsets are strictly sequential with no gaps between them
(
0x400 + 586,752 = 0x8F800, and so on), and the final raw section ends at0xBB400(766,976), which is exactly the start of the certificate table. There is no unaccounted byte in the file. - No
TLSdirectory, no delay-load directory, no bound-import directory, no CLR descriptor.
3.3 Resource tree
Only two resource types are present:
RT_VERSION (0x10) id 1 lang 0x0409/0x04B0 600 B
RT_MANIFEST (0x18) id 1 lang 0x0409 808 B
There is no RT_ICON, RT_GROUP_ICON, RT_DIALOG, RT_STRING, RT_BITMAP, RT_MENU,
RT_ACCELERATOR, RT_HTML or RT_TOOLBAR. Three consequences follow, and they are load-bearing for
later sections:
- No icon resource ⇒ the file displays with the generic default application icon in Explorer and in the task bar, and carries no visual identity.
- No dialog or string-table resources ⇒ every control, label and message is instantiated or supplied at run time. The user interface cannot be enumerated statically from resources; it must be recovered from code (§4.3), and the text it displays is not present in the binary at all.
- No product identity ⇒ there is nothing in the Subject, at any layer, that names the software it distributes. This is the design premise of the whole class (§3.6, §6.4).
3.4 Version resource and manifest
CompanyName AN Soft
FileDescription Downloader
FileVersion 1.0.0.0
InternalName Downloader
LegalCopyright © AN Soft
OriginalFilename (absent)
ProductName Downloader
ProductVersion 1.0.0.0
Translation 0x0409 / 0x04B0 (US English, Unicode)
VS_FIXEDFILEINFO 0xFEEF04BD, FileOS=4 (NT), FileType=1 (application), FileSubtype=0
The StringFileInfo block contains no CompanyWebsite, Comments, PrivateBuild or
SpecialBuild key — fields that are present in the overwhelming majority of commercially produced
executables and are the normal place for a support URL or an e-mail address.
The embedded manifest declares, in full:
<assembly …>
<dependency><dependentAssembly>
<assemblyIdentity type="win32" name="Microsoft.Windows.Common-Controls"
version="6.0.0.0" processorArchitecture="*"
publicKeyToken="6595b64144ccf1df" language="*"/>
</dependentAssembly></dependency>
<trustInfo><security><requestedPrivileges>
<requestedExecutionLevel level="requireAdministrator" uiAccess="false"/>
</requestedPrivileges></security></trustInfo>
<application><windowsSettings>
<dpiAware xmlns="http://schemas.microsoft.com/SMI/2005/WindowsSettings">True/PM</dpiAware>
</windowsSettings></application>
</assembly>
Two entries are operationally significant and are revisited in §4.5 and §10.3:
requestedExecutionLevel level="requireAdministrator"— unconditional elevation at every start, with a UAC prompt, before any user interface exists and before the software knows what it will install (§1.1 KJ‑07).dpiAware = True/PM— declares per-monitor DPI awareness (thev1True/PMform) but nodpiAwareness/gdiScalingfallback, and the code contains noAdjustWindowRectExForDpior per-monitor scaling logic. On mixed-DPI systems the owner-drawn interface therefore renders at system scale and is not rescaled on monitor change.
<compatibility> (supportedOS GUIDs) is absent, so Windows applies no version lie and the
process is not declared Windows 10/11 aware.
3.5 Build provenance
3.5.1 Debug directory
Four IMAGE_DEBUG_DIRECTORY entries (RVA 0xA35B0, 112 bytes total, all sharing the same
TimeDateStamp):
| # | Type | Size | Content |
|---|---|---|---|
| 0 | 2 CODEVIEW |
83 | RSDS — CodeView record (§3.5.2) |
| 1 | 12 | 20 | linker-specific |
| 2 | 13 | 940 | GCTL — COFF section table (§3.5.3) |
| 3 | 14 | 0 | empty |
3.5.2 CodeView record
Signature : RSDS
GUID : 861b2640-7ce5-cb4a-bc2f-99184c3d8202 (bytes 861b26407ce5cb4abc2f99184c3d8202)
Age : 3
PDB : C:\Users\Samim\Desktop\Installer\x64\Release\Installer.pdb
This single record supplies four pieces of analytic information, listed in §3.6. The build was made
without path normalisation (/pathmap), without deterministic source-path stripping, and without a
project-name rename — i.e. from a Visual Studio default configuration on a workstation desktop.
3.5.3 Linker section table (GCTL, debug type 13)
The table enumerates the COFF section contributions the executable was assembled from:
.text$di .text$mn .text$mn$00 .text$mn$21 .text$x .text$yd
.idata$2 .idata$3 .idata$4 .idata$5 .idata$6
.00cfg .CRT$XCA .CRT$XCAA .CRT$XCC .CRT$XCL .CRT$XCU .CRT$XCZ
.CRT$XIA .CRT$XIAA .CRT$XIAC .CRT$XIC .CRT$XIZ
.CRT$XPA .CRT$XPX .CRT$XPXA .CRT$XPZ .CRT$XTA .CRT$XTZ
.rdata .rdata$00 .rdata$r .rdata$voltmd .rdata$zzzdbg
.rtc$IAA .rtc$IZZ .rtc$TAA .rtc$TZZ
.xdata .xdata$x .bss .fptable .rsrc$01 .rsrc$02
| Fragment | Inference |
|---|---|
.CRT$XCAA…$XTZ, .CRT$XPA…$XPZ |
complete UCRT initialiser chains ⇒ statically linked CRT (/MT) |
.rtc$IAA/.IZZ/.TAA/.TZZ, .rdata$r |
RTTI runtime-check data and type descriptors ⇒ /GR enabled |
.rdata$voltmd |
volatile-metadata table — emitted only by VS 2019 16.x and later linkers |
.text$mn, .text$mn$00, .text$mn$21 |
COMDAT//Gy bucket placement under /GL |
.text$di, .text$yd, .bss |
dynamic initialisers, atexit destructors, zero-init globals ⇒ C++ with non-trivial globals |
.fptable |
x64 function-pointer table (see §3.2) |
.00cfg |
__guard_check_icall_fptr boilerplate |
3.5.4 Rich header
Present at file offset 0x3C (DanS), terminator Rich at 0xF8, XOR key 0x9176119f. The three
decoded padding dwords (0x0EBA1F0E, 0x0CD09B400, 0x04C01B821) are the standard MSVC /GS and
error-report helper markers; the associated __security_cookie (0x1400b3180) is referenced in the
prologue of every non-trivial function, confirming /GS was enabled project-wide. The header is
intact and internally consistent — no post-link editing.
3.5.5 Toolchain determination
| Evidence | Conclusion |
|---|---|
No VCRUNTIME140/MSVCP140/api-ms-win-crt-* in the import table, full api-ms-win-crt-* string set present |
statically linked UCRT (/MT) |
.CRT$X* chains, .bisect-free layout, MSVC mangling throughout |
Microsoft Visual C++ |
.rdata$voltmd, .fptable, blank-name sections tolerated |
linker VS 2019 16.x or VS 2022 |
nlohmann banner …3.11.2 (released 2022‑08) |
source tree not older than 2022 Q3 |
std::filesystem error strings ("state not recoverable", "owner dead", "cross device link") |
STL VS 2015 U3 or later, practically C++17 |
std::wstring_convert<codecvt_utf8_utf16<wchar_t,1114111,0>> RTTI (deprecated in C++17, removed in C++26) |
C++17 dialect, adherence to the pre-u8 era |
DllCharacteristics 0x8160 — no GUARD_CF bit |
/guard:cf not used |
| Prologue cookie loads | /GS on |
GCTL present |
/DEBUG on (so a PDB exists upstream) |
Determination: MSVC, x64, Release, /O2 /GL /LTCG, /MT, C++17, RTTI on, /GS on,
Control Flow Guard off. Consistent with a default Release|x64 configuration of Visual Studio 2019
or 2022, in which the developer changed nothing except the source.
3.6 What the provenance record discloses
The CodeView record is the highest-value artefact in the Subject, because unlike code it cannot be written to lie without deliberate effort.
| Disclosed | Value | Analytic use |
|---|---|---|
| Windows profile | C:\Users\Samim |
developer account name; corroborates the signature subject |
| Project name | Installer |
the product is called "Installer"; also the window class, window title and .text section name |
| Configuration | x64\Release |
default VS wizard output; no custom output directory |
| Build locality | …\Desktop\… |
built from the desktop, not from a repository working copy, CI agent, or mapped drive |
| Symbol name | Installer.pdb |
project file Installer.vcxproj (or equivalent) |
The absence of any repository-derived path (\src\, \git\, \build\, a solution folder) and the
presence of OneDrive/Desktop in the sibling products (§8) together indicate a single-developer,
non-CI, desktop-based build process across the whole product line.
3.7 Authenticode
3.7.1 Structure
WIN_CERTIFICATE at file offset 0xBB400, dwLength = 0x1F88 (8 072), wRevision = 0x0200,
wCertificateType = 0x0002. Body: PKCS#7 SignedData, version 1, digest algorithm SHA‑256,
content type 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.2.1.4 (SPC_INDIRECT_DATA_OBJID, i.e. an Authenticode indirect-data
descriptor), signature algorithm 1.2.840.10045.2.1 (ECDSA).
3.7.2 Path
[0] SSL.com Root Certification Authority ECC self-signed root
└─ SSL.com Code Signing Intermediate CA ECC R2 CA=true, 2019-03-07 → 2034-03-03
└─ AN Soft leaf, 2026-06-11 → 2027-06-11
[1] DigiCert Trusted Root G4 (timestamping chain, separate)
└─ DigiCert Trusted G4 TimeStamping RSA4096 SHA256 2025 CA1 CA=true
└─ DigiCert SHA256 RSA4096 Timestamp Responder 2026 1 leaf, TSA
3.7.3 Leaf certificate
Subject CN=AN Soft
O=AN Soft
L=Bergen op Zoom
ST=North Brabant
C=NL
Issuer CN=SSL.com Code Signing Intermediate CA ECC R2
O=SSL Corp, L=Houston, ST=Texas, C=US
Serial 158467513303841965040394699300328354453
NotBefore 2026-06-11 15:40:51 UTC
NotAfter 2027-06-11 15:40:51 UTC
Key usage digitalSignature
Extended KU code_signing (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.3)
Public key ECC
Signature sha256-ecdsa
Characteristics of note:
- OV, not EV. The subject is organisation-validated (the legal name is checked) but there is no
jurisdictionOfIncorporation*attribute set, no EV policy OID, and the validity is exactly one year. EV certificates are normally issued for two to three years and carry jurisdictional attributes. A one-year OV is the cheapest identity a company can present to SmartScreen. - ECC leaf. Modern, small, fast to verify, and — operationally — not the RSA key generation that featured in the 2022–2023 public-CA key-strength deprecations.
- No
serialNumber/organizationIdentifierattribute in the subject. For a Dutch eenmanszaak or vof this is normal (no statutory registration number is required in the DN), but it means the certificate does not itself disclose the KvK number that the vendor publishes on its website (§8.1). The certificate and the company register must be joined by the analyst, not by the validator.
3.7.4 Counter-signature
An RFC‑3161 signature_time_stamp_token is present as an unsigned attribute over the SHA‑256 digest
of the signature value:
TSA leaf CN=DigiCert SHA256 RSA4096 Timestamp Responder 2026 1
O=DigiCert, Inc., C=US
serial 11048481613454637687985428644217624629
valid 2026-08-05 → 2037-11-04
TSA issuer CN=DigiCert Trusted G4 TimeStamping RSA4096 SHA256 2025 CA1
serial 18316726489210163671024321415498844550
Root DigiCert Trusted Root G4 (issuer: DigiCert Assured ID Root CA, 2031)
The counter-signature is what makes the Subject verifiable after 2027‑06‑11, when the leaf expires. Windows will continue to report "digitally signed by AN Soft, timestamped" indefinitely, even if the certificate has been revoked for future signing and even if the vendor has ceased trading.
3.8 Component composition
The Subject is 96.2 % library and 3.8 % application code by volume.
| Layer | Approx. share | Identification |
|---|---|---|
| UCRT + C++ runtime + EH + locale/iostream | ~68 % | MSVC static CRT; three ASCII literal pools and three UTF‑16 pools of locale data |
std::filesystem / std::error_code implementation |
~9 % | full system-error string table ("cross device link", "owner dead", …) |
| PE / debug / RTTI machinery | ~5 % | .pdata + .xdata, type descriptors, COMDAT tables |
| GDI+ / WinINet import thunks | ~4 % | 12 + 10 functions, plus their initialisation |
| Application code | ~3.8 % | 28 KB across ~35 functions in 0x140003000–0x140035000 |
Decompilation recovered 1 654 functions; approximately 35 belong to the application. All application-authored human-readable text in the file amounts to under 5 KB (§Appendix B).
3.9 Library fingerprint
| Component | Evidence | Role |
|---|---|---|
| nlohmann/json 3.11.2 | banner 961c151d2e87f2686a955a9be24d316f1362bf21 3.11.2; [json.exception.; , column ; at line; type must be string, but is |
primary feed parser (JSON) |
| rapidxml | .?AVparse_error@rapidxml@@; expected <; expected element name; expected >; expected attribute name; expected =; expected ' or "; expected ;; invalid numeric character entity; unexpected end of data; bad conversion |
alternative feed parser (XML), same schema |
| WinReg (Dicanio header library) | .?AVRegException@winreg@@; ADVAPI32 imports are exactly RegCreateKeyExW, RegSetValueExW, RegGetValueW, RegCloseKey |
registry RAII wrapper |
| GDI+ | GdiplusStartup, GdipLoadImageFromStream, GdipCreateFromHDC, GdipDrawImageRectI, GdipCloneImage, .?AVImage@Gdiplus@@ |
streamed image rendering |
| WinINet | 10 imports incl. InternetCrackUrlA, HttpOpenRequestA, HttpSendRequestA |
all HTTP |
| urlmon | URLDownloadToFileW, URLOpenBlockingStreamA, .?AVDownloadCallback@@, .?AUIBindStatusCallback@@ |
file download + progress |
| comctl32 v6 | InitCommonControlsEx, msctls_progress32, SysLink |
progress bar, hyperlinks |
| Shell32 | ShellExecuteW, ShellExecuteExW, SHGetKnownFolderPath |
open file / open folder |
The presence of two complete feed parsers, one JSON and one XML, with the same field vocabulary
indicates the backend can serve either representation; , in the literal pool
(0xA05B0) is the XML entity the server uses to carry a literal comma inside an attribute or text
node, i.e. XML is a first-class serialisation and not a vestigial include.
3.10 Capability surface (imports)
Ten DLLs, 187 functions. ADVAPI32.dll contributes four — all registry. The complete import table
is reproduced in Appendix A. The distribution of functions across libraries is itself informative:
| DLL | fns | Reading |
|---|---|---|
KERNEL32 |
103 | of which ~80 are UCRT support (Fls*, RtlVirtualUnwind, GetStringTypeW, heap, locale, console, file-buffer); ~23 are application-visible (CreateProcessW, CreateThread, GetTempPathW, GetTempFileNameW, CreateDirectoryW, DeleteFileW, GetFileAttributesW, WaitForSingleObject, GetExitCodeProcess, Sleep, …) |
USER32 |
36 | one window class, custom-drawn controls, TrackMouseEvent, SetWindowLongPtrW |
GDI32 |
13 | GDI painting only (fonts, pens, brushes, RoundRect); no bitmaps, no DIBs |
ADVAPI32 |
4 | registry only |
SHELL32 |
3 | ShellExecuteW, ShellExecuteExW, SHGetKnownFolderPath |
ole32 |
1 | CoTaskMemFree (release of SHGetKnownFolderPath memory) |
urlmon |
2 | URLDownloadToFileW, URLOpenBlockingStreamA |
gdiplus |
12 | image decode/scale/draw |
WININET |
10 | HTTP |
COMCTL32 |
3 | InitCommonControlsEx + 2 ordinals |
Capabilities the Subject does not link, and therefore cannot perform without run-time symbol
resolution (none of which is present — no LoadLibrary/GetProcAddress pair is imported by the
application layer, only by the UCRT's own machinery):
Sockets / TCP / UDP / DNS .............. ws2_32 NOT IMPORTED -> no network path except WinINet/urlmon
Credential-store cryptography .......... no CryptUnprotectData -> crypt32 NOT IMPORTED
System crypto primitives ............... bcrypt NOT IMPORTED -> no hashing in-process
Named pipes / RPC ...................... kernel32 CreateNamedPipeW not imported
Services ............................... advapi32 CreateServiceW not imported
WMI .................................... no COM class instantiation (ole32 = CoTaskMemFree only)
Token / privilege / SID inspection ..... advapi32 OpenProcessToken/GetTokenInformation NOT imported
Process / module enumeration .......... kernel32 CreateToolhelp32Snapshot NOT imported
Thread suspend / injection ............. kernel32 SuspendThread, OpenThread NOT imported
Registry enumeration (Run keys, etc.) .. advapi32 RegEnumKeyEx/RegEnumValueW NOT imported
Shell / startup-folder writes ........... none
The registry wrapper's fixed four-function import set is decisive: because WinReg is the only
registry interface the program has, and WinReg's API surface is Create/SetValue/GetValue/Close
on keys named by the caller, the Subject is structurally incapable of enumerating the registry
or of discovering an autorun entry it was not told about. It reads a fixed, short list of keys, by name, as
part of the targeting model of §4.4 — and writes exactly two.
4. Architecture and control flow
4.1 Application layer
Of 1 654 recovered functions, ~35 implement the program. The remainder are UCRT, the C++ standard
library, locale facets, the exception/unwind machinery, GDI+ and WinINet thunks, and the
std::filesystem/std::error_code implementation.
| RVA | Size | Recovered role |
|---|---|---|
0x14000C990 |
971 | wWinMain |
0x14000D2E0 |
— | WndProc (owner-drawn non-client, hit-testing, hover state, paint) |
0x140003E00 |
678 | Bootstrap — descriptor fetch, fallback, config application, wizard construction |
0x14000A700 |
8 069 | ApplyConfig(json) — parse, targeting evaluation, page vector construction |
0x140004880 |
6 928 | ResolveProduct — GetModuleFileNameW, stem/token handling, identifier extraction |
0x140008180 |
1 038 | HttpPost(url, body) — WinINet request/response |
0x140007D70 |
1 036 | HttpGet(url) — InternetOpenUrlA variant, 2 000-byte reads |
0x14002EAC0 |
468 | HttpGet2(url) — second GET path (geo, images) |
0x14002E3B0 |
731 | TapAction(key) — funnel beacon builder |
0x140021910 |
368 | BuildGetDownloadInfo() |
0x1400040B0 |
873 | OpenOfferLink() — compose deep link, ShellExecuteW, return for storage |
0x140007040 |
243 | URLDownloadToFileW wrapper |
0x14000CD70 |
430 | LoadImageFromUrl() — URLOpenBlockingStreamA → GdipLoadImageFromStream |
0x140008C00 |
1 301 | RunSilent_ADR() — brand-specific download/execute |
0x140009120 |
1 301 | RunSilent_GLY() — byte-identical twin |
0x1400304E0 |
814 | EnsureDirectory() |
0x140030810 |
527 | ConsentAccept() |
0x140030A20 |
1 396 | OfferPageNext() — accept/decline, receipt, survey branch |
0x140031440 |
1 026 | MainWndProc |
0x140030FB0 |
1 160 | BuildWizardPage() |
0x14000FE30 |
1 092 | page teardown loop |
0x14000E1E0 |
771 | BuildEulaPage() |
0x14000E4F0 |
886 | BuildTextPage() |
0x14000E870 |
1 001 | BuildPrivacyPage() |
0x1400039D0 |
567 | RegGetString() (winreg wrapper) |
0x14000A470 |
646 | SpawnProc() — CreateThread + ShellExecuteW |
0x140006C50 |
1 002 | OpenFolder() — ShellExecuteExW, explorer /select, |
0x14000EC70 |
— | to_wstring(DWORD) — error formatting for the single failure dialog |
Two functions — RunSilent_ADR and RunSilent_GLY — are 1 301 bytes each and differ only in the
three-character temp prefix and the registry brand string. They are the same source function
instantiated twice because those strings are compile-time literals rather than parameters. This is
the first evidence of the dual-brand structure developed in §4.8.
4.2 Entry sequence
wWinMain(hInst, hPrev, cmdline, show)
{
WNDCLASSEXW wc = {};
wc.cbSize = 0x50;
wc.style = CS_HREDRAW | CS_VREDRAW; /* 3 */
wc.lpfnWndProc = WndProc;
wc.hInstance = hInst;
wc.hCursor = LoadCursorW(NULL, IDC_ARROW); /* 0x7F00 */
wc.hbrBackground = (HBRUSH)(COLOR_WINDOW + 1); /* 6 */
wc.lpszClassName = L"Installer"; /* 0xA09C0 */
if (!RegisterClassExW(&wc)) {
std::wstring msg = L"Window Class Registration Failed! Error code: ";
msg += std::to_wstring(GetLastError());
MessageBoxW(NULL, msg.c_str(), L"Error", MB_ICONERROR);
return 0;
}
ApplyConfig(&g_defaultConfig); /* (1) static defaults */
if (!g_gdiplusInit) { /* (2) lazy GDI+ */
GdiplusStartupInput in(1, NULL, FALSE);
GdiplusStartup(&g_gdiToken, &in, NULL);
g_gdiplusInit = true;
}
Bootstrap(); /* (3) NETWORK */
int cx = GetSystemMetrics(0), cy = GetSystemMetrics(1);
g_fontTitle = CreateFontW(24,0,0,0,600,0,0,0,DEFAULT_CHARSET,0,0,0,0x20,L"Calibri");
g_fontH1 = CreateFontW(18,0,0,0,600,0,0,0,DEFAULT_CHARSET,0,0,0,0x20,L"Segoe UI");
g_fontBody = CreateFontW(16,0,0,0,400,0,0,0,DEFAULT_CHARSET,0,0,0,0x20,L"Segoe UI");
g_fontSmall = CreateFontW(12,0,0,0,400,0,0,0,DEFAULT_CHARSET,0,0,0,0x20,L"Segoe UI");
g_hWnd = CreateWindowExW(0, L"Installer", L"Installer",
WS_POPUP | WS_VISIBLE, /* 0x90000000 */
(cx - 692) / 2, (cy - 492) / 2,
692, 492, NULL, NULL, hInst, NULL);
MSG msg;
while (GetMessageW(&msg, NULL, 0, 0)) {
TranslateMessage(&msg);
DispatchMessageW(&msg);
}
return 0;
}
Observations:
- Defaults are applied before anything is known.
ApplyConfigis called with a statically initialisednlohmann::jsonat0x1400B6E00, and then again fromBootstrap()with the server payload. The two calls take the same code path with the same type, so the "hard-coded fallback" is a genuine configuration document, not a scattering of defensiveifs. It is reachable for offline inspection (see OQ‑4). - GDI+ is initialised before the network call because the interface must be able to render the first page regardless of connectivity. The network call is blocking and on the UI thread (3).
Bootstrap()is synchronous on the UI thread and runs to completion before the window is created. Consequence: no window exists while DNS, TCP, TLS and the descriptor exchange are outstanding. On a slow or blackholed path the process presents as a running process with no window — indistinguishable from a hang, and a common source of "nothing happened" reports. There is no timeout constant in the literal pool, so the effective timeout is the WinINet default (30 s connect / 30 s send / 30 s receive per request, doubled by retries in some paths).- Typography is fixed:
Calibri24 semibold,Segoe UI18 semibold,Segoe UI16 regular,Segoe UI12 regular.FW_SEMIBOLD= 600. There is no font fallback, no scaling by DPI and no user preference; on a system without Segoe UI (allowed, but unusual) text renders in the generic face at these pixel sizes. GetMessageWreturn value is not validated for the-1error case, andwParam/lParamare discarded inTranslateMessage. Neither is consequential.WS_POPUP | WS_VISIBLE⇒ no caption, no border, no system menu, no minimise/maximise box, noWM_SIZEhandling. The user cannot move the window, cannot resize it, cannot close it with the title-barX(there is none) and — becausehIconisNULL— it has no taskbar icon distinct from the default. Termination is via the custom close control,Alt+F4(which arrives asWM_CLOSE), orTask Manager.
4.3 Interface model
The window is a 692 × 492 owner-drawn card, centred on the primary monitor:
| Aspect | Implementation | Evidence |
|---|---|---|
| Frame | borderless WS_POPUP, COLOR_WINDOW+1 brush |
§4.2, class registration |
| Child controls | created per page and destroyed on page change | GetWindow(GW_CHILD) / GW_HWNDNEXT loop in OfferPageNext |
| Button rendering | RoundRect + CreatePen + CreateSolidBrush + SetBkMode(TRANSPARENT) + DrawTextW |
GDI32 import set (13 functions, no bitmap API) |
| Hover state | TrackMouseEvent + InvalidateRect |
0x14000D220 |
| Text | DrawTextW with SetTextColor/SetBkColor |
USER32/GDI32 imports |
| Progress | msctls_progress32 (PBM_SETPOS/PBM_SETRANGE via SendMessageW) |
comctl32 import + class literal |
| Hyperlinks | SysLink class via InitCommonControlsEx(ICC_LINK_CLASS) |
SysLink literal + control creation |
| Inputs | STATIC, BUTTON, EDIT, COMBOBOX |
control class literals |
| Survey host | private SurveyWinClass / SurveyHost |
class registration literals |
The interface is fully owner-drawn: there are no dialog templates (§3.3), no stock controls on the
shell, and no visual identity. Text is set through SetWindowTextW from wide strings that originate
in the feed (§6). The practical consequence is that the Subject's appearance is a function of the
server response, not of the binary: titles, body copy, legal links, offer names and even the
number and order of pages are data.
The 692 × 492 fixed metric with no AdjustWindowRect and no DPI rescaling (despite the True/PM
manifest declaration, §3.4) means the interface is not resolution- or scaling-independent: at
200 % scaling it occupies a quarter-screen card with 16-pixel body text; at 1280 × 720 it is nearly
full-height.
4.4 Configuration model and targeting engine
ApplyConfig evaluates, for each element of the feed's offers array, three predicates. Offers
surviving all three become pages of the wizard.
void ApplyConfig(const json& j)
{
g_channel = get_string(j, "channel");
g_user_id = get_string(j, "userID");
for (const json& o : j["offers"]) {
/* P1 - geography */
if (o.contains("targetGeos")) {
bool ok = false;
for (auto& g : o["targetGeos"])
if (iequals(g.get<std::string>(), g_country)) ok = true;
if (!ok) continue;
}
/* P2 - registry presence */
if (o.contains("registryChecks")) {
bool present = true;
for (auto& c : o["registryChecks"]) {
if (!RegKeyValueExists(c["root"], c["path"], c["value"]))
present = false;
}
if (present) continue;
}
/* P3 - filesystem presence */
if (o.contains("fileChecks")) {
bool present = true;
for (auto& f : o["fileChecks"]) {
std::wstring p = ExpandEnvironmentStrings(widen(f.get<std::string>()));
if (GetFileAttributesW(p.c_str()) == INVALID_FILE_ATTRIBUTES)
present = false;
}
if (present) continue;
}
g_pages.push_back(Page::FromJson(o));
}
}
Semantics recovered from the call sites and the served data:
targetGeosis an allow-list of ISO‑3166‑1 alpha‑2 codes. Its negation form is a single leading!(["!DE"]= "everywhere except Germany"), which is the form used by two of the five served offers (§7.5). An empty array ([]) is treated as "no restriction". Only one country is compared, so the model is single-geo, not "geo-set intersection": a user behind a VPN is offered the bundle for the VPN's exit country.registryChecksis a suppression list: if every{root,path,value}triple exists, the offer is hidden. It is used exclusively to avoid re-offering software the user already has.fileChecksperforms the same role in the filesystem, with%ProgramFiles%expansion and, in the served data, a bare path with no executable name — the check is for the directory.- All three predicates are monotone towards hiding: nothing in the engine promotes an offer. A feed that returns fewer offers than expected can therefore be caused by any of the three, and the client has no telemetry path that reports which.
iequals (a case-insensitive wide-string compare) is the comparison used for country codes; the
implication is that the server's targetGeos values are matched without canonicalisation, so de,
DE and De are all valid and all match.
4.5 Elevation model
The manifest (§3.4) requests requireAdministrator unconditionally. The offers do not require it —
and this is demonstrable from the server's own arguments, not from inference:
| Offer | Installer arguments | Scope implied |
|---|---|---|
| OperaGX | --silent --allusers=0 |
explicitly per-user |
| AIChat | /S |
NSIS silent default; per-user unless /ALLUSERS is passed (it is not) |
| Glory | --silent --launch |
no scope switch |
| AdReject | --silent --channel IU |
no scope switch |
| Premier Opinion | -c:1538 -t:InstallUnion |
no scope switch |
--allusers=0 is the strongest single datum: the only offer whose installer documents an install
scope is configured not to use the machine scope. A per-user installation succeeds without
elevation. Therefore:
Finding F‑20 — Elevation is acquired speculatively. The Subject takes Administrator before it has contacted the network, before it knows which offers apply, and before any of those offers has expressed a need for it. Four of the five offers can be delivered per-user. The token's purpose is not to satisfy a known requirement; it is to remove the requirement from the design space of any future offer the server may return — including offers that did not exist when this build was signed. The user's sole consent gate (the UAC dialog) is presented before the offer is named, and is never re-presented as the offer set changes. Severity: Moderate‑High. Confidence: High (manifest, five argument vectors, and the absence of any
IsUserAnAdmin-style runtime check).
This has an architectural corollary which is developed in §10: the highest-privilege decision in the
process is made with the least information. Everything after WinMain is data-driven, and all of
it inherits the token that was granted to a window class registration.
4.6 Download and execution engine
RunSilent_ADR / RunSilent_GLY are the only functions that write an executable to disk and start it.
void RunSilent_<BRAND>(const std::wstring& url, const std::wstring& extra_args)
{
wchar_t tempDir[MAX_PATH], tmpName[MAX_PATH];
/* 1. acquire a UNIQUE NAME, not a temporary file */
GetTempPathW(MAX_PATH, tempDir); /* %TEMP%\ */
GetTempFileNameW(tempDir, L"ADR", 0, tmpName); /* %TEMP%\ADRx123.tmp */
DeleteFileW(tmpName); /* delete the .tmp */
std::wstring exe = std::wstring(tmpName) + L".exe"; /* ADRx123.tmp.exe */
/* 2. fetch */
DeleteFileW(exe.c_str());
HRESULT hr = URLDownloadToFileW(NULL, url.c_str(), exe.c_str(), 0, NULL);
if (FAILED(hr)) { DeleteFileW(exe.c_str()); return; } /* silent, no retry */
/* 3. compose */
std::wstring cmd = L"\"" + exe + L"\" --silent";
if (!extra_args.empty()) cmd += L" " + extra_args; /* unquoted */
/* 4. record consent BEFORE the child runs */
HKEY hk; DWORD one = 1;
RegCreateKeyExW(HKEY_CURRENT_USER, L"SOFTWARE\\<Brand>", 0, NULL, 0,
KEY_WRITE /*0x20006*/, NULL, &hk, NULL);
RegSetValueExW(hk, L"Consent", 0, REG_DWORD, &one, 4);
RegCloseKey(hk);
/* 5. run synchronously, windowless */
STARTUPINFOW si = {0}; si.cb = sizeof(si);
PROCESS_INFORMATION pi = {0};
if (CreateProcessW(exe.c_str(), cmd.data(), NULL, NULL, FALSE,
CREATE_NO_WINDOW /*0x08000000*/, NULL,
tempDir /* cwd */, &si, &pi)) {
WaitForSingleObject(pi.hProcess, INFINITE);
GetExitCodeProcess(pi.hProcess, &code);
CloseHandle(pi.hThread); CloseHandle(pi.hProcess);
}
}
Properties of this routine that are relevant to assessment:
- The
.tmpfile is created and immediately deleted.GetTempFileNameWis used as a uniqueness oracle, not as a file creator. The resulting path contains.tmpin its middle and.exeat its end, so the extension is.exe(loadable/executable) while naive pruning rules that match*.tmpare not triggered by the name the user sees. Registry-free, path-obfuscated staging. - No content verification.
URLDownloadToFileWreports transport success. There is no length check against a declared value, no hash, noWinVerifyTrust, noMapAndLoad+signature, no PE header test, no version check. A transport-200 response of 0 bytes, of an HTML error page, or of a later-dated binary is equally acceptable. If the result is not a valid image,CreateProcessWfails and the failure is discarded. - No quoting of the appended arguments. The path is quoted (
"…exe");--silentand anyparamsfrom the feed are concatenated unquoted.CreateProcessWreparses the whole string with the familiarCommandLineToArgvWrules, so spaces insideparamsbecome token boundaries, and a"insideparamsopens a quoted section. This is an intentional interface — the server writes a command line, the client assembles it — but the interface is string-level, with no escaping or structured encoding (§10.4). Consentis written before the child is launched, and on the download-success path only. A user who downloads the offer and then kills it at the first dialog, or whose antivirus quarantines the child before its first instruction, is recorded as having consented. The value is a click receipt, not an install confirmation.CREATE_NO_WINDOW, notDETACHED_PROCESS. The child has a console; it is hidden. Children of the child inherit the hidden console unless they allocate their own, which means console-oriented installers run without the customary flash but also without the customary indication that anything is happening.WaitForSingleObject(INFINITE)and the exit code read mean the parent can distinguish0/3010-style success and reboot-required codes, and does so (the code is stored to a global used by the Finish page). The operation is synchronous by design.
The child's lifetime is bounded by the parent's; closing the Subject's window with the close control while a child is running terminates the owner-drawn close path but not the process tree, so the child continues. This is observable as "an installer window closed but something kept installing".
4.7 Telemetry model
Two independent collectors.
(a) Ad-network collector — post.securestudies.com/TapAction.aspx (TAP), over plain HTTP:
http://post.securestudies.com/TapAction.aspx?
[&uid=<16-hex installation id>]
campaign_id=1538
&tpi=InstallUnion
&action_id=<N>
[&id=<offer id>] (action_id=8 only)
[&consent_version=<v>] (action_id=1 only)
action_id |
Emitted at | Recovered meaning |
|---|---|---|
0 |
first page construction | launch |
1 |
legal/privacy page shown | consent presentation (+ version) |
2 |
page transition | page view |
3 |
catalogue page rendered | offers shown |
4 |
offer page rendered | offer impression |
8 |
Accept on the optional offer | conversion (+ offer id) |
9 |
Decline, or single-page path | opt-out |
17 |
finish page | completion |
Zero-width GIF responses are discarded (HttpGet does not inspect content type); the beacon is
fire-and-forget and the interface does not depend on it succeeding. Killing securestudies.com
changes nothing observable except the vendor's statistics.
(b) Vendor collector — dlsft.com/callback.php and the dpdv3 pixel (§5.1). Served over HTTPS,
so it survives DNS filtering that kills (a). callback.php carries act=started|completed and the
channel/id pair from the product descriptor; dpdv3 carries campaignid=1538 and a co= value
which the code supplies as <Blocked> when the corresponding datum is unavailable — the string
<Blocked> therefore appears in the vendor's own access logs as a literal parameter value, which
makes the two codes distinguishable in the log without any other instrumentation.
The dual-collector design is standard for the class and is not evidence of concealment: the ad network is paid per event and requires its own pixel; the network operator is paid per download and requires its own. An analyst who blocks one and not the other sees a "partially silent" client, which is worth knowing before drawing conclusions from absence of traffic.
4.8 State, persistence and the dual-brand structure
Persistent state touched by the application layer:
| Store | Name | Type | Written when | Read when |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| HKCU | SOFTWARE\AdReject\Consent |
REG_DWORD = 1 | offer 2 accepted, before child launch | nothing (vendor-side check) |
| HKCU | SOFTWARE\Glory\Consent |
REG_DWORD = 1 | offer 3 accepted, before child launch | nothing (vendor-side check) |
| HKCU | SOFTWARE\InstallUnion\1538\BundleOfferActionUid |
REG_SZ | offer page completed (≥ 2 pages) | next launch, to suppress |
%TEMP% |
ADR<hex4>.exe, GLY<hex4>.exe |
PE | download | execute, then delete |
%LOCALAPPDATA% |
adreject\file.txt, glory\file.txt |
data | settings/state write | read |
There is no autostart: no Run/RunOnce, no startup-folder shortcut, no scheduled task, no
service. The registry footprint is write-once-per-install, and deleting it does not break the
application (the values are suppression flags; their absence merely means the offer may be presented
again).
The two brand strings are the only indication in the binary that this codebase serves more than one product. They are not user-visible; they are the same product published under two names, with disjoint consent keys so that accepting one does not suppress the other:
brand A AdReject %TEMP% prefix "ADR" HKCU\SOFTWARE\AdReject %ProgramFiles%\AdReject
brand B Glory %TEMP% prefix "GLY" HKCU\SOFTWARE\Glory %ProgramFiles%\Glory
shared InstallUnion\1538 BundleOfferActionUid
This is confirmed independently in §8: both AdReject and Glory are published, signed, versioned and priced by the same organisation, which is also the organisation that built the Subject.
4.9 Failure modes
| Condition | Observed/derived behaviour |
|---|---|
| No network, DNS blackholed | Bootstrap blocks to WinINet timeout; falls back to DEFAULT_CONFIG; wizard renders with default page set; no offer payloads resolvable |
HTTP 404/500 on service.php |
HttpPost returns body; parse fails; fallback config |
| Malformed JSON | nlohmann throws parse_error; fallback path; no dialog |
offers missing or null |
wizard has zero offer pages; decline event action_id=9 fires |
payload URL unreachable |
URLDownloadToFileW fails; temp file deleted; no user-visible error |
| child exits non-zero | exit code recorded; Finish page displays regardless |
| user clicks close during child run | window destroyed; child continues (process-tree ordering, §4.6) |
GetTempFileNameW fails (MAX_PATH/permission) |
goto cleanup; no dialog, silent return |
The Subject's error strategy is uniform: fail silently, render something, never block the funnel.
The single exception is the RegisterClassExW failure dialog (§4.2), which is the only error path a
user can see. Errors are otherwise converted into short-lived wide strings in a helper (0x14000FA20
prefix-joins "<message> failed: ", 0x1400128B0 appends the numeric GetLastError) and dropped.
5. Network infrastructure
5.1 Endpoint inventory
The Subject contains five absolute URLs (rendered in Appendix B with RVAs). Combined with the URLs in the payloads it retrieves and in the assets it references, the observed infrastructure is:
| # | URL / host | Method | Purpose | Transport | Resolver |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | https://www.dlsft.com/geo/ |
GET | bootstrap: issue installation identifier + resolve country | TLS 1.2+ | Cloudflare |
| 2 | https://dlsft.com/service.php?request=offers |
POST | offer bundle for the installation | TLS | Cloudflare |
| 3 | https://www.dlsft.com/service.php |
GET/POST | alternate base used by the deep-link composer | TLS | Cloudflare |
| 4 | https://dlsft.com/service.php?request=getDownloadInfo&name=<name> |
POST | product descriptor | TLS | Cloudflare |
| 5 | https://dlsft.com/callback.php |
GET | vendor-side event receipt (`act=started | completed`) | TLS |
| 6 | https://dlsft.com/PO.jpg |
GET | promotional creative | TLS | Cloudflare |
| 7 | https://filedm.com/privacy.php |
GET | Privacy Policy (hyperlinked in interface) | TLS | Cloudflare |
| 8 | https://filedm.com/terms.php |
GET | Terms of Service / EULA (hyperlinked) | TLS | Cloudflare |
| 9 | http://post.securestudies.com/TapAction.aspx |
GET | funnel telemetry | cleartext HTTP | Cloudflare |
| 10 | https://dpd.securestudies.com/dpdv3.aspx |
GET | post-download pixel | TLS | Cloudflare |
| 11 | http://directfiledl.com/getfile |
GET | product archive | cleartext HTTP, no 443 listener | Hetzner |
5.2 Request construction
The application speaks WinINet directly; there is no HTTP library, no cookie jar, no connection pooling, no proxy configuration and no user-agent rotation.
/* outbound */
InternetOpenA("Mozilla/5.0", INTERNET_OPEN_TYPE_DIRECT /* 1 */, NULL, NULL, 0);
/* offers + getDownloadInfo are POSTs with a form body */
InternetCrackUrlA(url, 0, 0, &components); /* ICU flags 0x68 */
InternetConnectA(session, components.lpszHostName,
(scheme == 4) ? 443 : 80, /* HTTPS -> 443 */
NULL, NULL, INTERNET_SERVICE_HTTP /* 3 */, 0, 0);
HttpOpenRequestA(conn, L"POST", path, NULL, NULL, NULL,
secure ? 0xA4C00000 : 0xA4400000); /* SECURE|RELOAD|… */
HttpSendRequestA(req, headers, header_len, body, body_len);
headers = "Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded"
for (;;) { InternetReadFile(req, buf, 0x800 /* 2048 */, &n); if (!n) break; append(buf, n); }
Points of analytic substance:
INTERNET_OPEN_TYPE_DIRECT(1) — notPRECONFIG(0). The Subject therefore ignores system and per-user proxy configuration, WinHTTP autoproxy, PAC files and WinINet LAN settings. An environment that has enforced egress filtering by requiring a proxy will see this client either fail or attempt an unauthorised direct path. For the analyst it is a useful discriminator: a proxy-based capture that shows no connection is not proof of no connection.- No cookie persistence.
HttpOpenRequestAis called with a NULL state array and withoutINTERNET_FLAG_NO_COOKIES, so WinINet may create an in-memory/session cookie jar for the process, but nothing is written to%TEMP%and nothing survives exit. Identity is carried in URLs, not cookies. Mozilla/5.0as both User-Agent and session name. The UA has no platform token, noAppleWebKit, no(KHTML, like Gecko), no version. It is a 10-character constant. Against any real browser population this is a low-entropy, high-precision signature (§11.2).- Response cap.
InternetReadFileinto a 2 048-byte stack buffer, appended to astd::string, with no maximum size. A malicious or broken server could drive an unbounded heap growth; there is no guard. In practice the feed is 8.9 KB. - Error strings are built but never surfaced (
"InternetOpenA failed: ","Failed to parse URL: ","InternetConnectA failed: ","HttpOpenRequestA failed: ","HttpSendRequestA failed: ","Error reading from server: "). They are consumed by a helper that appendsGetLastError()and discards the result. There is no log file, noOutputDebugStringcall site, and no dialog. Debugging the Subject's network behaviour in situ therefore requires a debugger or an API monitor; the application will not tell you what went wrong (§4.9).
5.3 Live interrogation
All ten endpoints were resolved and interrogated on 2026‑11‑16/17 from a United Kingdom egress, with
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0.
| Endpoint | Status | Bytes | Content-Type | Body as served |
|---|---|---|---|---|
GET https://www.dlsft.com/geo/ |
200 | 18 | text/html; charset=UTF-8 |
3482d239f6935cd,GB |
GET https://dlsft.com/ |
200 | 2 | text/html |
US |
GET https://dlsft.com/service.php?request=offers&channel=default |
200 | 0 | text/html |
(empty) |
POST …request=offers |
200 | 8 887 | text/html |
JSON, 5 offers |
POST …request=getDownloadInfo&name=ByteBreaker V1_85892839 |
200 | 232 | text/html |
JSON, 1 product |
GET https://dlsft.com/callback.php |
200 | 0 | text/html |
(empty) |
GET https://dlsft.com/PO.jpg |
200 | 32 755 | image/jpeg |
413 × 30 progressive JPEG |
GET https://filedm.com/privacy.php |
200 | 9 235 | text/html |
rendered policy |
GET https://filedm.com/terms.php |
200 | 7 635 | text/html |
rendered terms |
POST http://directfiledl.com/getfile |
200 | 12 | text/html |
not valid id |
Two operational details are confirmed by the table and matter in practice:
service.phpis POST-only. A GET with the same query string returns200and a zero-length body. Any analyst who reproduces the protocol with GETs will conclude, wrongly, that the service is dead. (§7.4 of the companion notes made precisely this inference and had to be corrected.)directfiledl.comhas no TLS listener.curl https://directfiledl.com/getfilefails atconnect()after ~1.2 s;curl http://…succeeds. The service is not merely configured to serve plain HTTP as a default — HTTPS is unavailable, which means a client that upgrades (HSTS,Upgrade-Insecure-Requests, a.appdomain) cannot fetch the product at all.
/geo/ returns a CSV pair. The first field is a 16-character lowercase hexadecimal installation
identifier; the second is an ISO‑3166‑1 alpha‑2 country code computed by the server from the client's
IP address. The identifier is 64-bit, not a UUID (a v4 UUID would be 32 hex with hyphens), not a hash
of anything client-side (it is stable only for the request in which it is issued; see §5.5), and it is
the only user-scoped token in the entire protocol.
5.4 The "security code" scheme
directfiledl.com/getfile is not a static file path. It validates two parameters, and the second is
computed by the client from the first. Reconstruction of the generator (0x140009CF0, 1 022 B) and
of its caller (0x14000A470, 646 B):
std::wstring SecurityCode()
{
static const wchar_t* SALT = L"SCI_multipart"; /* RVA 0xA08A0, 13 chars */
std::wstring g = g_id; /* JSON "id", wide */
std::wstring x;
for (size_t i = 0; i < g.size(); ++i)
x.push_back((wchar_t)(g[i] ^ SALT[i % 13])); /* repeating-key XOR */
uint32_t table[256];
for (uint32_t n = 0; n < 256; ++n) { /* CRC-32, reflected */
uint32_t c = n; /* poly 0xEDB88320 */
for (int k = 0; k < 8; ++k) c = (c & 1) ? (c >> 1) ^ 0xEDB88320 : c >> 1;
table[n] = c;
}
uint32_t crc = 0xFFFFFFFF;
for (wchar_t ch : x) crc = (crc >> 8) ^ table[(ch ^ crc) & 0xFF]; /* low byte per char */
crc = ~crc;
std::wstringstream ss;
ss << std::hex << std::setfill(L'0') << std::setw(8) << crc;
return ss.str();
}
/* caller */
url = g_payload + L"?id=" + g_id + L"&s=" + SecurityCode();
Worked example, g_id = L"85892839":
id 38 35 38 39 32 38 33 39 "85892839"
salt 53 43 49 5F 6D 75 6C 74 "SCI_mult"
xor 6B 76 71 66 5F 4D 5F 4D "kvqf_M_M"
crc32 6F 75 A7 CD
s 6f75a7cd
url http://directfiledl.com/getfile?id=85892839&s=6f75a7cd
$ curl -sS -D- -o bytebreakerV1.zip \
'http://directfiledl.com/getfile?id=85892839&s=6f75a7cd'
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Length: 16787263
Content-Type: application/octet-stream
X-Powered-By: Express
$ sha256sum bytebreakerV1.zip
aa3fc2c089a8f039b2198d6f64e4e727e1631c7e18fe084429b1b491330ad85f bytebreakerV1.zip
Negative cases:
GET /getfile HTTP/1.1 200 → "not valid id" (12 B)
GET /getfile?id=9999 HTTP/1.1 200 → "not valid id"
GET /getfile?id=abc HTTP/1.1 200 → "not valid id"
GET /getfile?id=85892839 HTTP/1.1 200 → "Security code is not matching: carefully copy and do not change the link." (73 B)
GET /getfile?id=85892839&s=6f75a7cd HTTP/1.1 200 → ZIP, 16,787,263 B, application/octet-stream
5.4.1 Assessment of the scheme
| Property | Value | Consequence |
|---|---|---|
| Key | fixed, compiled into every copy | recoverable by anyone with a copy (this report) |
| Cipher | repeating-key XOR over a 13-byte salt | not a cipher; a mask |
| Tag | CRC‑32 (linear, 32-bit, unkeyed-combinable) | not a MAC; forgery is trivial |
| Input | the public id only |
no per-user, per-build or per-time component |
| Output length | 8 hex characters, zero-padded | 32 bits |
| Effect | prevents other sites embedding getfile?id= |
✓ |
| Effect | prevents URL scanners/unfurlers fetching payloads | ✓ |
| Effect | prevents an analyst reading a packet capture | ✗ |
| Effect | binds a URL to a recipient or a time | ✗ |
| Effect | prevents hotlink enumeration | ✗ (one valid s per id, computable once the law is known) |
The scheme is best characterised as link signing as DRM, not as access control. Its economics are sensible: an unreasoned crawler, a Discord embedder or a Lean/Threads "link unfurl" bot will not compute the code, so 99 % of the accidental traffic that would otherwise consume bandwidth is deflected. Its weakness is that the entire security rests on a constant inside a file the user already has. There is no rate limit, no short-circuit cache, no per-IP binding and no nonce, all of which are cheap to add.
5.4.2 The validator is a shape test, not a record test
?id= was probed with nine values to distinguish "identifier exists" from "identifier is well formed":
id= |
Response |
|---|---|
85892839, 8589283, 85892840 |
Security code error ⇒ passes |
9999, 0, 1, abc, `` (empty) |
not valid id ⇒ fails |
Both 7-digit and 8-digit values pass, and consecutive values around the subject pass, although the
subject is the only identifier in a 701-value window that resolves to a product (§6.2). The check is
therefore a pattern test (\d{7,8}, or a length comparison) executed before the signature check,
and it discloses two properties of the backend that were not intended to be disclosed: the key is a
short integer, and the signature check runs before the database lookup (so ?id=…&s=… for an
existent product costs one row read, and for a non-existent product costs none). Neither is severe;
both are unnecessary leaks.
A second leak is presentational: the failure message is "Security code is not matching: carefully copy and do not change the link." — phrasing addressed to a human who mistyped a share link, not to the client that generated the link. The client can only emit a valid link, so this sentence can never be true for the client. It is either copied from a different product (one with shareable links) or written for the analyst who is, by now, reading the response body. On the evidence of §11.6 the former is likely: the sentence fits a click-to-download file host, not a machine-generated installer.
5.5 Identifier semantics
Three distinct identifiers circulate. They are often conflated; they are not interchangeable.
| Name | Example | Length | Where issued | Lifetime | Nature |
|---|---|---|---|---:|---|---|
| product id | 85892839 | 8 dec | service.php row key | until product deleted | server-side catalogue key; appears in the filename, the descriptor, and the signed download URL |
| installation id | 3482d239f6935cd | 16 hex | GET /geo/ | one bootstrap | server-issued opaque token; 64-bit; used as TAP uid= and echoed as JSON userID |
| channel / userID nonce | fbLzx, ByQX | 5 alnum | each getDownloadInfo response | one response | attribution/session nonce; regenerated per request; not persisted |
The distinction matters for privacy assessment:
- the installation id is not a fingerprint. It is a random-looking value issued by the server, so its entropy comes from the server, not from the host: reinstall Windows and it changes; clear it from memory and it changes. Nothing binds it to hardware, account, locale, time zone or IP, other than the fact that the server can, if it logs the request, correlate the id with the requesting IP and clock. In GDPR terms it is a pseudonymous online identifier, not a device identifier.
- the channel and userID nonces change on every request, so they cannot be used for cross-request
correlation by the client; they can be used for correlation by the server only through its own log
of
(request time, IP, id, nonce). Their presence is therefore evidence that the server does keep such logs — otherwise the token would be pointless. - no other identifier is transmitted. No locale, no time zone, no screen metrics, no OS build, no install path, no user name, no machine name, no volume serial, no MAC, no SID, no tenant, no architecture, no language. The complete list of outbound scalar values is in §9.1.
This is, deliberately or not, a data-minimising design — and the single most defensible thing that can be said about the wrapper's handling of personal data.
5.6 Hosting and topology
| Host | A/AAAA | Reverse / operator | TLS | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|
dlsft.com |
Cloudflare 104.21.x, 172.67.x, 2606:4700:303x:: |
Cloudflare | yes | API host; server: cloudflare, alt-svc: h3 |
www.dlsft.com |
Cloudflare | Cloudflare | yes | bootstrap /geo/ |
filedm.com |
Cloudflare | Cloudflare | yes | brand, legal pages, analytics |
directfiledl.com |
116.202.13.47, 2a01:4f8:c012:42ca::1 |
static.47.13.202.116.clients.your-server.de — Hetzner |
no | single host, plain HTTP, Express |
dlsft.com/callback.php etc. |
Cloudflare | — | yes | — |
securestudies.com |
— | — | no (TAP) / yes (DPD) | third-party measurement |
The asymmetry is the finding:
- the control plane (offers, descriptors, legal, telemetry) is on Cloudflare: TLS, HTTP/2, HTTP/3, anycast, DDoS absorption, origin hiding, and — significantly — the ability to serve HTTPS on names the operator does not have certificates for;
- the data plane (the 16.7 MB archive) is on a single Hetzner cloud instance in Germany, reached by plain HTTP on port 80, with a Hetzner PTR record that names the hosting provider and nothing about the customer, and with no listener on 443.
server: cloudflare, cf-cache-status: DYNAMIC, cf-ray: …-CPH (Copenhagen edge) on the control plane;
server absent (Express's default posture) on the data plane. The two planes are owned by the same
commercial entity (§8) and are operationally separate, which is a reasonable small-operations design and
an unreasonable design if the archive is meant to be trusted, because the only thing that can be
authenticated about a plain-HTTP fetch is the bytes the middle of the path chose to deliver.
5.7 Assets referenced
| Asset | Referenced by | Retrieved | Content |
|---|---|---|---|
dlsft.com/PO.jpg |
BDV DEFAULT_CONFIG |
200, 32,755 B, image/jpeg, ETag "4377e68b…" |
413 × 30 progressive JPEG, Adobe Photoshop CC 2019 (Macintosh), created 2019‑10‑04 08:01:55 −04:00, saved 08:30:04, sRGB IEC61966-2.1, photoshop:ColorMode=3 |
filedm.com/privacy.php |
BDV DEFAULT_CONFIG |
200, 9 235 B | "Privacy Policy", brand Filedm, quick-website.css, @fortawesome/fontawesome-free, .panelWidth{max-width:800px} |
filedm.com/terms.php |
BDV DEFAULT_CONFIG |
200, 7 635 B | "Terms of Service", same template, <!-- Preloader --> |
filedm.com/assets/img/brand/logo.png |
product descriptor | 200 | brand mark used in the wizard header |
www.honeygain.com |
Glory (via SDK) | 200 | — |
raw.githubusercontent.com/ShadowWhisperer/BlockLists/master/Lists/Ads |
AdReject | 200 | managed domain blocklist, plain text |
The PO.jpg metadata is the most analytically productive single asset in the chain (it is 32 KB of
JPEG and one sentence of provenance). Its embedded XMP history reads:
action="created" when="2019-10-04T08:01:55-04:00" softwareAgent="Adobe Photoshop CC 2019 (Macintosh)"
action="converted" parameters="from image/gif to image/jpeg"
action="saved" when="2019-10-04T08:30:04-04:00" softwareAgent="Adobe Photoshop CC 2019 (Macintosh)"
So the creative is a flattened GIF from October 2019, produced on a Macintosh, 34 days in under the
thirteen-minute window of its own creation, and never touched again. It is also 413 × 30 — a
strip, not a hero — i.e. the shape of an in-line banner slot in a ten-year-old offer wall, not of the
600 × 200 hero that a 2026 download manager would use. This single asset dates the interface template
it belongs to earlier than the nlohmann::json version that serialises it, earlier than the Monaco
build that sits beside it, and earlier than every one of the products it is used to sell.
5.8 Assessment
A‑5.1 — The control plane is profiled, the data plane is not. Cloudflare termination on every
machine-readable endpoint, Hetzner static.*.clients.your-server.de on the one endpoint that serves the
large object. This is a cost decision (bandwidth egress is cheapest at a bare host) that has a security
consequence (the large object is the only one without TLS).
A‑5.2 — The s scheme is functional but misnamed. It is presented as a "security code"; it is an
anti-crawl mask with no confidentiality, no integrity in the cryptographic sense and no freshness. Its
one security-relevant property is accidental: because the algorithm lives in the client, it proves that
the client is the Subject's build family — a weak client attestation. An unknown requester that supplies
a valid s has either reversed the same 1 KB of code or copied a link, and the server cannot tell which.
(Confidence: High.)
A‑5.3 — Identifier design is privacy-positive, incidentally. A server-issued 64-bit installation id with no host-derived inputs is the minimum viable attribution token. Whether this reflects intent or merely the absence of a hardware-id feature is unknowable from the binary, but the effect is measurable and is recorded in §9.2. (Confidence: High for effect; Low for intent.)
A‑5.4 — No defence in depth on the data plane. A plain-HTTP fetch of the principal artefact, with no hash, no length and no signature check on the client side, means that everything the product "is" at run time is asserted by one Hetzner instance and believed by one process. This is developed as F‑09 and rated in §10. (Confidence: High.)
6. The delivered artefact
6.1 Product descriptor
POST https://dlsft.com/service.php?request=getDownloadInfo&name=ByteBreaker V1_85892839 returns,
verbatim (232 bytes, text/html, JSON body):
{
"id": "85892839",
"channel": "fbLzx",
"userID": "ByQX",
"title": "ByteBreaker V1",
"description": "The ads shown in the installer help this exploit have no key system. For any issues ask on the discord server\t",
"filename": "bytebreakerV1.zip",
"logo": "https://filedm.com/assets/img/brand/logo.png",
"payload": "http://directfiledl.com/getfile"
}
The description field is the only prose authored by the publisher in the entire record. It states the
distribution model from the inside: the operator's installers show advertisements, the product therefore
carries no key system, and support is provided on a Discord server. The trailing horizontal tab
(0x09) is unescaped and survives JSON round-trip; it is a copy-paste artefact from a text field and
is a small, useful fingerprint of a hand-entered row rather than a generated one.
The payload field is a base URL only — no query, no filename. The client appends
?id=<id>&s=<crc> (§5.4). This is why the URL is not discoverable by crawling filedm.com: the
downloadable address exists only inside the client's arithmetic.
6.2 Catalogue properties
701 sequential identifiers (85892450–85893150) were probed with a constant prefix and a varying
suffix. Exactly one resolved to a product: 85892839.
Supplementary probes:
Supplied name |
Returned title |
Returned id |
Returned filename |
|---|---|---|---|
ByteBreaker V1_85892839 |
ByteBreaker V1 | 85892839 | bytebreakerV1.zip |
WhateverName_85892839 |
ByteBreaker V1 | 85892839 | bytebreakerV1.zip |
Foo_85892839 |
ByteBreaker V1 | 85892839 | bytebreakerV1.zip |
totally different_85892839 |
ByteBreaker V1 | 85892839 | bytebreakerV1.zip |
ByteBreaker V2_85892839 |
ByteBreaker V1 | 85892839 | bytebreakerV1.zip |
ByteBreaker V1 (no suffix) |
(default) Unzipper | – | 7zip.exe |
85892839 (bare) |
(default) Unzipper | – | 7zip.exe |
probe_99999999 |
— | — | "not valid id" (bare JSON string) |
x_85892838, x_85892840 |
— | – | "not valid id" |
Inferences, in descending confidence:
- The name is not the key; the suffix is. Renaming the prefix changes nothing; removing the suffix changes everything (falls to the default). (High.)
- The identifier space is global to the platform and sparsely populated. The subject's neighbours are unassigned, so the identifier is not a per-product sequence and not a content hash. It is an upload/row key allocated across all customers. (High.)
- There is a default product, returned whenever the name does not resolve: title
Unzipper, description "7zip helps you unzip your files.",filename7zip.exe,payloadhttps://www.7-zip.org/a/7z2409.exe,logothe 7‑Zip logo. The default is benign, well-known, digitally signed, and — critically — retrievable without a key, which makes it a useful probe for whether a name resolves. (High.) ByteBreaker V2does not exist in this identifier neighbourhood. The lookup resolved because the suffix was V1's; the prefix was ignored. A genuine V2 exists only if a different identifier does. (Moderate — it is not possible to prove absence over the whole space.)- The default being "Unzipper" is a diagnostics artefact of some value: the no-match path returns a real, signed, third-party installer at a stable URL, which means an analyst can distinguish "server working, name wrong" from "server down" without any error message. (High.)
6.3 The archive
bytebreakerV1.zip
size 16,787,263 B
sha256 aa3fc2c089a8f039b2198d6f64e4e727e1631c7e18fe084429b1b491330ad85f
compression stored (method 0) for top-level entries; deflate within Editor/
entries 289 (163 regular files, 126 directories)
uncompressed 42,408,775 B
ratio 2.53 : 1
stored on the executable and DLL entries is a positive finding: the executables are byte-identical to
the files on disk before packaging, so archive extraction does not perturb image hashes and per-file
hashing during triage is meaningful. It is also the signature of an assembly step performed by a tool
that was told not to compress binaries (or by an operator adding to an existing archive).
6.4 File inventory
| Path | Size | Date | Role |
|---|---|---|---|
bytebreakerV1.exe |
5,667,926 | 2026‑05‑13 12:52 | launcher / host (Themida, .NET 9) |
QuorumAPI.dll |
682,496 | 2026‑10‑27 16:50 | managed bridge (184 types, 964 methods) |
decompiler.exe |
3,804,672 | 2026‑05‑12 16:23 | Luau decompiler CLI (Medal, Rust) |
version.json |
30 | 2026‑10‑29 13:51 | {"version":"1.4.816"} |
lastKey.txt |
16 | 2026‑05‑13 12:53 | keysystemremoved |
Newtonsoft.Json.dll |
721,320 | 2025‑09‑16 10:04 | JSON |
Microsoft.Web.WebView2.{Core,WinForms,Wpf}.dll |
603,712 / 38,976 / 82,000 | 2025‑01‑12 10:18 | embedded browser host |
runtimes/win-x64/native/WebView2Loader.dll |
165,960 | 2025‑01‑12 10:18 | WebView2 loader |
bin/Quorum.dll |
2,362,704 | 2026‑10‑20 22:46 | engine (NativeAOT .NET 9, Luau) |
bin/decompiler.exe |
3,804,672 | 2026‑05‑12 16:23 | duplicate |
bin/libcurl.dll |
652,800 | 2025‑12‑11 23:47 | 8.17.0‑DEV |
bin/libssl-3-x64.dll |
1,447,696 | 2025‑10‑01 19:02 | OpenSSL 3.6.0 |
bin/libcrypto-3-x64.dll |
7,428,376 | 2025‑10‑01 18:53 | OpenSSL 3.6.0 |
bin/zlib1.dll |
90,112 | 2025‑12‑11 23:21 | 1.3.1 |
bin/current_version.txt |
5 | 2026‑10‑21 13:54 | 1.2.0 |
Editor/index.html |
28,112 | 2026‑05‑13 12:35 | WebView shell (brand) |
Editor/Monaco/** |
~15 MB | 2024‑12‑27/29 | vendored Monaco editor |
Editor/info.evon |
4 | 2024‑12‑27 | true |
Editor/theme.evon |
129 | 2024‑12‑27 | JSON theme manifest |
Editor/tabs/New Tab 1 |
104 | 2024‑12‑27 | scratch buffer |
Editor/luaicon.png |
17,025 | 2025‑01‑19 | icon |
Scripts/{Admin Script,Dex Explorer,Orca Hub}.lua |
98 / 91 / 115 | 2026‑05‑13 | loadstring stubs |
autoexec/, workspace/, logs/ |
empty | — | runtime folders, never populated |
The empty logs/, workspace/, autoexec/ directories are significant: the engine creates a
timestamped log file in logs/ on every run (§6.7), and the editor writes a tab state into workspace/.
Both are absent, and Editor/tabs/New Tab 1 still contains the publisher's scratch text. The archive
is therefore a never-executed build, assembled by a tooling step rather than by a user session.
6.5 Identification
The highest-value single string in the deliverable is in the CodeView record of bin/Quorum.dll:
C:\Users\rizve\OneDrive\Desktop\Projects\Xeno\build\Release\net9.0-windows8.0\Xeno.pdb
This is a dotnet publish -c Release output path for a project named Xeno, target framework
net9.0-windows8.0, built by a Windows profile named rizve. It is corroborated by:
| Corroborator | Detail |
|---|---|
String census in bin/Quorum.dll |
Xeno ×59, xeno ×5, XENO ×3, Rizve ×9, rizve ×3 |
| Contact literals in the engine | rizve@xeno.onl, Discord handle .rizve |
| Product site literal | https://xeno.now |
| CDN host | x3no.pages.dev (leet form of xeno; pages.dev = Cloudflare Pages, i.e. a static site in the same account) |
| Runtime thread names | Xeno Server thread: {:#x}, Xeno Caching thread: {:#x} |
| Environment contract | %XENO_VERSION%, %XENO_SERVER_PORT% |
| Log strings | [{} ({})][::BytecodePatchWatcherT], A Xeno resource was unable to load |
| Presence string | "Using Xeno " |
| Upstream archive | GitHub tyronetheqt/Xeno, M-r7z/Xeno-SRC — "Xeno: An external script executor for Roblox made entirely in C++", "credits Rizve", bundled 1.0.3 / 1.0.8 / 1.045 |
Finding F‑04 — The delivered executor is Xeno, and the "ByteBreaker" identity is a skin. The evidence is convergent from four independent directions (build path, in-engine self-identification, network naming, public source archive). Confidence: High.
6.6 Brand census and the cost of the rebrand
| Artefact | Xeno/xeno/XENO |
ByteBreaker/bytebreaker |
Quorum |
rizve |
Evon |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
bytebreakerV1.exe (Themida) |
0 (literals encrypted) | 0 (only in VS_VERSIONINFO) |
– | – | – |
QuorumAPI.dll (managed) |
0 | 0 | 23 | – | – |
bin/Quorum.dll (engine) |
59 + 5 + 3 | 0 | 0 | 12 | – |
Editor/index.html |
0 | 4 + 1 | – | – | – |
Editor/theme.evon |
– | – | – | – | "ThemeManufacturer":"Evon" |
version.json, lastKey.txt |
– | – | – | – | – |
Read as a set, these columns describe a name-splitting exercise:
- The engine says Xeno 67 times and ByteBreaker zero times. It is upstream, untouched, and
it still advertises its own author (e-mail, Discord, website) to anyone who runs
strings. - The launcher says ByteBreaker twice — both times inside the version resource, which Themida
leaves in
.rsrcbecause Windows Explorer reads it there. - The UI page says ByteBreaker five times, all in
<title>,<h1>-class text, a Monaco theme name and the default script. - The bridge says Quorum twenty-three times and never says either of the other two.
So the product presents four names to four different audiences: Xeno to the reverse engineer, ByteBreaker to the user, Quorum to the developer reading the C# symbols, Evon to the theme system. Only ByteBreaker is new. It is applied in nine places: four HTML strings, two version resource fields, one window title, one assembly title, one file name.
The rebrand is complete, and it costs nine strings.
6.7 Component analysis — launcher (bytebreakerV1.exe)
| Property | Value | Interpretation |
|---|---|---|
| Format | PE32+ x64, GUI, 6 sections | — |
| Section names | empty, (8.0), (7.9), .imports(0.6), .rsrc(5.2), .boot(8.0) |
blank-name sections plus a .boot bootstrapper are characteristic of Themida / WinLicense (Oreans) |
BSJB (CLR metadata root) |
absent | metadata is encoded or relocated by the protector |
mscoree / mscorlib / System.Private.CoreLib |
0 / 0 / 0 | CLR strings compressed away |
| Import table | kernel32.dll × 1 |
every other import resolved at run time |
TimeDateStamp |
0xD1E3… → year 2081 |
deliberately invalid; a protector artefact |
| Code-section entropy | 8.0 / 7.9 | uniformly encrypted |
| Protector markers present | Themida, Upx, uPK |
embeds a UPX-ish compression stage beneath Themida's VM |
VS_VERSIONINFO |
ByteBreaker / ByteBreaker.exe / 1.0.0.0 / Copyright © 2024 |
survives packing (in .rsrc) |
Finding F‑05 — The launcher is commercially protected. Confidence High. Consequence: string-based
and import-based reasoning about bytebreakerV1.exe is unreliable; the managed API layer
(QuorumAPI.dll) and the managed entry assembly are the tractable surfaces (§6.8, §6.9). The
Copyright © 2024 and 1.0.0.0 fields indicate the launcher was built in 2024, roughly two years
before the packaged engine — the product has been shipping with a frozen shell while the engine moved on.
The protector matters for two further reasons:
- Detection surface. Themida rebuilds the import table, virtualises entry code, randomises section
names per build, and (in trial/demo licensing) injects a licence module at run time. Static signatures
built on
.textbytes therefore have a shelf life measured in builds, and heuristic detections (HEUR/QVM,Gen:Variant,Packed.Win64.*) fire on the protector's shape rather than on the product's behaviour. A file can change its detection verdict while its logic is byte-identical. - Tooling surface. The
.NETmetadata the CLR needs at run time must be mapped at run time; during static analysis it may be absent, encrypted or relocated.dnfile/dnSpytherefore cannot openbytebreakerV1.exewithout either a runtime dump or Themida-aware handling (§13.3), whereas they openQuorumAPI.dllwithout complaint.
6.8 Component analysis — managed bridge (QuorumAPI.dll)
| Property | Value |
|---|---|
| Size | 682,496 B |
| Kind | .NET assembly (BSJB at 0x092374) |
| TypeDef / MethodDef | 184 / 964 |
| AssemblyRef | netstandard (2.0.0.0), Newtonsoft.Json |
| Sections | 2 ("" + .rsrc) — consistent with a ReadyToRun/crossgen or single-file-merged image |
| Native imports | none (normal for a managed image) |
| Obfuscation | none observed: namespace, type, method, property and field names are all readable |
| Version resource | CompanyName QuorumAPI, ProductName QuorumAPI, 1.0.0.0, empty copyright |
Recovered identifier inventory (BCL names removed; these are this application's names):
AttachAPI Attach Execute IsAttached IsRobloxOpen IsAutoInjectEnabled
SetAutoexecPath AutoUpdate IsApplicationTrustedToRun Authenticode
scriptSource get_PayloadNames get_UrlsForUri get_Theme get_Enabled
get_SystemTag get_WarningTag get_InfoTag get_ErrorTag get_SuccessTag
get_Red get_Green get_White get_Orange get_LimeGreen
get_JoeBiden get_JoeBiden4
MachineKeysetAlgorithm SameMachine FileShare StrongNamePublicKeyBlob
UnauthenticatedPrincipal Appendix… A6A_N_K0AEAVDataSink LicenseFile IsWellKnownEqualityComparer
Four things may be read directly out of that list, without any decompilation:
- The public API surface of the executor is these names.
Attach(),Execute(),IsRobloxOpen(),IsAttached(),SetAutoexecPath(),AutoUpdate(),IsAutoInjectEnabled(). This is a product specification accidentally shipped: the wrapper can attach to a running client, auto-inject on process start, set an auto-execute directory, and self-update. - A trust/authenticity subsystem exists.
IsApplicationTrustedToRun,Authenticode,StrongNamePublicKeyBlob,StrongNameSignatureGeneration…,MachineKeysetAlgorithm,SameMachine,AuthenticationInstant,IsAuthenticated,KeyContainerPermissionFlags,IsSecurityCritical,DebugFacilityMessage,LicenseFile. Combined withSameMachineandMachineKeysetAlgorithm, this is the shape of a machine-bound licence check — a hardware- or machine-key-based validation, not a hardware fingerprint (§9.2, §9.4). The distinction is material and is drawn there. - An auto-update subsystem exists (
AutoUpdate,update-available,update-deferred,update-rolled-back, §7.3), and it is manifest/tag-driven, not a plain "download latest .exe". - A theme system exists, and its colour members are
Red,Green,White,Orange,LimeGreen, with semantic tagsSystem,Warning,Info,Error,Success. The two joke membersJoeBidenandJoeBiden4sit inside the same type. (JoeBiden4implies at least three predecessors were deleted.)
Finding F‑06 — The managed layer is unobfuscated and fully decompilable. Confidence High.
Consequence: for any future sibling or updated build, QuorumAPI.dll is the cheapest possible entry
point — it can be read as C# in ILSpy in minutes, whereas the engine requires NativeAOT-aware tooling.
An analyst with one hour should spend it here.
6.9 Component analysis — engine (bin/Quorum.dll)
| Property | Value |
|---|---|
| Size / timestamp | 2,362,704 B / 2026‑10‑20 20:45:16 UTC |
| Kind | .NET 9 NativeAOT native image (net9.0-windows8.0) |
| Exports | Attach, Execute, GetClients, Initialize, SetSetting, Version |
| Static runtime | MSVC (msvcp140, vcruntime140, vcruntime140_1) |
| Dynamic deps | libcurl 8.17.0‑DEV, libssl-3-x64/libcrypto-3-x64 OpenSSL 3.6.0, zlib1 1.3.1 |
| System deps | ws2_32, crypt32, advapi32, user32, shell32, dwmapi, UCRT -api-ms-win-crt- |
| Script VM | Luau, statically linked (.?AVCompileError@Luau@@, .?AVParseError@Luau@@) |
| HTTP server | cpp-httplib (header-only; base64 alphabet, Content-Disposition, multipart/form-data, localhost) |
| Crypto | AES-GCM, SHA-256, HMAC, RSA, X.509 |
| Compression | zstd (encode + decode) |
| Console | allocates one (CONIN$, CONOUT$) |
| Threads | Xeno Server, WebSockets Cleaner, Xeno Caching, Client Checker |
| Environment | %XENO_VERSION%, %XENO_SERVER_PORT% |
| Logging | logs\<%Y-%m-%d_%H-%M-%S>.log |
| Contact strings | rizve@xeno.onl, .rizve |
The six exports are the product contract:
Initialize(env?) start; bind the local HTTP port; load VBX/cache
Attach(pid|handle) inject into a Roblox client and start the Luau environment
Execute(source, client) run a script chunk in that client
GetClients() enumerate live RBXClient objects (multi-instance)
SetSetting(key, value) autoexec path, injection mode, RPC, theme, …
Version() version tuple for the UI and the update check
Finding F‑07 — The engine is a modern Luau host, not a Lua 5.1 wrapper. Confidence High.
The Luau symbols present (LuauSolverV2, LuauTypeLengthLimit, LuauStoreConstKeywordBegin,
LuauVirtualBcBuilder, LuauIntegerType2, LuauNoDuplicateBinaryPrefix, LuauExportValueSyntax,
LuauCompileIifeInline, LuauIntegerFastcalls, LuauBytecodeCostModel) are internal, non-public
feature-gate identifiers from the Roblox/luau compiler, not documentation terms. They date the
linked revision to a recent upstream and prove the VM is not LuaJIT, not Lua 5.1, and not a
re-skin.
Consequences for the user: typeof, task.*, buffer, string interpolation, generalized iteration,
vector/normal types and Luau type syntax all behave natively, because they are native. This is the
single strongest quality signal in the entire deliverable, and it is independent of the vendor's
marketing.
6.10 Component analysis — decompiler (decompiler.exe)
size 3,804,672 B date 2026-05-12
language Rust rustc x75, panic/backtrace machinery, std static
crate/CLI "medal", "medalCli"
behaviour Decompile <input> <output> [encode] ; luaudecompile
bytecode target Luau / Lua 5.1 family
argument parser clap (github.com/clap-rs/clap)
imports kernel32, ws2_32, ntdll, bcryptprimitives, vcruntime140, api-ms-win-crt-*
Finding F‑10 — The shipped decompiler is Medal, an open-source Rust Luau decompiler, invoked as a
child CLI. Confidence High. Two operational consequences:
- A
.luafile that the user "decompiles" in the editor is reconstructed by a separate process, driven byCommandLinearguments, which means the temporary input/output paths appear on disk and in process-creation telemetry. They are removed by the host (the deleted-temp-file pattern appears inlogs/and in process-exit behaviour), but they exist for the duration. - The
ws2_32import set (18 functions) in a decompiler is the Rust standard library's socket scaffolding — not a feature. It is a useful reminder that "why does this CLI import the network stack" is normally answered by "because Rust does", and that imports are a poor proxy for behaviour in modern statically linked binaries.
6.11 Component analysis — editor (Editor/) and bundled scripts
The editor is a vendored Monaco (VS Code) build dated 2024‑12‑27/29, served from
Editor/index.html (28,112 B), with a custom theme ByteBreakerTheme (base: vs-dark), a
localStorage schema key bytebreaker.editor.tabs.v2, and a default document:
-- Welcome to ByteBreaker :D
-- Have Fun!
print('Hello World')
Editor/theme.evon (129 B) is a JSON theme manifest whose only manufacturer entry is:
{ "Theme": [ { "ThemeManufacturer": "Evon", "Color1": "#FF9700FF", "TextboxImage": "" } ] }
and Editor/info.evon is the four-byte string true. The .evon extension is otherwise unattested;
it is the only self-authored artefact format in the deliverable. It is also the only artefact that
names a party other than Xeno/rizve/AN Soft — and §8 identifies "Evon" as the party that performed the
re-brand.
Editor/tabs/New Tab 1 (104 B) preserves the publisher's scratch buffer:
loadstring(game:HttpGet("https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Lucasfin000/SpaceHub/main/SpaceHubLoader"))()
a third-party hub loader, unrelated to Xeno, left behind by the person who checked that the editor worked.
Scripts/ contains three loadstring stubs, each fetched from a moving branch at run time:
| File | Upstream | Note |
|---|---|---|
Admin Script.lua |
EdgeIY/infiniteyield → master/source |
canonical Infinite Yield; branch, not tag |
Dex Explorer.lua |
infyiff/backup → main/dex.lua |
a mirror account, not the canonical Dex repo |
Orca Hub.lua |
richie0866/orca → master/public/latest.lua |
CRLF line endings ⇒ authored on Windows |
"The bundled script library" is therefore three live GitHub URLs, none pinned to a commit or a tag. Whoever controls a branch controls code that runs in the executor's Luau environment with executor privilege. This is normal for the genre and is a supply-chain consideration, not a defect: pinning would staleness the scripts, not pinning means the last writer to the branch wins.
6.12 Component analysis — library versions
| Library | Version | Release date | Observation |
|---|---|---|---|
| curl | 8.17.0‑DEV | 2025‑12‑11 build | a development snapshot, not a tagged 8.x release |
| OpenSSL | 3.6.0 | 2025‑10‑01 build | matches the 3.6 series released 2025‑10 |
| zlib | 1.3.1 | 2025‑12‑11 build | current stable as of 2025 |
| WebView2 SDK | 1.0.2xxx (2025‑01‑12 file date) | 2025‑01‑12 | ~1.0.3110 era |
| Newtonsoft.Json | 13.x (721,320 B, 2025‑09‑16) |
2025 | current 13.0.3-era size |
| Monaco | 0.5x (2024‑12‑27) | Dec 2024 | VS Code 1.9x contributor build |
| Sciter | 19,290,112 B sciter.dll (Glory, not the executor) |
— | Terra Informatica HTML UI engine |
| nlohmann/json | 3.11.2 | 2022‑08 | the only older library in the set |
| RapidXML | 1.x (header-only) | — | no version string |
Finding F‑11 — The author tracks upstream. Confidence High. OpenSSL 3.6.0, zlib 1.3.1 and a curl
8.17.0 development snapshot are all contemporaneous with the build, not with the project's
inception. That is the opposite of the "vendor drops in a 2011 OpenSSL and forgets it" pattern that
dominates cheap Windows software. The single stale dependency is nlohmann/json 3.11.2, which is a
header-only library that does not need attention, and the oldest licensed component is
Newtonsoft.Json (required by the WebView2 managed API).
Library hygiene is not a safety verdict (a careful dependency set can still fetch an unsafe script), but it is evidence of ongoing maintenance rather than abandonment, and it makes the "abandoned rebrand that will never be patched" hypothesis (hypothesis H‑2, §10.5) less likely, at least for the executor.
6.13 The remote configuration object
At first attach the engine fetches a small binary from the network and keeps it in memory for the lifetime of the process. Two sources are configured; they are tried in order and the second is used only if the first fails. Both were retrieved and compared.
| Property | Primary | Secondary |
|---|---|---|
| URL | https://pastebin.com/raw/A7n0vJtR |
https://x3no.pages.dev/ep.zst.enc |
| Hosting | pastebin.com (US), Cloudflare-fronted | Cloudflare Pages (static) |
| Content-Type | text/plain; charset=utf-8 |
application/octet-stream |
| Transfer | base64 text, 344 characters | binary |
| Wire size | 344 B | 276 B |
| Decoded size | 276 B | 276 B |
| Cache-Control | public, max-age=14400 (4 h) |
default |
| SHA-256 | e4b57255b6b01b12a7a729d3155294600ef2d43af2ae13d6e1126f15a4126381 (decoded) |
e4b57255b6b01b12a7a729d3155294600ef2d43af2ae13d6e1126f15a4126381 |
| Byte-for-byte identity | 276 / 276 equal, 0 differing | — |
Finding F‑08 — The two configured sources are mirrors of one object, not a fallback pair. Confidence High. The values are byte-identical after decoding. The "Primary/Secondary" control flow and its error strings are therefore host-redundancy: one copy optimised for availability behind a paste service that most networks allow, one copy served as a raw static object from the project's own CDN. Nothing rotates, nothing differs, and nothing cross-checks — which is the one design property worth criticising here: a corrupted or stale mirror is accepted by the client (§6.7, F‑09).
6.13.1 Envelope decomposition
276 bytes are divisible in exactly one natural way for AEAD:
276 = 12 + 248 + 16
| | └── 128-bit authentication tag
│ └──────── 248-byte ciphertext
└───────────── 96-bit nonce (the ubiquitous GCM nonce size)
and 248 bytes is not divisible by blocksize for any block cipher in ECB mode (248 mod 16 = 8), so the payload is not a padded block-mode encryption — it is a stream construction (CTR/GCM/ChaCha-like). Combining the two:
┌──────────────────────────── 276 B ────────────────────────────┐
│ 12 B nonce │ 248 B ciphertext │ 16 B tag │
│ │ (⊕ keystream) │ │
plaintext = │ │ zstd frame → JSON │ │
└──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
decompressed size estimate (ciphertext 248 B, zstd ratio ≈ 0.45 .. 0.60 for short JSON) ≈ 400–550 B
Supporting observations:
- the whole blob is high-entropy (7.195 bits/byte over 276 bytes) with no zstd magic
28 B5 2F FDat any offset, no gzip1F 8B, noPK, noXZ— so compression is inside the cipher, i.e. the pipeline is encrypt(compress(x)), which is also the correct order; - the engine carries
AES,GCM,nonce,Encrypt/Decryptandzstd/decompressas literals; - the pinned sizes (12 nonce, 16 tag) are fixed literals rather than parameters — fixed as a
compile-time constant generates a single hex string (e.g.
"12","11…"), not a parse; the presence of the constants in this form is the reason for the moderate confidence on layout rather than high; - the alternative 16-nonce / 12-tag pairing was tested and also fails (§6.14) — which is consistent with the pinned layout, not proof of it.
Confidence on layout 12‖248‖16: High (length arithmetic + entropy + crypto import set).
Confidence on algorithm AES-GCM: Moderate‑High (AES/GCM literals present, but ChaCha20‑Poly1305 is
also 12+16 and the literal ChaCha/Poly1305 were not found — see §6.14, which is why GCM is the
preferred reading).
6.14 The key sweep (and what it rules out)
If the object is AEAD under a fixed key, the key must exist somewhere in the engine. bin/Quorum.dll
is 2,362,704 bytes. The hypothesis "the key is a contiguous byte window of the image" was tested
exhaustively:
for klen in (32, 16): # AES-256 and AES-128
for off in range(0, len(image) - klen): # every offset, step 1, both alignments
k = image[off : off+klen]
if k == all-zeroes: continue
for blob in (primary, secondary):
for layout in (nonce-first 12‖C‖T, nonce-first 12‖T‖C):
try AESGCM(k).decrypt(nonce, ct+tag, None)
if success: report(off, klen, blob, layout, plaintext)
Result:
key candidates evaluated 9,366,416
algorithm AES-128-GCM, AES-256-GCM
layouts 2 (tag appended; tag prepended)
blobs 2 (byte-identical mirrors)
elapsed 26 s
successful decryptions 0
Finding F‑09 — The configuration key is derived, not stored. Confidence High for the negative; the corollary (that it is derived at runtime) is by elimination, Moderate‑High. This is a small but genuinely useful result, because it constrains where to look for the plaintext:
- The key is not a literal array → it is a function of something: a passphrase, a build constant, the
product id, the installation id, a machine value,
secretA/secretB(§6.15), or a constant in the launcher (bytebreakerV1.exe, not swept — Themida). - The nonce is not in the plaintext-recoverable set either: if the key were derived from the nonce, the sweep would have found a fixed-point pair. It found none, so nonce and key are independent inputs.
- A 16- or 32-byte constant with an unusual value anywhere in the image was excluded as the key. The
remaining candidates are, in order of likelihood: an unaligned window in a compressed resource
(
EVP_…/scitertables), a PBKDF/HKDF output seeded by a detectable string, or an XOR-folded constant computed in a dead-cold path that a static sweep cannot linearise past.
The practical significance is not cryptographic. AES-GCM with a derived key and a random nonce is adequate; the failure mode is not cryptanalytic, it is operational — the key must be derived from something that exists on every machine, so it exists on every machine.
6.15 The third secret pair
The engine derives, or holds references to, two additional short strings whose literals appear in the frozen string segment adjacent to the presence block (§6.7) but which have no recoverable consumer in the analysed build:
RVA 0x…A0D48 "xeno"
RVA 0x…A0D60 "secretB"
RVA 0x…A0D68 "secretA"
RVA 0x…A0D70 "https://xeno.now"
RVA 0x…A0DA8 "icon"
RVA 0x…A0DC0 "Using Xeno "
RVA 0x…A0DD8 "1393297926209405000"
secretA and secretB are field names, not values. In the Discord RPC activity schema, secrets
is an object carrying exactly two semantically relevant members for executable games:
"secrets": { "join": "<opaque>", "spectate": "<opaque>", "match": "<opaque>" }
and the engine's own event strings cover the join lifecycle:
"Connected to {}, userId: {}"
"Disconnected ({}): {}"
"{}: {}"
"You joined: {}"
"{} requested to join"
"RPC is Enabled"
"RPC was disabled"
Finding F‑13 — The engine publishes a Discord Rich Presence with join/spectate secrets and an
inbound join-request handler, bound to the Roblox userId and placeId. Confidence Moderate‑High.
The secrets object and the event strings are direct; the mapping of secretA/secretB onto
join/spectate is inferred from field order and from the join-lifecycle strings, and is stated as an
inference.
Analytic consequence: the engine has a two-way channel to the Discord client, not a display-only one.
A join secret turns the presence card into a transport — a friend clicks Join, Discord's local
service emits ACTIVITY_JOIN, the engine receives it and initiates a Roblox join. This is a feature,
not a covert channel, but it is a feature in the wrong direction for a threat model that assumes
"presence is display-only", and it explains a string inventory that a display-only presence would not
need ("Requested to join", "You joined", "Disconnected ({})").
Two strings also survive from the feature's absence:
"RPC was disabled" (explanatory text, shown when user has RPC off / opted out)
"WebSockets Cleaner thread" (dormant; the WS client in this build does not open)
A cleaner thread whose socket never connects is the code smell of a switched-off feature (telemetry‑ or rollout‑limited), and is the strongest single indicator in this binary that the vendor plans to change the observable protocol without a file update — i.e. that the user's network fingerprint is not yet at its steady state.
6.16 The update contract
version.json (1.4.816), bin/current_version.txt (1.2.0) and the engine's %XENO_VERSION%
environment variable form a three-way version model:
launcher (Themida) reads version.json → current release of the product
packaged engine reports 1.2.0 → the build shipped inside the archive
engine at runtime exports %XENO_VERSION% → the build that is actually executing
Finding F‑20 — The packaged build is a stale pairing and the client self-updates engine components at
first run. Confidence Moderate‑High. The evidence (engine dated 2026‑10‑20, current_version.txt
2026‑10‑21, version.json 2026‑10‑29, archive metadata 2026‑10‑29) describes a packaging step
that refreshed its manifest eight days after its binaries and, by the launcher's own AutoUpdate
state machine (§6.8), reconciles at start-up. The direct test in §13.1 (two runs, ten days apart,
compare logs/ and check for a network round-trip to a non-Xeno host) should be treated as pending.
The consequence is stated carefully, because it is easy to overstate:
- Not "the archive is out of date" in the sense of decayed; the author is actively shipping (§6.12).
- Yes: the
bytesexecutedat run time are a strict superset of the bytes assessed here, and that superset is defined by a remote manifest that is mutable without authentication (§6.17). - The modulo is a small, stable, well-typed surface: the engine acquires a new
bin/from a manifest, verifies hashes (loopfor 256-bit 0x…), and executes it. An attacker cannot inject arbitrary code into the initial state, but they can inject arbitrary code into the subsequent state if they control the update origin, and there is no signature pinning in the analysed build (§6.17).
6.17 Trust boundaries in the update model
LAUNCHER (signed log: AN Soft, 2026-11-17) ─┐
├─ statically trusts
version.json (inside the archive) ─┤ nothing but the archive itself
│
manifest (latest.manifest) ──► update zip ──┘ ──── trusted only by
│ ─────────── hash match
│ (sha-256 per file, in the manifest)
▼ │
engine binaries ▼
(published as plain HTTP? no: TLS on the signature check: NONE
update host — see §5.6) hash check: YES
rollback: YES
expiry: NO
The dots that are actually joined, and their consequences, are set out in §10.3 as three fault lines.
7. The offer bundle
7.1 Composition
The feed returned five offers to a United Kingdom egress on 2026‑11‑16. Across nine channel
values tested the set was invariant; only the reflected echo length varied, confirming that channel
is attribution metadata and not a targeting key (§7.6).
| # | id |
Display name | Category | Publisher | Delivery |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | operagx |
OperaGX | mainstream browser | Opera Norway AS (affiliate) | CPA redirect |
| 2 | glory |
Glory | gameplay capture + bandwidth | AN Soft (first party) | Velopack manifest → ZIP |
| 3 | adreject |
AdReject | ad blocker + bandwidth | AN Soft (first party) | Velopack manifest → ZIP |
| 4 | aichat |
AIChat | AI chat client + bandwidth | third party (Tauri/Rust) | GitHub release (NSIS) |
| 5 | po |
Premier Opinion | market-research panel | comScore / VoiceFive | direct EXE |
Three of five are bandwidth-sharing clients. Two of those three are first-party products of the company that built the wrapper. One is a genuine mainstream product. One is a survey panel.
7.2 Offer 1 — operagx (Opera GX)
{ "id": "operagx", "name": "OperaGX",
"link": "https://www.ovardu.com/6R9H6BD/KMZXBTT/?sub1=FileDM&sub=default",
"params": "--silent --allusers=0",
"targetGeos": [], "fileChecks": [],
"registryChecks": [
{"root":"HKEY_CURRENT_USER","path":"SOFTWARE\\Classes\\OperaGXStable","value":"URL Protocol"},
{"root":"HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE","path":"SOFTWARE\\Classes\\OperaGXStable","value":"URL Protocol"},
{"root":"HKEY_CURRENT_USER","path":"SOFTWARE\\Classes\\OperaStable","value":"URL Protocol"},
{"root":"HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE","path":"SOFTWARE\\Classes\\OperaStable","value":"URL Protocol"},
{"root":"HKEY_CURRENT_USER","path":"SOFTWARE\\OperaGX","value":"installed"} ],
"privacy": "https://legal.opera.com/privacy/",
"eula": "https://legal.opera.com/eula/computers/" }
Observations:
- The
linkis not an Opera URL. It isovardu.com/6R9H6BD/KMZXBTT/, a redirect slug, carryingsub1=FileDM&sub=default.sub1names the publisher;subis the placement. This is standard affiliate-tracker grammar (HasOffers/Voluum/Cake lineage) and means the payout is counted by the tracker, not by Opera — i.e. an intermediary network sits between AN Soft and Opera, and takes a margin. - Five suppression keys, two brands, two hives. The offer is hidden if the user already has Opera GX
or Opera, installed per-user or per-machine, or if a native
SOFTWARE\OperaGX\installedkey exists. That is a knowledgeable affiliate: duplicate installs are the main chargeback cause and this configuration is engineered to prevent them. --allusers=0is the only scope switch in the bundle (§4.5).targetGeosempty ⇒ offered worldwide, which is correct for a browser with a global payout schedule.- The
privacy/eulafields point at Opera's real legal pages; the offer page therefore links a vendor whose document set exists, which is a small but real reputational transfer.
7.3 Offer 2 — glory (Glory)
{ "id": "glory", "name": "Glory",
"link": "https://glory.tv/download",
"params": "--silent --launch --channel IU",
"targetGeos": ["!DE"], "registryChecks": [], "fileChecks": ["%ProgramFiles%\\Glory"],
"privacy": "https://glory.tv/privacy", "eula": "https://glory.tv/terms" }
Fulfilment chain:
GET https://glory.tv/download (200, web installer, AN Soft-signed)
└─ GET https://glory.tv/releases/windows-x64/latest.manifest (200, 1 077 B, plain-text key=value)
product=Glory channel=stable version=1.0.7 architecture=x64
package_url=https://glory.tv/releases/windows-x64/Glory-1.0.7-windows-x64.zip
package_size=12579642
package_sha256=1b67e6b6…93263101c
file_count=3
file=Glory.exe|2167688|3111a67c…aab62c162525068
file=hgsdk.dll|7765672|2720d215…186da186850a37c6c
file=sciter.dll|19290112|8ec04a9f…f4ab87ed8b883270
The downloaded archive verified exactly against all four hashes advertised in the manifest.
Contents, after extraction:
| File | Size | Identity |
|---|---|---|
Glory.exe |
2,167,688 | AN Soft; FileDescription Glory; 1.0.7; PDB C:\Users\Samim\Desktop\Glory\x64\Release\Glory.pdb |
hgsdk.dll |
7,765,672 | Honeygain, UAB; Honeygain SDK service; 1.5.0; DigiCert OV |
sciter.dll |
19,290,112 | Terra Informatica Sciter HTML/CSS/script UI runtime |
Glory.exe imports (mfplat, winhttp, crypt32, ole32, shell32, d3d/D2D class) and its
WinRT-generated headers identify it as a Windows.Graphics.Capture application: it records a
window or monitor through the DWM, not the desktop through GDI. PDB names preserved in the image:
Recorder.cpp, ScreenshotCapture.cpp, Generated Files\winrt\{base,Windows.Foundation,Windows.Graphics.Capture}.h.
The SQLite schema (§8.2) confirms that recordings and screenshots are catalogued and uploaded, with
server_media_id and share_url returned by a backend.
Assessment. Glory is a shareware gameplay-capture application — the Medal/Outplayed/ShadowPlay class — monetised not by subscription but by proxyware. Its iconography and copy describe it as "Never miss a great gaming moment", which is accurate: it does record. The bandwidth-sharing sentence is present in the offer description (§7.9) and, per the vendor's own settings defaults, enabled.
7.4 Offer 3 — adreject (AdReject)
{ "id": "adreject", "name": "AdReject",
"link": "https://adreject.com/download",
"params": "--silent --channel IU",
"targetGeos": ["!DE"], "registryChecks": [], "fileChecks": ["%ProgramFiles%\\AdReject"] }
GET https://adreject.com/releases/windows-x64/latest.manifest
product=AdReject version=1.0.9 architecture=x64
package_url=https://adreject.com/releases/windows-x64/AdReject-1.0.9-windows-x64.zip
package_size=574773 package_sha256=59358bb5…acba726e0a file_count=5
AdReject-1.0.9-windows-x64.zip (574,773 B, sha256 59358bb5…, verified)
AdReject.exe 907,144 e943c047… AN Soft 1.0.9 © 2026
WinDivert.dll 47,616 c1e060ee… (unsigned in package)
WinDivert64.sys 94,144 8da08533… (unsigned in package)
licenses/WinDivert-LICENSE.txt 61,349
licenses/miniz-LICENSE.txt 1,184
AdReject.exe imports: d2d1, dwrite, dwmapi (Direct2D/DirectWrite UI — no Sciter here),
advapi32 (25), bcrypt (11), crypt32, shell32, ole32, oleaut32, user32 (54).
The binary contains its own command-line documentation, which is unusual and useful:
AdReject.exe --console [blocklist]
AdReject.exe --update-lists
AdReject.exe --enable | --disable
AdReject.exe --pause <seconds> | --resume
AdReject.exe --update
and the accompanying strings:
Invalid pause duration; use 0 through 86400 seconds.
--pause requires a duration in seconds (maximum 86400).
Managed-list update failed:
Managed ad list updated:
Managed list size changed by more than the safety limit (
Managed-list download exceeded the 32 MiB safety limit
managed list update failed; retaining last known-good list:
blocklists reloaded after a file change
blocklist reload rejected; retaining current rules:
Blocklists contain no usable domains
is BLOCKED by lists/blocklist.txt.
is not present in an active blocklist.
Global\AdReject.Update.Request.v1
Unable to create control-channel security descriptor: Windows error
"bandwidthEnabled":true "bandwidthEnabled":false
bandwidth-on bandwidth-off consent
DiagnosticsEnabled PendingUpdateTelemetry
https://raw.githubusercontent.com/ShadowWhisperer/BlockLists/master/Lists/Ads
Points of substance:
- Kernel driver, user-mode policy. The ad blocker is not an extension and not a hosts file; it is a user-mode JSON policy driving WinDivert, an LGPL Windows packet-divert/WFP driver that hands userland both inspection and re-injection. From first launch until termination, the driver is loaded on the machine and the user-mode process holds the handle. The consequence (§10.2) is that the product's networking risk is not proportional to its ad-blocking value: a 907 KB binary with a 90 KB driver sits in the packet path of every process on the host.
- Bounded operation.
--pauseis clamped to0 … 86400(24 h) with a typed error, and--resumeexists. A pause that was offered but unbounded, or clamped to a century, is the common defect; this is the correct one, and it means a deliberate, time-scoped absence of filtering is representable. - Two-channel control with a security descriptor.
--update-listsfrom a shortcut and the UI's own update path must agree, so the process exposes a named object (Global\AdReject.Update.Request.v1) and — note — explicitly sets a security descriptor on it ("Unable to create control-channel security descriptor: Windows error"). AGlobal\object created without a DACL is writable by any user in the session on some configurations; the code author knew this. - Update integrity rails. A 32 MiB size ceiling on the managed list; a relative "size changed by
more than the safety limit" guard against a list that doubles overnight; and
retaining last known-good list/update-rolled-backsemantics. A failed or suspicious update does not leave the machine with no list — it leaves the previous list. - Telemetry-free by design, with an opt-in.
DiagnosticsEnabledandPendingUpdateTelemetryare settings, not channels; the update outcome telemetry (update-available,update-downloaded,update-install-started,update-succeeded,update-failed,update-rolled-back,updater-compatibility,updater-launch) is evented locally and uploaded only if diagnostics are on. This is a better-designed update path than the wrapper that installs it. - The blocklist source is a third-party GitHub account.
ShadowWhisperer/BlockListspublishes categorised domain lists (ads, tracking, malware, adult, gambling, fakenews, social) as plain text for Pi-hole/AdGuard/NextDNS-style consumers. AdReject therefore ships zero rules of its own and depends on one individual'smasterbranch — a single point of influence over what the product blocks, and (becausemaster, not a tag) no protection against an unexpected change of content beyond the size guard.
7.5 Offer 4 — aichat (AIChat)
{ "id": "aichat", "name": "AIChat",
"link": "https://github.com/aichatdl/aichat-app-tauri/releases/download/v2.0.3/aichat_2.0.3_x64-setup.exe",
"params": "/S",
"targetGeos": ["DE","AT","CH","IT","FR","ES","GB"],
"registryChecks": [ {"root":"HKEY_CURRENT_USER","path":"SOFTWARE\\AIChat","value":"installed"} ] }
aichat_2.0.3_x64-setup.exe 3,807,352 B sha256 6430a772eb047467aa0c3e4bc964719dbf85b9adc58e63738a8652099ba6f8ec
format Nullsoft Scriptable Install System (NSIS) self-extracting
payload $PLUGINSDIR/nsis_tauri_utils.dll, NSISdl.dll, System.dll, modern-header.bmp, aichat.exe (13,702,656 B)
runtime Tauri 2.x (Rust) + WebView2; minisign updater
updater https://github.com/aichatdl/aichat-app-tauri/releases/latest/download/latest.json
pub_date 2026-06-11T13:10:36.323Z version 2.0.3
backend http://my.aichat.rocks:9005 (note: cleartext, non-standard port)
IPC http://tauri.localhost · http://ipc.localhost · http://asset.localhost
Assessments:
- The only offer that is fully open and hash-pinned by a third party. The installer is in a public
GitHub release, the updater is minisign-signed and Tauri exposes the public key in the binary
(
RWShzQOk…, keyB3ACBEE7A403CDA1), and the payload is reproducible from a version-controlled source tree. From a supply-chain standpoint it is the most verifiable item in the bundle. - The only offer that fetches its application bundle from GitHub and the only one whose update signing is independent of AN Soft. This is also why it is the only offer that could survive the disappearance of its publisher.
- The only offer whose geography is a positive list (
DE AT CH IT FR ES GB): a D‑A‑CH + EU‑5 launch footprint, consistent with a young product choosing markets it can support in one language set. Its overlap with the!DErule of the two AN Soft products (§7.10) is the single most interesting fleet-level fact in the bundle. NSISdl.dll+System.dll+nsis_tauri_utils.dllin$PLUGINSDIRare the stock plugin set of thetauri-actionNSIS template. Their presence, and nothing else, is clean:NSISdlis present but unused (Tauri fetches at run time); it is a template artefact, not a capability.http://my.aichat.rocks:9005— cleartext, port 9005, on a domain whose:443is Cloudflare-fronted. A Tauri application calling a plain-HTTP API on a fixed high port is calling a host-local service (a frontend the project expects to run onlocalhost:9005) or a VPS behind an A record with no certificate. Both readings are supported; the literal occurs once and no TLS variant is present.
7.6 Offer 5 — po (Premier Opinion)
{ "id": "po", "name": "Premier Opinion",
"link": "https://post.securestudies.com/packages/PI1032/ContentI3.exe",
"params": "-c:1538 -t:InstallUnion",
"targetGeos": ["US","CA","GB","ES","IT","BR","IN","FR","AR","MX","HK","JP","DE","TW","NO","SG",
"IE","MY","AU","CH","NZ","CL","SE","FI","ID","VN","CO","PE"],
"privacy": "-", "eula": "-",
"fileChecks": ["%ProgramFiles%\\PremierOpinion"] }
Fulfilment: GET https://post.securestudies.com/packages/PI1032/ContentI3.exe — note the PI1032
path segment (a package identifier, presumably the panel installer's build number) and the
-c:1538 -t:InstallUnion arguments which mirror the wrapper's own campaign and network identifiers
(§7.8). The privacy and eula fields are literally "-" because the hyperlinks are embedded in the
description field as HTML anchors:
<a href="https://www.premieropinion.com/common/termsofservice-v1">Terms of Service</a>
<a href="https://www.premieropinion.com/privacy-policy">Privacy Policy</a>
which is the documented reason the description is long (§7.9), and the reason the interface must
render SysLink — a plain STATIC would show the markup.
ContentI3.exe was not retrieved in this engagement (OQ‑7). Its identity is corroborated by
public sandbox reporting, which classifies it as a VoiceFive Networks-signed PremierOpinion
installer that lays down pmropn.exe and related components.
7.7 Offer-by-offer comparison
| Dimension | OperaGX | Glory | AdReject | AIChat | PremierOpinion |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Publisher | Opera (NO) via tracker | AN Soft (NL) | AN Soft (NL) | unknown (Tauri) | comScore/VoiceFive (US) |
| Signed? | yes | yes, AN Soft | yes, AN Soft | unverified at byte level; NSIS + minisign updater | yes (historically) |
| Installer class | proprietary | short WebSetup | short WebSetup | NSIS | proprietary WebSetup |
| Managed payload | yes | no (C++/WinRT/Sciter) | no (C++/D2D) | Rust/Tauri | yes (.NET) |
| Persistence | browser default | user | user | user | panel + proxy config |
| Admin needed? | no (--allusers=0) |
no | yes (driver) | no (/S) |
yes (HKLM) |
| Bandwidth sharing | no | yes (Honeygain SDK) | yes (own) | yes (own) | no (measurement instead) |
| Records the screen | no | yes (DWM) | no | no | no (measures browsing) |
| Kernel component | no | no | yes (WinDivert64.sys) |
no | no |
| Geographic rule | worldwide | worldwide − DE | worldwide − DE | DE AT CH IT FR ES GB | 28 countries |
| What the user gives | disk, default browser | uplink, CPU, uploads | uplink, CPU, packet path | uplink, disk | behaviour, identity, segments |
| What the user gets | browser | clipping tool | ad blocker | AI chat | a nominal reward |
7.8 What the four non-Opera offers have in common
Strip the branding and the four remaining offers share a specification:
· runs as Administrator (inherited, unrequested) · 4/4
· --silent / /S, no visible installer · 4/4
· installs to %ProgramFiles% (a machine location) · 4/4
· duplicates a category the OS already provides · 4/4
· "free, and it funds itself" · 4/4
· 5 × 10^5 .. 8 × 10^6 bytes, C++/Rust, no Electron · 4/4
The third and fourth rows are the diagnostic ones. A per-user installer that writes to
%ProgramFiles% is a machine-scoped installer wearing a per-user costume. The user was told the offer
was theirs; the offer was provisioned for the machine, under a token that no one is going to ask about
again. This is the operational definition of a household install without a household prompt —
PreventNonAdminInstall/AppLocker written for the logical user will not restrain it, because the user
who accepted it is a member of the machine's Administrators.
7.9 The vendor's own description of the bargain
Four of the five offers state the trade explicitly. Collected verbatim:
Glory — *"Clip recent gameplay, record full sessions, and capture high-quality screenshots with ease. ✓ HD gameplay recording ✓ Save recent gameplay clips ✓ One-click screenshots ✓ Share recordings with a link ✓ Lightweight and free to use. Glory includes bandwidth sharing to help support the free service and reduce ads. Your device may function as a network exit node, and your public IP address may be used for commercial web traffic."*
AdReject — *"Block all annoying ads and trackers on your PC. ✓ Works for all browsers and apps ✓ Lightweight and free to use. AdReject includes bandwidth sharing to help support the free service and reduce ads. By accepting the offer you also accept our terms and bandwidth sharing to be enabled. It can be disabled at any time in the settings."*
AIChat — *"Free access to premium AI chat models… The application shares your bandwidth to support the free use of the application."*
PremierOpinion — (see §7.10) the full Comscore participation instrument, including "Comscore's use of this software to run in the background and connect to and monitor other applications" and the special-category consent.
OperaGX — "We recommend Opera GX… The browser can be uninstalled at any given moment."
This is the report's most important single observation about disclosure:
The two products that share the user's bandwidth most aggressively (Glory, AdReject) describe it most
precisely — including the phrase "network exit node" and the phrase "your public IP address may be used for
commercial web traffic", which are the only two places in the entire bundle where a lay reader is told what
a proxy actually is. The third-party products describe it less precisely: AIChat says "shares your
bandwidth" without saying with whom, and PremierOpinion does not mention bandwidth at all (it is not a
bandwidth product; it measures behaviour).
The comparison to draw is therefore not "honest versus dishonest". It is "self-disclosing versus self-silent":
| Disclosure present in bundle | Present in AN Soft products | Present in third-party products |
|---|---|---|
| The word bandwidth | yes | yes (AIChat) |
| What is taken (upload capacity / MX egress) | yes ("bandwidth sharing") | no |
| What it becomes ("network exit node") | yes (Glory) | no |
| What is exposed ("public IP address… commercial web traffic") | yes (Glory) | no |
| Whether it can be turned off ("disabled at any time in the settings") | yes (AdReject) | no |
| Whether the user is paid | no | no |
| Whether acceptance is pre-ticked | no (a click) | no (a click) |
The bundle is, in disclosure terms, more honest than the median free Windows utility and less honest than the median paid one. Both halves of that sentence are supported (§10.6), and neither is the same claim as "it is or isn't a stealer".
7.10 targetGeos and the Germany exclusion
operagx []
aichat ["DE","AT","CH","IT","FR","ES","GB"] ← positive list, includes DE
glory ["!DE"] ← negative list, excludes DE
adreject ["!DE"] ← negative list, excludes DE
po [28 countries] ← includes DE
The two bandwidth products owned by AN Soft are suppressed in exactly one country, and the third-party bandwidth product targets that same country first. Four hypotheses, with the evidence that discriminates between them:
| Hypothesis | Predicts | Verdict |
|---|---|---|
| Germany monetises poorly | DE excluded from all bandwidth offers | Rejected — AIChat sells into DE positively |
| German users churn / complain | DE excluded from first-party only | Consistent |
| Legal/consent friction in DE (GDPR + TTDSG §25 consent for non-essential processing; strict §305–310 BGB terms control; active Verbraucherzentrale enforcement on "free" software; strong VPN culture reducing node value) | first-party products, which carry the vendor's legal entity and address, withdraw; an arm's-length third party with its own terms takes the exposure | Consistent with every data point |
| A/B artefact | no stable pattern | Rejected — two independent products, persistent across probes |
Finding F‑24 — The Germany exclusion is a deliberate risk-placement decision, not a yield decision. Confidence Moderate. A single-country exclusion would be weak evidence; an exclusion of the same country by both first-party bandwidth products belonging to a Dutch company — while the third-party bandwidth product includes it and the wrapper's own ad stack is global — is a repeated, consistent pattern. It implies the operator priced something country-specific as risk rather than as CPM, and risk that attaches to the first-party legal entity is, in the ordinary course, regulatory.
---RPT8 wc -l ByteBreaker_V1_85892839_Report.md
8. Commercial model and attribution
8.1 The entity that built the Subject
The version resource, the Authenticode leaf, the CodeView path and the vendor's own web copy agree on the following, each field corroborated at least twice:
| Field | Value | Sources |
|---|---|---|
| Trading name | AN Soft | cert CN/O; CompanyName (§3.4); about.php |
| Trading brands | FileDM / Filedm (filedm.com) |
about.php: "FileDM is an AN Soft operation" |
| API brands | dlsft.com, directfiledl.com |
literals (§5.1) |
| Country | Netherlands | cert C=NL; contact.php |
| Locality | Bergen op Zoom, Noord-Brabant | cert L=/ST=; contact.php |
| Address | Halleystraat 32, 4624 SB Bergen op Zoom | contact.php |
| Telephone | +31 6 11866277 (mobile) | contact.php |
| KvK / CoC | 61185515 | contact.php |
| Established | 2013 — "has since then operated a multitude of interesting web projects" | about.php |
| Developer of record | Windows profile Samim |
RSDS in Subject; RSDS in Glory.exe |
| Signing certificate | SSL.com OV, ECC, serial 158467513303841965040394699300328354453, 2026‑06‑11 → 2027‑06‑11 |
§3.7 |
Finding F‑15 — The Subject's signer and the platform that distributes it are the same legal entity.
Confidence High. The certificate subject of the wrapper is AN Soft; the commercial operator of
filedm.com/dlsft.com states on its own About page "FileDM is an AN Soft operation". There is no
publisher-supplier separation to model: the wrapper is not third-party download-manager software that the
publisher licensed, it is a vertical service of the distribution platform, like a CDN edge or a
payment checkout.
This single fact reorganises the attribution graph (§8.3): there are not two commercial parties (platform + publisher) supporting the user, there are three (energy + optimisation + attention), and the platform is also one of the product suppliers.
The single authenticating number is 61185515 — the Dutch Chamber of Commerce (KvK) registration. A
KvK number is a legal fact and can be resolved against the register independently of anything in the
binary. Every other identifier in this report is a technical fact (a hash, a GUID, an RVA) that says
"this is the same file"; 61185515 says "this is the same legal person" — which is the fact a
provenance argument needs and a hash cannot supply.
8.2 The entity's product line: what the same developer built
The strongest evidence of how the platform works is not in the Subject — it is in the fact that the platform's own two products run the same fetch-and-execute machinery as its wrapper does.
Glory.exe (offer 2, built by AN Soft) contains the SQLite schema of a media-capture application.
glory/themes/…, TEXT, INTEGER, REAL, blob, "clip_enabled", "qrkoti", and the SQL type
tokens are fragments emitted by the C++ sqlite3 interface at compile time on the same pattern as
Quorum.dll's literals: "clip_enabled" is a settings key, TEXT/INTEGER/REAL/blob are the
five accepted column affinities, and <root>\glory\themes\… is a provisioned asset tree. The
pertinence is not what the schema means for clips; it is that the vendor provisions assets the same
way twice — one directory tree per concern, addressed by absolute path under the install root, with
a JSON manifest beside it (theme.evon here, manifest/secrets there).
glory/themes/… — absolute, hard-coded, three-deep theme paths:
settings: <root>\glory\themes\<name>\.theme.json
<root>\glory\themes\<name>\fonts\font.ttf
<root>\glory\themes\<name>\…
<root>\glory\themes\fonts\…
Four absolute paths with \.theme.json suffixes, all under <root>\glory\themes\; a fifth path is
relative. There is no %APPDATA%, no SHGetFolderPath, no KRKN/szLicence — the theme system is
addressed against one root and fails closed for any name it is not told about.
Glory + / title>Glory</ / Honeygain / — Privacy Policy / — Terms of Service / — 2026 are
complete in Glory.exe and absent in Glory.exe: i.e. Glory.exe is Glory.exe with every
occurrence of the word Glory excised in the titlebar and dialog captions, and one occurrence in a link
left as …glory.tv….
hgsdk_* — the eleven SDK functions — are called by name, each in exactly one place, with
an if (hgsdk_missing) return; guard:
/* Glory.exe, from the Honeygain integration */
p_init = GetProcAddress(hgsdk, "hgsdk_init");
p_identify = GetProcAddress(hgsdk, "hgsdk_identify");
p_optin = GetProcAddress(hgsdk, "hgsdk_opt_in");
p_optout = GetProcAddress(hgsdk, "hgsdk_opt_out");
p_isoptin = GetProcAddress(hgsdk, "hgsdk_is_opted_in");
p_start = GetProcAddress(hgsdk, "hgsdk_start");
p_stop = GetProcAddress(hgsdk, "hgsdk_stop");
p_isrunning = GetProcAddress(hgsdk, "hgsdk_is_running");
p_consent = GetProcAddress(hgsdk, "hgsdk_request_consent");
p_mute = GetProcAddress(hgsdk, "hgsdk_mute");
p_log = GetProcAddress(hgsdk, "hgsdk_log");
and its user-facing strings:
"HoneygainSdk: missing export" — diagnostic, perhaps the only honest error in the bundle
"Using Xeno " — (engine, unrelated)
"bandwidthSharingEnabled" — settings key
"… bandwidth sharing to help support the free service …"
"… disable it … "
The presence of hgsdk_request_consent as a resolved symbol with a call site proves the integration
can ask; the presence of hgsdk_opt_in also as a resolved symbol with a call site proves it also
can't-be-asked-and-just-does. In a correct integration the consent callback is wired to opt_in;
in a sloppy one opt_in is called at startup and request_consent is a dead export in the table.
Resolving which by static analysis is not possible from the strings (OQ‑4), which is precisely
why the compensation structure is the more reliable indicator: AN Soft is paid for bandwidth, not for
consent. (OQ‑4.)
8.3 The three-party chain, drawn
┌───────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ rizve — author of Xeno │
"engine" │ · Luau 0.6xx fork, NativeAOT .NET 9 │
(supply) │ · bytecode-patch executor (the executor) │
│ · no revenue from ByteBreaker │──┐
└───────────────────────────────────────────────┘ │ free &
▲ Project path in PDB (§6.5) │ publicly
│ │ archived
┌───────────┴───────────────────────────────────┐ │
│ "Evon" — re-skinner │ │
│ · theme pack, HTML shell, TestKey marker │◄───┘
│ · distribution of the ZIP │
└───────────┬───────────────────────────────────┘
│ distributes
▼
┌───────────────────────────────────────────────┐ ┌──────────────────────┐
│ AN Soft / FileDM (KvK 61185515) │ pays │ InstallUnion/PPI │
"wrapper" │ · build: Downloader.exe, Glory, AdReject │◄───────│ campaign 1538 │
(demand) │ · property: filedm.com, dlsft.com, dlswift… │ │ TAP funnel │
│ · distribution: wrapper + offers + assets │ └──────────────────────┘
└───────────┬───────────────────────────────────┘
│ delivers
▼
┌───────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ the user, who wanted a Roblox exploit │
└───────────────────────────────────────────────┘
Three commercial observations:
- Zero of the three parties touches the user's credentials, and each party's revenue is a different unit: rizve (reputation), Evon (retention / re-brand), AN Soft (install + egress + impression).
- The chain is stable in one direction and fragile in the other. Rizve can abandon Xeno; Evon can stop paying or stop publishing; AN Soft can pivot campaigns. Only AN Soft has a contract with the user, and it is a click. Everything to the left of that click is someone else's commercial relationship, and none of it is disclosed at the click.
- Every party profits from the user pressing Accept, and only one party profits from the user being installed at all. rizve's incentive ends when the ZIP downloads. Evon's ends when the executor appears. AN Soft's only begins there.
8.4 Campaigns, sub-campaigns and the channel field
InstallUnion PPI network (advertising exchange)
└─ campaign 1538 the commercial deal referenced by the Subject (hard-coded)
└─ channel IU InstallUnion, passed as a child-process argument by AN Soft products
└─ "default" the value the Subject sends; a *label*, not a key
└─ id per-installation counter (85892839)
The chain is shallow and honest: campaign_id=1538&tpi=InstallUnion states network and campaign; the
child processes state --channel IU; the identifier states which install of the wrapper. There is no
hidden second campaign, no re-branding layer, no "traffic source" beyond the one hard-coded string.
But the hierarchy is not monetarily flat: the PPI network is an exchange. Publishers sell installs into it; advertisers buy them out of it; the exchange intermediating (InstallUnion) sets a clearing price per country and per offer. The 1538 deal is therefore a buy-side contract (AN Soft supplying supply-side installs) against a sell-side contract (each of the five offers paying per its unit). The two halves of the exchange have different incentives — the sell side wants every install monetised at maximum value; the buy side wants installs that pass its quality filters — and an exchange's margin is the difference it can hide between them (floor price minus clearing price).
That is enough structure to explain the four things that would otherwise be arbitrary in this report:
- Why the funnel is instrumented 8 times rather than once. A sell-side contract is per-event; reach and conversion must be provable per offer to be billable.
- Why the fallback/default exists. The wrapper must be monetisable on day 1, before any advertiser has bought inventory for the ByteBreaker listing. A default product ("Unzipper") is revenue in the absence of a roadmap.
- Why the ZIP is stale. The distribution contract pays on download, not on product freshness; nothing in the economics rewards re-packaging the engine.
- Why Germany is excluded from the first-party products but not from the market. Sell-side contracts carry per-country compliance obligations; buy-side contracts only carry a country code. F‑24.
8.5 Why Roblox exploits are the chosen vertical
The vertical selection is not accidental, and it is worth stating because it explains why the quality of the engine (Xeno) and the quality of the wrapper are so unrelated:
| Property of the vertical | Commercial consequence |
|---|---|
| The buyer is 13–17, credit-card-poor, parental-card-rich | no card needed for the user; CPA paid on the parent's household |
| The buyer is permanently out of pocket — every Roblox patch breaks every script | renewable demand: the user returns weekly for the next build, watching ads again |
| Zero-price expectation — a paid executor must be twice as good | price is expressed in attention, not money — the unit PPI sells |
| High technical churn — the underlying method is "detected" and replaced | the publisher can migrate customers between engines (Xeno → Xeno 2 → …) without owning one |
| Anonymous, non-reviewable distribution — no Steam page, no store listing, no refund | trivial re-branding: nine strings (§6.6) |
| Community distrust, community expertise — the audience can use Process Monitor | the wrapper must be technically defensible, not merely opaque — hence openap + a real engine |
| Cartelised traffic — a small number of YouTube channels move the download | distribution is centralised by the audience, so payoffs are predictable |
The seventh row is the one with the most explanatory power, and the least intuition: the audience is the most technically literate consumer of "free software" on the internet. It is also the least likely to be able to act on that literacy (no VM habit, no offline-first instinct, no patience for five pages of wizard). That combination is precisely what a transparent wrapper with an honest browser offer monetises best, and what an opaque wrapper with a dark bundle monetises worst. The output of that incentive — a wrapper that hides not its purpose but the economics of the purpose — is exactly what was assessed. It is a rational product for the market. It is the wrong product for the market if the market ever learns to read §7.9.
9. Data collection and privacy assessment
9.1 Complete outbound footprint
Every datum the Subject and the delivered product transmit, with its destination, encoding and observer. There are no others: the literal pools of all four binaries were enumerated and each URL/format string was traced to its producer.
| # | Datum | Format | Destination | Transport | Produced by | Observable to |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | installation id | 16 hex | every dlsft.com request (&uid=, JSON userID) |
TLS | server (/geo/) |
operator, TAP, Cloudflare |
| 2 | country | ISO-3166 α2 | not sent; used locally against targetGeos |
— | server (/geo/) |
nobody |
| 3 | product id | 8 dec | getDownloadInfo?name=, directfiledl?id= |
TLS / plain | filename | operator, file host, path observer |
| 4 | campaign + network | 1538, InstallUnion |
TAP query, child argv, HKCU key | plain HTTP / argv | compile-time | ad network, any process, any LAN |
| 5 | consent decision | 1 / absent |
TAP action_id, HKCU, BundleOfferActionUid |
mixed | user click | operator, network, any local user |
| 6 | consent version | decimal | TAP consent_version= |
plain HTTP | compile-time | ad network, path |
| 7 | offer id | po-2 |
dpdv3?co=, BundleOfferActionUid |
TLS / registry | compile-time | operator, local |
| 8 | staging filename | ADR/GLY + 4 hex + .exe |
%TEMP% |
filesystem | GetTempFileNameW |
any local process able to list %TEMP%; the file host |
| 9 | presence state | "Playing ByteBreaker", Roblox userId, placeId, secretA, secretB |
Discord IPC (discord-ipc-*) → Discord servers |
local pipe, then Discord's own TLS | engine | Discord, friends list, any process that can open the pipe |
| 10 | Roblox server identity | placeId |
presence (above) and join-request echo | local pipe | engine | friends of friends (presence is public to Discord's "playing" surface) |
| 11 | execution volume | script count, session seconds | nothing — summarised locally only, in logs\ |
— | engine | anyone who reads the log folder |
| 12 | system clock | implicit | all of the above | — | OS | — |
| 13 | IP address | TCP source | all of the above | — | network | every host on the path, and every CDN in front of it |
| 14 | proxy-egress identity | IP + port + TLS-ext order | connect.sdk.honeygain.com |
TLS | Honeygain SDK | Honeygain, UAB |
9.2 Negative evidence: what is not collected
The following probes were run case-insensitively against the complete literal strings of every component, including UTF‑16 runs and the Rust/SQLite/blob regions:
| Probe | Subject | Engine | Bridge | Launcher | Glory | AdReject | AIChat |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
ROBLOSECURITY |
– | – | – | – | – | – | – |
RobloxCookies |
– | – | – | – | – | – | – |
LocalStorage |
– | – | – | – | – | – | – |
Login Data · Web Data · Cookies (SQLite) |
– | – | – | – | – | – | – |
Local State · os_crypt |
– | – | – | – | – | – | – |
places.sqlite · logins.json · key4.db |
– | – | – | – | – | – | – |
leveldb · Local Storage |
– | – | – | – | – | – | – |
discord (as a path) |
present | present | – | – | – | – | – |
Registry\…\Discord |
– | – | – | – | – | – | – |
wallet.dat · Exodus · Electrum · Atomic |
– | – | – | – | – | – | – |
MetaMask · Keystore · eth |
– | – | – | – | – | – | – |
Steam · ssfn · Battle.net · Riot |
– | – | – | – | – | – | – |
tdata · Telegram · key_datas |
– | – | – | – | – | – | – |
FileZilla · recentservers.xml · siteman |
– | – | – | – | – | – | – |
CryptUnprotectData · DPAPI |
– | – | – | – | – | – | – |
sqlite3_open · sqlite3_ |
– | present | – | – | present | present | present |
MachineGuid · VolumeSerial · GetAdaptersInfo |
– | – | – | – | – | – | – |
GetUserNameW · GetComputerNameW |
– | – | – | – | – | – | – |
GetSystemInfo · GlobalMemoryStatusEx |
– | – | – | – | – | – | – |
GetVersionEx · RtlGetVersion |
– | – | – | – | – | – | – |
SecurityCenter2 · EnumServicesStatus (AV / integrity) |
– | – | – | – | – | – | – |
NtQueryInformationProcess · IsDebuggerPresent |
– | – | – | – | – | – | – |
vbscript · mshta · powershell (LOLBins) |
– | – | – | – | – | – | – |
SetWindowsHookEx · GetAsyncKeyState (input) |
– | – | – | – | – | – | – |
GetClipboardData · SetClipboardData |
– | – | – | – | – | present | – |
CreateToolhelp32Snapshot · Process32First |
– | – | – | – | – | – | – |
InternetCrackUrl · WinHttpCrackUrl (own URL parsing) |
– | present | – | – | – | – | – |
The one non-absent entry worth attention is GetClipboardData/SetClipboardData in AdReject.exe
(this is the miniz presence, not a clipboard tool — see §9.4). It has no reader:
AdReject.exe attaches no WM_CLIPBOARDUPDATE listener and contains no OpenClipboard/GetClipboardData
import, so it does not read clipboard contents. It writes (for the license/copy-to-clipboard control)
and never reads — the minimum required for a "copy key" button, and the absence of clipboard-reading is a
positive finding against the class of "clipboard-stealing executors".
9.3 The three consent mechanisms, and their deficiencies
| Mechanism | Where | Mechanism of record | Deficiency |
|---|---|---|---|
| Bundle offer | Subject, wizard page 4 | HKCU\…\BundleOfferActionUid = URL; Consent = 1 before child launch |
default action is Accept; Cancel writes state=3, which is ignored; the recorded "consent" precedes and does not require completion |
| SDK opt-in | Glory / hgsdk | hgsdk_request_consent callback → UI → hgsdk_opt_in / opt_out |
which is called, and whether on first run, was not resolved (OQ‑4); the serialised default "bandwidth_enabled":true is the value written when there is nothing to read |
| Panel | PO, description text | Comscore participation instrument, -c:1538 -t:InstallUnion |
pre-existing; accepts on behalf of "all other users of this device, including minors"; no privacy/eula field — the text is the offer description |
Finding F‑21 — Consent is recorded but not demonstrated. Confidence High. In three of the four mechanisms that reach a registry key in this chain, the marker is written before the user performs the action that the marker claims to record:
- the Subject writes
ConsentbeforeCreateProcessW; a child that fails to start, crashes at0xC0000135or is quarantined by AV leavesConsent=1behind (§4.6); - the Subject writes
BundleOfferActionUidat page completion, which on a 2-page offer is reached whether the user Accepted or Declined (§4.8); - the SDK's
is_opted_inis a state, not an event, so "opted in" survives anopt_outthat failed to persist.
Only the TAP funnel actually distinguishes Accept (action_id=8) from Decline (action_id=9) — and it
is sent to a third party over plain HTTP, which is the one recipient that cannot be trusted to
have a legal interest in the record.
9.4 Fingerprinting versus licensing
QuorumAPI.dll contains MachineKeysetAlgorithm, SameMachine, StrongNamePublicKeyBlob,
LicenseFile, IsApplicationTrustedToRun and Authenticode. These are the vocabulary of
.NET machine-keyed licensing — CryptoAPI machine key containers, which are generated on first use
and stored site-bound under %APPDATA%\Microsoft\Crypto\Keys/%PROGRAMDATA%\…, and which are what a
SameMachine check means.
The distinction, stated precisely because it is routinely elided:
| Practice | Mechanism | Persistence | Cross-app linkability | Privacy interest |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Machine-key licensing (present here) | a key pair generated locally, used to seal a licence blob; the provider never learns the machine | stable per machine, per store | none — two apps generate independent keys | low: it is a secret, not an identifier |
| Hardware fingerprinting (absent here) | hash of MachineGuid + VolumeSerial + MAC + CPU + RAM + disk + SMBIOS, transmitted |
stable per machine, per vendor | full — every vendor can compute the same tuple | high: it is a stable cross-site identifier |
The Subject is in the first class. That is a genuinely better design than the (much more common)
second, and the analysis of the literal pool supports it: there is no call to GetVolumeInformation,
GetAdaptersInfo, GetComputerNameW, SystemInfo (there is no GetSystemInfo import),
GlobalMemoryStatusEx, Win32_ComputerSystem, Win32_BIOS or WMI anywhere in any of the three
binaries, and therefore no component from which a hardware identifier could be constructed.
9.5 Special-category data (po)
The comScore participation text is distinct from the other offers: it is the only one that enumerates purposes, scope and categories. Its scope claims are unusually broad for consumer software:
- runs in the background;
- connects to and monitors other applications;
- measures all online behaviour of all device users, including secure sessions, web forms and shopping baskets;
- shares with third parties;
- consent covers precise geolocation and data that may reveal race/ethnicity, religious beliefs, political opinions, trade-union membership, health information, sex life or sexual orientation, and citizenship or immigration status;
- the user consents on behalf of all other users of the device, including minors.
That last clause is the one that survives cross-checking best. It is present in the served feed, it is retained verbatim in the delivered offer object, and it is the clause that §9.7's privacy assessment should rest on: the product records the consent of the person at the keyboard and binds the absent parties to the same terms.
9.6 Who can see what
| Observer | What it can learn | How |
|---|---|---|
| AN Soft (operator) | installation id, country, product id, consent decision, consent version, funnel timings, client IP, User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 |
all 16 events, server-side |
| InstallUnion (network) | campaign, funnel events, per-event reach | TAP, plaintext HTTP |
| Securestudies (measurement) | campaign, uid, action, order-of-events | TAP + dpdv3, plaintext |
| Opera / its affiliate network | click, install, publisher slug FileDM |
tracking URL |
| comScore / VoiceFive | participation, panel data | panel installer |
| Honeygain, UAB | your IP as a peer; the traffic it relays | egress |
| Whatever Honeygain's customers are | your IP as a source of requests | egress |
| Cloudflare | every request's destination, timing, ASN, UA | CDN |
| Your ISP | that you downloaded 16.7 MB from a Hetzner box over plain HTTP | transit; and the exact bytes, if they are TEE'd |
| Hetzner | the same, at rest | hosting |
| Any unprivileged local process | the consent receipt, the two Consent flags, the staging names — and therefore “this account accepted an offer, on this date” |
HKCU read; directory listing |
| Discord, and every member of your friends list | that you were playing ByteBreaker, and which Roblox game | presence, public by default |
The row worth dwelling on is the fourth from the bottom, because it is the only disclosure in this
table that no privacy notice mentions and no setting can suppress. HKCU is readable by every
process in the user's session, by every service running as that user, and by every administrative tool
— and it is enumerable, which is the property that matters. A host does not have to open
BundleOfferActionUid to learn that its owner accepts offers: the key's mere existence, alongside the
two Consent flags the wrapper writes before the installers run (§9.3), is sufficient, and it costs a
directory listing. Combined with the absence of an uninstaller (§12.1), the residual is permanent — the
receipt is removed only by hand.
It is a small thing, and it is the only small thing in this section that is also a classification: "users of this machine accept software offers" is exactly the kind of predicate that ad-targeting and licensing systems buy. The Subject's own designers cannot have objected: they wrote the key, and they paid for it in clarity.
9.7 Privacy assessment
| Criterion | Rating | Basis |
|---|---|---|
| Data minimisation by the wrapper | Good | 3 scalars transmitted; no free-text; no OS, locale, screen, install or account data (§9.1 rows 1–9) |
| Purpose limitation | Poor | one datum (the installation id) is used for attribution, statistical cohort and consent audit; no separate consent per purpose |
| Transparency | Adequate | offer descriptions disclose the trade; but the operators "InstallUnion — Network" do not disclose Honeygain, the SDK version, or the proxy category |
| Consent quality | Poor | see §9.3 — one event recorded, two unproven, one default-true |
| Retention | Unknown | no retention interval appears in any binary; Cache-Control: max-age=14400 describes CDN retention, not log retention |
| Rights (GDPR) | Unknown, contactable | AN Soft is a Dutch B.V./V.O.F. (KvK) with a real postal address; the law applies. No privacy contact was found other than privacy@tmrginc.com, which is comScore's, not AN Soft's |
| Recipients | Enumerateable | five commercial parties + Cloudflare + Hetzner; no broker aggregation |
| Categorisation | Low | no special-category data by the wrapper; special-category by po only if accepted, and there with explicit (if boilerplate) consent text |
| Technical safeguards | Weak | one datum over plain HTTP; one datum over DFS-listing-readable registry; product integrity unverified; no TLS on the data plane |
Finding F‑25 — Data protection posture is dominated by mechanism, not by scope. Confidence Moderate. The controller collects little and aches the fewest places in its peer group — but what little it collects is transmitted with controls that would fail a competent DPIA:
- a cross-site identifier (
uid=) over plaintext, logged by the recipient in cleartext; - no
hsts,.phpoverhttp:, no integrity on the product; - a local persisted state (
BundleOfferActionUid) that is user-accepted only in text and never in a subprocessor list.
The data protection risk here is not likely to be assessed highly by a risk-calculation formula because the volume is negligible and no legal rights hinge on a 16-hex installation counter. The risk with material teeth is the size of the third-party population that the model hands data to (Honeygain alone, per egress §9.6), and the size of the population subject to the consent clause for minors (every household; HIPAA-adjacent if ever marketed as a health service, which it is not).
9.8 Adjudication
| Property | A typical free Windows utility | This Subject | Best practice |
|---|---|---|---|
| analytics SDK | yes, opaque | no — one ad-network pixel, one vendor callback, both enumerable | minimal |
| browser bundle | yes, pre-selected | yes — visible, first, and not pre-selected | visible |
| upsell / nag | yes, at exit | no — no exit funnel, no timer, no trial | none |
| key system / paywall | often | no | none |
| autostart | usually | no | none |
| uninstaller | yes (MSI/NSIS) | no — delete-and-forget | yes (class-worst row) |
| telemetry scope | device + usage | 3 scalars, server-issued id | minimal |
| data-plane transport | TLS | plain HTTP, no 443 listener | TLS |
| product integrity | signed or hashed | unverified | verified |
Which is the summary judgement of the wrapper's craft: ahead of its class on six rows, behind on three, and the three are all mechanism while the six are all restraint. It does less, it does it deliberately, and it does not build the plumbing that would make what it does defensible when the offer bundle changes.
| nag screen | none (no key system, no trial) | ✔✔ |
| autostart | none | ✔ |
| uninstallable | no uninstaller at all | ✘ (class-worst) |
10. Risk assessment
10.1 Method
Findings are stated once, with an identifier, and are then rated on two independent axes:
- Severity — consequence if the finding materialises, for a representative consumer user:
Critical/High/Moderate/Low/Informational. - Confidence — strength of the evidence for this report:
High/Moderate/Low, per the convention in §2.3.
Severity is a property of the finding; confidence is a property of the analysis. They are not multiplied and no risk score is asserted: the arithmetic of risk matrices is not reproducible across analysts and a bare number invites false precision. A finding rated Moderate / High should be actioned; a finding rated High / Low should be investigated further before being actioned.
10.2 Findings register
| ID | Finding | Severity | Conf. |
|---|---|---|---|
| F‑01 | The Subject is a generic, server-driven PPI wrapper whose behaviour is not determinable from the binary: the product, its name, its banner, its legal text, its payload and its offer set are all supplied at run time. | Moderate | High |
| F‑02 | Product identity is keyed on an eight-digit server-side row id embedded in the filename; the human-readable portion is decoration. The id is stable, publishable and enumerable (§6.2). | Informational | High |
| F‑03 | The Subject is Authenticode-signed to a real, resolvable Dutch legal entity (AN Soft, KvK 61185515) with an OV certificate countersigned by a public TSA. Authenticity is therefore stated; only the vendor's conduct is unstated. | Low | High |
| F‑04 | The delivered executor is a third-party re-brand of Xeno (rizve); "ByteBreaker" comprises nine strings across four files. There is no ByteBreaker engineering, no ByteBreaker organisation and no ByteBreaker continuity plan. | Low | High |
| F‑05 | The launcher is Themida-protected: import table reduced to one, sections unnamed, timestamp invalidated, managed metadata relocated. Protector-driven AV heuristics therefore fire irrespective of the product's behaviour, and static byte-signatures have a short half-life. | Moderate | High |
| F‑06 | The managed bridge (QuorumAPI.dll) is unobfuscated: 184 types, 964 methods, original names, including the full executor API and the theme/licence model. It is the cheapest and most complete source of product documentation available to an analyst — and to a competitor. |
Low (to user) / Moderate (to vendor IP) | High |
| F‑07 | The engine is a .NET 9 NativeAOT image exporting a six-function C ABI (Initialize/Attach/Execute/GetClients/SetSetting/Version), with a statically linked Luau VM whose revision is dateable to the Luau* internal feature-gate names. |
Informational | High |
| F‑08 | Remote configuration is fetched from two byte-identical mirrors (Pastebin, Cloudflare Pages) and interpreted as the engine's hot-loadable "RBXClient data". Neither mirror is authenticated, both are mutable without notice, and the primary is behind a four-hour CDN cache: unbounded staleness with no version negotiation. | Moderate | High |
| F‑09 | The configuration envelope is AEAD with a fixed 12+16 byte layout (nonce₁₂ ‖ zstd(JSON) ‖ tag₁₆) and a runtime-derived key: a 9 366 416-candidate sweep of the engine image found no static key (§6.14). The plaintext and hence the client's actual instruction set remain unavailable to static analysis. |
Moderate‑High | High (envelope) / Moderate (key origin) |
| F‑10 | A Medal (Rust, medalCli, clap) Luau decompiler binary is shipped alongside the executor, exposing bytecode-to-source as a supported workflow and a first-class attack surface for deobfuscation. |
High | High |
| F‑11 | The bundled scripts are unpinned master/main loads (infiniteyield, orb/orca, dex) executed on user click, each from a different trust domain — one of which (infyiff/backup) is a third-party mirror rather than the canonical repo. |
Moderate‑High | High |
| F‑12 | The Windows .evon theme/manifest format is internal-only, undocumented, and parsed by a home-grown parser; ThemeManufacturer:"Evon" is the sole self-attributed party in the deliverable. |
Low | High |
| F‑13 | Discord Rich Presence with join/spectate secrets is implemented, bound to Roblox userId and placeId; presence publishes that the user is running ByteBreaker, and — with show_game — the Roblox place name to every member of their Discord friends list. |
Low (privacy: Moderate for minors) | Moderate‑High |
| F‑14 | The engine reads Environment.UserName and surfaces it in the WebView2 user-agent, all desktop-session environment variables and the install path. Presence leaks one datum; the UI leaks the rest. |
Low | High |
| F‑15 | The Subject's signer and its distribution platform are the same legal entity (§8.1). There is no independent "download manager vendor" to which the product's provenance can be delegated; the platform is an interested party, and it is one of the five product suppliers. | Moderate | High |
| F‑16 | The offer bundle is five items over three monetisation units: one CPA browser, two first-party proxyware products, one third-party proxyware app, one market-research panel. The vertical selected is one in which proxyware is the natural second revenue line to ad-blocking, so the bundle is coherent rather than random. | Moderate | High |
| F‑17 | 3 of 5 offers exchange idle uplink for value; on acceptance the host becomes a residential proxy exit node, sanctioned by a one-line description and a pre-ticked default ("bandwidth_enabled":true). |
High | High |
| F‑18 | Egress is mediated by the Honeygain SDK 1.5.0, an organisation/EV-signed Lithuanian component (Honeygain, UAB, SERIALNUMBER=306103177, Vilnius) with a consent API that the host may or may not call (§8.2, OQ‑4). |
High | High (presence) / Moderate (consent path) |
| F‑19 | AdReject loads a kernel-mode packet-interception driver (WinDivert64.sys) and applies user-mode domain policy from a single third-party GitHub branch with a 32 MiB ceiling, a relative size-change guard and last-known-good rollback. The blast radius of the driver is the whole host; the blast radius of the policy is the operator's ambition. |
High | High |
| F‑20 | Elevation is speculative (§4.5): requireAdministrator is bought before the offer set is known, and no offer requires machine scope (--allusers=0, /S, no /ALLUSERS). The user's only consent gate is presented before the thing consented to is named. |
Moderate‑High | High |
| F‑21 | The product archive is delivered over plain HTTP from a single host with no 443 listener, and is not verified client-side (no length, hash, signature or PE check). Integrity rests on one 13-character constant (§5.4). | Moderate‑High | High |
| F‑22 | The packaged engine is stale against its own manifest (1.2.0 vs 1.4.816), so the bytes assessed are a strict subset of the bytes that will run (§6.16). Static assessment cannot be transitively closed. |
Moderate | Moderate‑High |
| F‑23 | Consent markers (Consent, BundleOfferActionUid) are written before and independently of the corresponding action succeeding (§9.3); on a 2-page offer, Decline and Accept both complete the page and both write the receipt. |
Moderate | High |
| F‑24 | Germany is excluded from both first-party bandwidth products by a !DE negative list, while the third-party bandwidth product is positively targeted at DE AT CH IT FR ES GB. The pattern is consistent with risk placement, not yield optimisation (§7.10). |
Low | Moderate |
| F‑25 | The wrapper's data protection posture is minimal in scope, weak in mechanism: 3 scalars, an unlinkable 64-bit server-issued id, no hardware identifiers — but a cross-site id over plaintext, a home-grown link mask presented as a security code, product integrity unverified, and a local state readable by any desktop process. | Moderate | High |
| F‑26 | No credential-store, cookie-store, wallet, keylogger, clipboard-read or clipboard-write capability exists in any of the four assessed components (§9.2); the absent primitives are the defining ones of those classes. | Informational | High |
10.3 The three fault lines
Three structural properties explain almost every finding above, and would survive a re-brand, a re-engineer or a re-customer:
L1 — The decision to elevate is separated from the information needed to justify it.
Manifest-level requireAdministrator is evaluated at process start, before Bootstrap(), before the
offer feed, before the product descriptor, before SetSetting("autoexec"). Every later decision —
which offers, how many, from where, verified how — is taken inside the elevated context. The
information required to decide whether elevation is warranted (the offer set) arrives after the
privilege (the token) is irrevocable. Nothing in the code attempts to re-establish parity; there is no
--no-admin path, no CreateRestrictedToken, no "some offers need admin" annotation in the feed. The
wrapper cannot de-escalate because the feed has no field that would tell it to.
L2 — Trust is transacted, not earned. Every trust decision the Subject makes is expressed as a constant in its own image:
`Mozilla/5.0` → trust the CDN (constant)
`SCI_multipart` → trust the file host (constant)
the 13-byte salt → trust the redirect (constant)
`INTERNET_OPEN_TYPE_DIRECT` → trust the system proxy settings (constant: ignore)
`%05x` arg-order → trust the offer feed (constant)
the UTF-8 names of the legal pages → trust the publisher's identity (constant)
the manifest `requireAdministrator` → trust that Administrator is safe (constant)
and nothing in the program is verifiable against a changing world: no signature validation, no hash comparison, no version negotiation, no certificate-pin, no expiry, no revocation, no signature of the product. Each constant is individually defensible and collectively unfalsifiable: an attacker with any one of them (the salt, the CDN, the feed) is inside the trust boundary. A professional product in 2026 would have replaced the salt with an Ed25519 signature over the descriptor, and would not have needed the salt at all.
L3 — The user is the last component in the supply chain to learn what the chain is.
The engineering data flows inward: the feed knows the offer set, the manifest knows the version,
the service knows the country, the SDK knows the accounting, the engine knows the Roblox identity. The
user-visible data flows never: five pages exist and none contains what has been installed,
where it lives, how to remove it, what version, what the download manager itself is, or that a
second party manufactured it. The single sentence in the entire visible interface that describes
the transaction honestly is the description of whichever offer the user happens to be looking at
(§7.9) — and that sentence is written by the advertiser, not by the vendor. The wrapper's own
copy is three words ("Download Manager", "Welcome to the", "Finish").
10.4 Scenarios
Illustrative, with likelihoods on the user-experience axis rather than the actuarial one.
| S | Scenario | Likelihood | Impact | Findings |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| S‑1 | User runs the stub, declines everything, wants only the exploit. Gets the exploit. No lasting change beyond %LOCALAPPDATA%\adreject+glory folders and three HKCU keys; disk +3 MB; one Discord presence entry. |
High | Low | F‑04, F‑15, F‑23 |
| S‑2 | User accepts the bundle offer, runs Glory to record a clip. Uplink is used continuously at low rate; IP appears in third-party geolocation logs; a household identity is now on a proxyware list. | High | Moderate | F‑16, F‑17, F‑18 |
| S‑3 | Same as S‑2, but on a metered 4G/5G router or a metered tether. Bleed = GB, billed at the cap floor, silently. | Moderate | High | F‑17, F‑18 |
| S‑4 | Same as S‑2, on a shared house or a dorm port. A peer's scrape originates from the user's address; the abuse notice is served on the household, not on the peer. | Moderate | Moderate | F‑18 |
| S‑5 | User accepts the bundle, AdReject is installed, and a WinDivert conflict arises with an existing VPN, security product or second proxyware client (two WFP callouts at the same layers is a classic conflict). The symptom is reported as "the VPN broke"; the cause is a 90 KB driver installed on six clicks. |
Low‑Moderate | Moderate | F‑19 |
| S‑6 | The Pastebin entry (A7n0vJtR) is edited by the owner, by pastebin.com staff, or is simply deleted for terms-violation (the usual fate of loader pastes). The primary returns 404; the fallback (Pages) is behind a Suspected-Malware filter on some resolvers. Cold starts fail, warm starts keep the cached blob, and the community reports "the executor stopped working for some people" — for a reason that has nothing to do with the executor. |
Moderate | Moderate | F‑08 |
| S‑7 | The encrypted blob is replaced with a valid but different one (stale, or generated for an older RBX version) — the client cannot tell, because there is no version field outside the ciphertext. Patch sites land wrong; the client fails after injection; to the user this is "ByteBreaker is broken after the Roblox update", and to the vendor it is invisible. | Low | Moderate | F‑08, F‑09 |
| S‑8 | The data plane is attacked. directfiledl.com is a bare Hetzner host on port 80. A network-position attacker (public Wi-Fi, a middlebox, a poisoned resolv, an ISP ad-injector) replaces the 16.7 MB ZIP. No check exists in the client (§5.4, F‑21). The user gets a ZIP, runs an executor, and it has the same file names as the expected one. |
Low | High | F‑21 |
| S‑9 | The engine is attacked. bin/Quorum.dll is unauthenticated managed code loaded by bytebreakerV1.exe; weakness −2 in §13.4, and a deliberate replacement of the engine by a sibling build passing Version() is simpler still. |
Low | High | F‑06, §13.4 |
| S‑10 | The user is targeted by a co-resident. Any unprivileged local process can read HKCU\…\BundleOfferActionUid and enumerate %LOCALAPPDATA%\adreject|glory, establishing "this user accepts offers" as a boolean — the cheapest behavioural segment on a Windows host, and enough to rank them. |
High (certain) | Low | F‑23, F‑25 |
The pair to read together is S‑1 and S‑2: the most likely outcome is benign, and the most likely interesting outcome is the one the user chose. The pair to read together next is S‑7 and S‑8: the mechanism is most fragile (content) and the transport is most fragile (integrity) at the same place, and that place is the one hop the vendor does not control.
10.5 Hypotheses tested
| # | Hypothesis | Method | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|
| H‑1 | "The 775 KB file is the exploit; the exploit is a stealer" | full-function decompilation, literal census | Rejected — no exploit code, no credential primitives, no product name |
| H‑2 | "It is an abandoned re-brand that will never be updated" | pinned library ages, engine commit cadence, live endpoints | Rejected — engine 2026‑10‑20, bridge 2026‑10‑27, manifest 2026‑10‑29, endpoints live at time of writing; the artefact is abandoned by the publisher, the upstream is not |
| H‑3 | "It is actively malicious, i.e. the 'offer' path is the payload path" | call-graph tracerpt between offer-feature and system-feature (no shared path), Consent gating |
Rejected — the two paths share CreateProcessW and nothing else |
| H‑4 | "It is a monetised file host with a hierarchical offer system, not an exploit shop" | /geo/ response, 701-id sparse scan, five offers with three different unit economics |
Supported (see §8) |
| H‑5 | "The vendor is a single developer, not a team" | one Windows profile, one PDB directory, two source files, 92 % of the code from libraries | Supported |
| H‑6 | "The executor is a reskin of a well-known engine" | PDB path, string census, Luau symbols | Supported — Xeno 1.x |
| H‑7 | "The bandwidth is monetised, i.e. the bundle is a proxyware funnel" | hgsdk.dll identity, hgsdk_* exports, "exit node" copy, !DE pattern |
Supported |
| H‑8 | "The legal pages are placeholders and the entity is unverifiable" | live /privacy.php, /terms.php, About page naming AN Soft, KnK, address, telephone |
Rejected — the entity is verified; the pages are boilerplate by both parties' standards |
| H‑9 | "The RequireAdministrator manifest is required by one of the five offers" |
five argument vectors; only AdReject's driver needs it; Opera explicitly does not | Rejected — it is taken speculatively, not functionally (F‑20) |
10.6 Aggregate assessment
The chain is best described as a monetisation funnel with one real product, four adjuncts and three revenue units, rather than as a piece of software with a purpose.
- It is not "malware" in the sense the word is used on the forums it will be discussed on: nothing hidden, nothing encrypted that claims not to be, no capability that contradicts its stated purpose.
- It is "unwanted" in the sense that matters: three of five offers change the network position of the host, one changes its kernel, one changes its survey population, none is asked for by name in the marketing that brings the user, and the one thing every user does want — the exploit — is the one thing nobody makes money from.
The honest single sentence is:
A competently engineered, transparently modelled, signed distribution wrapper that pays for a free Roblox exploit by selling three things the recipient was not thinking about at the moment of download: a browser install, an ad-blocking predicate, and the upload capacity of the connection.
11. Detection and indicators
11.1 Host indicators
Registry — the three durable, family-specific keys:
HKCU\SOFTWARE\InstallUnion\1538\BundleOfferActionUid REG_SZ <offer URL | uid>
HKCU\SOFTWARE\AdReject\Consent REG_DWORD 1
HKCU\SOFTWARE\Glory\Consent REG_DWORD 1
of which SOFTWARE\InstallUnion\1538\ is the best single pivot in the entire case: it is
created by the wrapper (not by the offers), it names the network and the campaign, it survives
uninstallation of everything it advertised, and it is shared by every product this campaign delivers —
so a single-key sweep across a fleet segments "exposed to InstallUnion campaign 1538" independently of
filename, hash or which product the user wanted.
Filesystem
%TEMP%\ADR<4 hex>.exe wrapper's brand-A staging (GetTempFileNameW "ADR" + ".exe")
%TEMP%\GLY<4 hex>.exe wrapper's brand-B staging
%LOCALAPPDATA%\adreject\file.txt brand-A state
%LOCALAPPDATA%\glory\file.txt brand-B state
%ProgramFiles%\Glory\ offer 2: Glory.exe, hgsdk.dll, sciter.dll
%ProgramFiles%\AdReject\ offer 3: AdReject.exe, WinDivert.dll, WinDivert64.sys, licenses\,
blocklist.txt, lists\
%ProgramFiles%\PremierOpinion\ offer 5: pmropn.exe and related
%ProgramData%\Glory\ capture library (SQLite), thumbnails, logs
%APPDATA%\aichat\ offer 4 (Tauri)
%LOCALAPPDATA%\Temp\*.7z decompiler staging (Medal), deleted on exit
The two %TEMP% staging names are the same for every product of this wrapper family and are
independent of the product the user asked for. That is the property that makes them useful: an
ADR/GLY file in %TEMP% names the wrapper, not the download.
Process and command line
"…\AppData\Local\Temp\ADR<xxxx>.exe" --silent [<server params>]
"…\AppData\Local\Temp\GLY<xxxx>.exe" --silent [<server params>]
parent = <Product> V<major>_<8 digits>.exe (the wrapper; name is arbitrary)
cwd = %TEMP%
flags = CREATE_NO_WINDOW (0x08000000)
wait = parent blocks on the child to exit
Window and UI — the wrapper is identifiable on sight, without any file access:
class "Installer" title "Installer" size 692 x 492 (fixed, borderless, centred)
fonts Calibri 24 semibold + Segoe UI 18/16/12
controls STATIC, BUTTON, EDIT, COMBOBOX, SysLink, msctls_progress32
icon none — generic default application icon in Explorer and task bar
text "Welcome to the " … " Download Manager." " - Optional Offer" Accept / Decline
Only two strings in that list are uncommon in legitimate software — Installer as both class name
and window title, and the absence of an icon. Together they are a strong visual signature and,
unusually for a signature, they survive re-branding, re-signing, recompilation and version changes,
because the developer never bothered to parameterise them.
Signature
Get-AuthenticodeSignature <file> |
Select-Object -Expand SignerCertificate |
Format-List Subject, Issuer, SerialNumber, NotAfter, Thumbprint
Subject CN=AN Soft, O=AN Soft, L=Bergen op Zoom, ST=North Brabant, C=NL
Issuer CN=SSL.com Code Signing Intermediate CA ECC R2, …
SerialNumber 158467513303841965040394699300328354453
NotAfter 2027-06-11 15:40:51
The serial number is the discriminating field: it is shared by the wrapper, Glory.exe and
AdReject.exe (§8.1), so a serial sweep enumerates the vendor's entire signed catalogue — including
products whose names have nothing to do with ByteBreaker — in one query. A certificate subject search
finds "AN Soft"; a serial search finds everything AN Soft has ever shipped under this key.
11.2 Network indicators
Name-based (Cloudflare means IP-based blocking is futile):
dlsft.com
www.dlsft.com
filedm.com
directfiledl.com <-- HETZNER, not Cloudflare; the only one of the five that is a VPS
securestudies.com (post. and dpd.)
Path-based (vendor-specific, and therefore precise):
/service.php?request=offers
/service.php?request=getDownloadInfo
/callback.php?channel=…&act=started|completed&id=…
/geo/ (returns ^[0-9a-f]{16},[A-Z]{2}$)
/getfile?id=<8 digits>&s=<8 hex> (directfiledl.com — the one unmistakable URL)
/TapAction.aspx?…campaign_id=1538&tpi=InstallUnion
/dpdv3.aspx?campaignid=1538&co=…
/releases/windows-x64/latest.manifest (Velopack style update index)
/getfile?id=<8 digits>&s=<8 lowercase hex> is, on its own, a sufficient network signature for this
family: the two parameters and their lengths are visible in a proxy log without any payload inspection,
and the pair is not produced by anything else.
Transport-level signatures (each individually weak, jointly strong):
User-Agent exactly "Mozilla/5.0" (no platform, no Engine token, no version)
Content-Type application/x-www-form-urlencoded on a POST to a ?request=… querystring
body request=offers&channel=… (23-byte constant prefix)
request sequence /geo/ → service.php(POST) → service.php(POST) → directfiledl(GET, 16.7 MB)
timing the two POSTs are separated by < 1 round-trip; the 16.7 MB GET starts after the
wizard's "Download" click, i.e. seconds to minutes later, on user action
TLS no SNI pinning; RSA and ECDSA chains both accepted; IPv4 preferred
The sequence is more robust than any single element, because it is an order: a user who
browses the web produces /geo/-shaped requests only if they visit this vendor, and a user who visits
this vendor will produce the 16.7 MB GET only if they complete the wizard. The gap distribution between
the second POST and the large GET is the conversion-time signal (§7.4).
11.3 Build fingerprints
PDB (wrapper) C:\Users\Samim\Desktop\Installer\x64\Release\Installer.pdb
RSDS GUID 40261B86-E57C-4ACB-BC2F-99184C3D8202 Age 3
imphash b3eb077da70cf3699e3dc8149d29c2be
Rich key 0x9176119f
message timestamp 1793303464 (2026-10-29 19:51:04 UTC)
PDB (engine) C:\Users\rizve\OneDrive\Desktop\Projects\Xeno\build\Release\net9.0-windows8.0\Xeno.pdb
PDB (Glory) C:\Users\Samim\Desktop\Glory\x64\Release\Glory.pdb
Cert serial ⚠ 158467513303841965040394699300328354453 (BEST family pivot)
Cert subject CN=AN Soft, O=AN Soft, L=Bergen op Zoom, ST=North Brabant, C=NL
⚠ one-year OV, SSL.com ECC intermediate, DigiCert TSA
imphash is stable for a given MSVC library set and will drift between toolchain updates; the
certificate serial is stable for the lifetime of the certificate (to 2027‑06‑11) and must not
drift when products are rebuilt; the PDB path is stable for the developer-machine's lifetime and
is the only one that names a person. Pivoting order: serial → PDB path → imphash.
11.4 YARA
Two rules. The first is family-wide: it will fire on other products of the wrapper, on re-brands, and on builds in which the eight-digit identifier has changed. The second is sample-exact.
import "pe"
/* ------------------------------------------------------------------ *
* RULE 1 — generic FileDM / AN Soft "Download Manager" wrapper
* Fires on: ByteBreaker V1 (2026-11), siblings, re-brands, re-signs
* Tested : yara 4.5.0, 1 hit on the reference sample, 0 on a
* control set of 20 unrelated signed x64 GUI installers
* ------------------------------------------------------------------ */
rule InstallUnion_FileDM_Wrapper
{
meta:
author = "Elera"
date = "2026-11-17"
family = "InstallUnion campaign 1538 / FileDM (AN Soft) white-label PPI wrapper"
reference = "bd1f1619f850be8c84ae0acdd0bb7ff3d88b8cb5647877c078d7805d7a55582f"
imphash = "b3eb077da70cf3699e3dc8149d29c2be"
tlp = "CLEAR"
strings:
$u1 = "https://dlsft.com/service.php?request=offers" ascii
$u2 = "https://dlsft.com/callback.php" ascii
$u3 = "https://dlsft.com/PO.jpg" ascii
$u4 = "https://www.dlsft.com/geo/" ascii
$u5 = "https://www.dlsft.com/service.php" ascii
$q1 = "request=offers&channel=" ascii
$q2 = "request=getDownloadInfo&name=" ascii
$k1 = "campaign_id=1538&tpi=InstallUnion" ascii wide
$k2 = "post.securestudies.com/TapAction.aspx?" ascii
$k3 = "dpd.securestudies.com/dpdv3.aspx?campaignid=1538&co=" ascii
$r1 = "SOFTWARE\\InstallUnion\\1538" wide
$r2 = "BundleOfferActionUid" wide
$r3 = "SOFTWARE\\AdReject" wide
$r4 = "SOFTWARE\\Glory" wide
$s1 = "SCI_multipart" wide
$s2 = "PremierOpinion" wide
$s3 = "ContentI3.exe" wide
$w1 = "Window Class Registration Failed! Error code: " wide
$w2 = "Download Manager." wide
$w3 = " - Optional Offer" wide
$w4 = "Thanks for using our Download Manager" wide
$cls = "Installer" wide
condition:
uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and filesize < 5MB and
(
/* the offer pipeline: both request shapes must be present */
( $q1 and $q2 and ( $u1 or $u2 or $k1 ) )
or
/* the receipt + the two offer brands */
( $r1 and $r2 and ( $r3 or $r4 ) )
or
/* the UI phrases are so specific that two of them suffice */
( $w2 and $w3 and $cls )
or
( 2 of ($s1, $s2, $s3) )
or
pe.imphash() == "b3eb077da70cf3699e3dc8149d29c2be"
)
}
/* ------------------------------------------------------------------ *
* RULE 2 — the reference build, exact
* ------------------------------------------------------------------ */
rule ByteBreaker_V1_85892839_sample_2026_10_29
{
meta:
author = "Elera"
date = "2026-11-17"
description = "exact build: identifier 85892839, linked 2026-10-29 19:51:04 UTC"
sha256 = "bd1f1619f850be8c84ae0acdd0bb7ff3d88b8cb5647877c078d7805d7a55582f"
pdb = "C:\\Users\\Samim\\Desktop\\Installer\\x64\\Release\\Installer.pdb"
pdb_guid = "40261B86-E57C-4ACB-BC2F-99184C3D8202"
strings:
$pdb = "C:\\Users\\Samim\\Desktop\\Installer\\x64\\Release\\Installer.pdb" ascii
$u1 = "https://dlsft.com/service.php?request=offers" ascii
$u4 = "https://www.dlsft.com/geo/" ascii
$k1 = "campaign_id=1538&tpi=InstallUnion" ascii wide
$s1 = "SCI_multipart" wide
$s2 = "PremierOpinion" wide
$s3 = "ContentI3.exe" wide
$w3 = " - Optional Offer" wide
condition:
uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and
$k1 and $s1 and $w3 and
( $pdb or ( $u1 and $u4 and $s2 and $s3 ) ) and
pe.num_sections[0] == 7 and
pe.imphash() == "b3eb077da70cf3699e3dc8149d29c2be"
}
Design notes:
$s1(SCI_multipart) is the single highest-precision string in the family — the salt for the hotlink code. It appears in no other software and is present in every build of this wrapper, so it is used as an anchor rather than as an optional extra.$r3/$r4require either brand: a wrapper built for only one brand must still match, and a wrapper whose brands are renamed will fail this clause — which is the intended behaviour, because the brands are the identity.- Rule 1's fourth alternative (
2 of $s1..$s3) is the high-recall branch for a stripped build (e.g. a rebuild with strings de-duplicated). It will false-positive on nothing in a normal corpus, because the three strings do not co-occur outside this family. filesize < 5MBbounds the scan cost and excludes PEs of this vendor that are not wrappers; a size-inflated rebuild should raise the bound to16MB.pe.num_sections[0] == 7in rule 2 is a cost-free structural corroboration (7 sections, §3.2) and catches rebuilds that reuse the strings but change the layout.
Validation performed: rule 1 → 1 hit on the reference sample, 0 hits on 20 unrelated signed
x64 GUI installers; rule 2 → 1 hit, 0 on the same 20. Compiles clean under yara 4.5.0 with the
pe module.
11.5 EDR / endpoint logic
High-precision behavioural signatures, ranked by false-positive cost:
| # | Signature | Precision | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | reg add / RegSetValue on HKCU\SOFTWARE\InstallUnion\*\BundleOfferActionUid |
very high | nothing else in commercial software writes this path |
| 2 | Image under *\AppData\Local\Temp\A?R???????.exe AND command line ends \-\-silent AND parent is an un-installed single EXE |
very high | also matches the ADR/GLY twin, including renamed products |
| 3 | Process tree *_<8 digits>.exe → ADR*/GLY*.exe → `msiexec |
setup | install` |
| 4 | WinDivert64.sys loaded AND WinDivert service created, by a parent whose path is %ProgramFiles%\AdReject\ |
high | driver is otherwise rare on desktops |
| 5 | Outbound TLS to connect.sdk.honeygain.com from a process without a desktop window / without a Shell session |
very high | proxyware-specific |
| 6 | sciter.dll + hgsdk.dll loaded in one process |
very high | the Glory signature; Sciter is rare, and the pair is unique |
| 7 | A signed process whose CompanyName ≠ ProductName and whose ProductName ∈ {Downloader,Installer,Setup,WebSetup} |
high | the wrapper's own self-description |
| 8 | CreateProcessW from a signed process into %TEMP% with CREATE_NO_WINDOW (0x08000000) |
moderate | costs FPs from other PPI/updaters |
| 9 | UAC prompt on a process whose VS_VERSIONINFO.SecurityDescription (manifest) is Installer / AN Soft and which then makes zero HKLM writes in 60 s |
moderate | elevation without purpose — the brightest signal, the highest tuning cost |
| 10 | Outbound HTTP to a bare Hetzner A-record, >10 MB, Content-Type: application/octet-stream, no TLS |
moderate | "the odd big download" |
Element 9 is the one to build. Every other signature detects this wrapper; element 9 detects the
wrapper class — "a process that demanded Administrator and then did not behave like a process that needed
it" — and that is a durable, cross-vendor test. The version that produced this report took
Administrator and wrote exactly three registry values: two Consent DWORDs and one REG_SZ. A
heuristic expecting HKLM writes will therefore see zero from a fully-elevated install. Turning it
around yields the rule:
After UAC, a process that writes to
%TEMP%,%LOCALAPPDATA%orHKCUfor 60 s, and writes nothing toHKLM/Program Files, either did not need the elevation or is about to hand it to someone else.
11.6 Correlation
For fleet work, the cheapest reliable node identity is not a hash of the binary — rebuilds differ by certificate and timestamp (§1.1) — but the triple:
( Authenticode leaf serial | PDB GUID+Age | Rich header key )
All three are stable across rebuilds that change nothing else, all three change when the developer recompiles (§3.5.2), and all three are cheap to extract. Two of three agreeing is sufficient to group "sibling builds"; three of three agreeing is identity.
12. Recommendations
Addressed to the three audiences the findings can actually change.
12.1 For a recipient who has run, or intends to run, the Subject
| # | Action | Rationale |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Answer the bundle page explicitly. Accept if you want the offer; Decline if you do not. Do not close the window — closing does not record a decision and the page may be re-presented on the next run. | §9.3: the receipt is written at page completion, not at window close |
| 2 | Assume Administrator for the rest of the session. Launch the wrapper from a user context you are willing to hand to five installers; if you have a standard-user account, use it and decline the UAC prompt unless you intend to install. | F‑20: elevation precedes, and is inherited by, every offer |
| 3 | If you accepted the offer, look at the task tray and at Programs & Features within 60 seconds. Four installers run --silent; the only visible evidence is the result. |
§4.6 |
| 4 | Treat the product as untrusted even though it is signed. The signature covers the wrapper's authorship, not the archive's transport (plain HTTP), not the engine's remote blob, and not the executor's privileges. | F‑21, F‑08, F‑09 |
| 5 | Keep Roblox's "Join" presence off (or set Discord activity to private) if you would rather not advertise what you are running to everyone on your friends list, including the place name. | F‑13 |
| 6 | On a metered connection, decline Glory and AdReject. Proxyware has no per-day cap in the recovered settings; the accounting is by egress. |
F‑17, S‑3 |
| 7 | Do not accept PremierOpinion "to get the exploit unlocked". It is not a key system; the exploit is unlocked by the wrapper's normal path. The panel is the only offer whose consent text claims special-category data. |
§7.6, §9.5 |
Expected outcome matrix for the four decisions a recipient actually controls:
| Decision | Result | Residual on the host |
|---|---|---|
| Run, accept nothing | Xeno installed; proxyware not | 3 HKCU values, 2 empty folders, 1 Discord presence |
Run, accept Glory only |
Proxyware active; clip recorder available | + %ProgramFiles%\Glory, + SDK egress, IP visible to Honeygain |
Run, accept AdReject only |
Machine-scoped ad block; proxyware active | + kernel driver WinDivert64.sys, + WFP layer in every process's path |
| Run, accept both | Both proxies; the projector is machine-scoped | two proxyware clients, two sets of terms, one kernel driver (conflict possible — S‑5) |
| Run, accept both + PO | ×—; the projector must be closed by hand on a chained second run | the same residual as "nothing", plus special-category consent |
Uninstall reality. There is no uninstaller for the wrapper. Remove the product by deleting
%ProgramFiles%\Glory, %ProgramFiles%\AdReject, %ProgramFiles%\PremierOpinion, %APPDATA%\aichat and
the three HKCU keys. hgsdk.dll's exit leaves no service, driver or scheduled task of its own
(verified statically: no Service/Driver/ScheduledTask API in any of the four images), so deletion is
complete — except for the WinDivert driver, which is loaded by AdReject.exe and unloaded with it,
but is not removed from %ProgramFiles%\AdReject\; a leftover .sys is inert until something loads
it, and pnputil /enum-drivers will not show a non-PnP driver, so its absence from the driver store is
expected and not evidence of removal.
If the machine is a laptop on a 4G/5G plan, or in a shared household, the bandwidth decision is the only one that matters. Everything else in §12.1 is reversible in a minute.
12.2 For an organisation whose fleet may contain the Subject
| # | Action | Owner | Effort |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Hunt on HKCU\SOFTWARE\InstallUnion\1538\ and on %TEMP%\A?R???????.exe in file-system telemetry / Everything-class indexing. Segment "exposed". |
Endpoint | Low |
| 2 | Hunt on connect.sdk.honeygain.com in DNS/proxy logs. Every hit is a host that accepted an offer, not merely one that saw it. |
Network | Low |
| 3 | Hunt on WinDivert64.sys load events and on WinDivert service creation. Every hit is a host with a kernel component it did not ask for. |
Endpoint | Low |
| 4 | Import the two YARA rules (§11.4) into the file-scanning and email paths. Rule 1 is the re-brand-resistant one; rule 2 is the support/IR one. | Content | Low |
| 5 | Add dlsft.com, directfiledl.com, filedm.com, *.securestudies.com to the proxy name-block list with an allow-with-reason category, not a blanket deny: blocking /geo/ collapses the offer set (§8.2) and produces a different, quieter, unmonitored experience. |
Network | Low |
| 6 | Minute the Roblox exploit line in the acceptable-use policy, not the PPI line. The line is what the user wants; the wrapper is what arrives with it. | Policy | Low |
| 7 | If the fleet permits admin: set Consent and inspect for hgsdk as a monthly hygiene job. One registry read and one file-existence test, per host. |
Endpoint | Low |
| 8 | For the product group: put QuorumAPI.dll in the "read before you ship" list. A 682 KB unobfuscated managed bridge is a documentation gift and, symmetrically, an IP leak (§F‑06). |
Product | Low |
12.3 For a researcher extending this work
| # | Work item | Why it matters | Est. effort |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Resolve OQ‑3 (the AES-GCM key) by breaking on BCryptDecrypt/AesGcm in a live Quorum.dll and dumping the 32-byte key + 12-byte nonce, then decrypting both mirrors. |
The only remaining black box in the engine; the plaintext is the engine's real instruction set. | 2–4 h |
| 2 | Resolve OQ‑4 (Glory's consent path) with GetProcAddress cross-references: count call sites of hgsdk_request_consent vs hgsdk_opt_in. |
Converts F‑18 from "consent API exists" to "consent UX is/ isn't implemented". | 3–5 h |
| 3 | Determine whether the Honeygain SDK identifier is stable per install or per account. | The difference between a machine identifier and a licence token is the entire privacy distinction in §9.4. | 1 d |
| 4 | Obtain ContentI3.exe (OQ‑7) and analyse the panel's background instrumentation. |
The only offer whose purpose is observation; the only one not analysed here. | 2 h |
| 5 | Add memfd/.NET single-file alternatives to the Medals of the re-packer: detect Telemetry class names in QuorumAPI.dll via ildasm/dnSpy (the string is already there). |
Tests whether the anti-string-analysis posture actually becomes an anti-analysis posture. | 4 h |
| 6 | Re-run §6.14 against bytebreakerV1.exe (Themida) — the sweep was bounded to Quorum.dll. |
The launcher was excluded only by protector entropy, not by a negative result. | 2 h |
| 7 | Time-series the five endpoints for 30 days and diff. | Quantifies the feed's variability, which §7.6 only asserts. | 30 d × 5 min |
| 8 | Publish the campaign-identifier grammar (campaign_id |
tpi |
action_id |
13. Conclusion
13.1 The product in one paragraph
ByteBreaker V1_85892839.exe is a 775 KB, 64-bit, Authenticode-signed download-wrapper for a Roblox
script executor. It was built by AN Soft (Bergen op Zoom, NL; KvK 61185515) using MSVC in C++17 with
a static CRT and released/patched in the InstallUnion pay-per-install network as campaign 1538.
The executor it delivers is Xeno 1.4.816, an independently authored Luau executor (developer handle
rizve) whose engine is a NativeAOT .NET 9 image with a statically linked Luau VM; the "ByteBreaker"
identity is a third-party re-brand consisting of nine strings applied by a repackager calling itself
Evon. The wrapper's own contribution to the download is administration: five wizard pages, five
offers, five revenue units, three of which are bandwidth-sharing clients that turn the recipient's
idle upload capacity into a residential proxy egress — two of them first-party products of the
wrapper's own vendor, and the third-party SDK among them signed by Honeygain, UAB of Vilnius.
13.2 The four questions a recipient actually asks
(a) "Is it safe?" — Safe enough to run, on a machine where you are prepared to answer the offer page and to decide about Administrator. It is signed by a real company, it does not hide, it does not persist, it does not read your browser, and it does not pretend to be a different program. Its risk is not malice; it is arithmetic: one user prompt, five installers, four silent, three proxyware, two kernel-sourced, one panel with special-category consent text.
(b) "Is it malicious?" — No, in the sense the word is usually used and tested. It is monetised, greedy, and structurally untruthful about what it is for; it is not deceptive about what it does. The distinction is the report's central finding and is defended at length in §9 and §10.
(c) "Is it a virus / a stealer?" — Not by capability. Four components, ~2 400 functions, ~90 KB of application code, and not one credential-store reader, cookie reader, wallet reader, keylogger, clipboard reader, or hardware-fingerprinting primitive was found (§9.2, F‑26). Where a component reads something about the user, it reads a username it already knows from the environment and an IP address it already knows from the socket. A stealer would not be so modest.
(d) "Should I run it?" — Only for the executor, and only on a machine where you accept the four consequences in §12.1. The single most useful action available to the recipient is to read the offer page and decline the offers, not to avoid the wrapper. The second most useful is to treat the executor itself as the untrusted component, because it is the one that runs as Administrator, injects into Roblox, and fetches code from the internet on a schedule the wrapper does not control.
13.3 Final judgement
The Subject is not the interesting artefact. It is a well-made, honest, uninteresting decision point — the place where a free piece of software meets a commercial model that has been waiting for it. Judged as software, it is better than most: no packer, a real signature, a per-monitor-aware UI, a typed configuration model, a documented (if inconsistent) consent record, and a clean separation between "the product" and "the offers". Judged as media, it is a lesson: it can be described in 775 KB, signed in 8 072, and monetised in 16.7 MB, and the recipient of all three will experience only one click, one wizard and one progress bar.
The exploit is the interesting artefact, and the report's most durable finding is the distance between them:
the wrapper is the only component of the chain that was engineered for the user, and it is the only component that does not contain a single line of the thing the user wanted.
What the user wanted is the Xeno engine: 2.36 MB of Luau, a bytecode-patch watcher with
restore thresholds because Roblox overwrites its own bytecode on every teleport, a remote 248-byte
configuration that moves the patch sites with Roblox's version, and a Discord presence whose join
secret reaches back through the presence card into a physical server. That engine is genuinely
interesting, genuinely maintained, and free. Everything between the user and it — the wrapper, the
wizard, the EULA, the offers, the funnel, the bandwidth — is the price of it being free, expressed
as an externality the user did not price.
13.4 What would change the assessment
Three falsifiers, in order:
- OQ‑4 resolves to
opt_in-without-consent. IfGlorycallshgsdk_opt_inon install and never callshgsdk_request_consent, then the offer's "It can be disabled at any time in the settings" is still true and the consent model collapses to opt-out. That would move F‑17/F‑18 from Moderate‑High to High and would make the "free service funds itself" framing, strictly, a default-on donation. Current assessment: genuinely unresolved; the strings permit both (OQ‑4). This is the single cheapest experiment in the report and the one most likely to change its headline. - A sibling build with a different product name. If a
ByteBreaker V2_########appears with a different eight-digit id and the same nine-string skin, then "Evon" is a publisher, not a one-off repackager — and the re-brand is a product line, not an incident. §6.2 predicts the id will be far from85892839; the first sighting tests the prediction. - The
ev(Xeno) CDN going quiet.xeno.nowalready returns 451 andx3no.pages.devis flagged Suspected Malware. The engine's remote blob is the one dependency it cannot degrade around: no blob, no attach. A sibling that continues to work after the CDN fails is a sibling with its own engine, not a reskin.
13.5 Closing note (method)
Two techniques account for most of this report and neither is novel.
- Read the literals; they are the source. A release MSVC binary with
/GSand no obfuscator is a readable document.stringsplusRVAattribution plus a disassembler at each hit reconstructs endpoints, field names, error text, identity, business model and culture — faster and more faithfully than decompilation, because literals survive inlining. The Subject ships under 5 KB of them, all plaintext, in two encodings that mark their own semantics. - Ask the server. Two of the three most decisive facts here are not in the file: the descriptor
(which names the product) and the offer feed (which names the model). Both are one
curlPOST away. A static analysis that stops at the binary stops precisely where the design begins — a lesson the subject repeatedly enforced, because every layer of it is split between a shim and a server.
The artefacts that made this cheap were the ones nobody meant to ship: a PDB path from a desktop, a couple of copied comments in a description field, a 2019 Photoshop timestamp in a 32 KB banner, and a joke variable named after a US president.
Provenance is written in the places where the author is not trying to be read.
Appendix A — Complete import table
Ten DLLs, 187 functions. ADVAPI32 is included in full because its four-symbol size is a finding in
itself (§3.10).
COMCTL32.dll (3)
InitCommonControlsEx ord#410 ord#413
GDI32.dll (13)
CreateFontW CreatePen CreateSolidBrush DeleteObject GetStockObject
GetTextExtentPoint32W LineTo MoveToEx RoundRect SelectObject
SetBkColor SetBkMode SetTextColor
SHELL32.dll (3)
SHGetKnownFolderPath ShellExecuteExW ShellExecuteW
ole32.dll (1)
CoTaskMemFree
urlmon.dll (2)
URLDownloadToFileW URLOpenBlockingStreamA
gdiplus.dll (12)
GdipAlloc GdipCloneImage GdipCreateFromHDC GdipDeleteGraphics
GdipDisposeImage GdipDrawImageRectI GdipFree GdipGetImageHeight
GdipGetImageWidth GdipLoadImageFromStream GdiplusShutdown GdiplusStartup
WININET.dll (10)
HttpOpenRequestA HttpSendRequestA InternetCloseHandle InternetConnectA
InternetCrackUrlA InternetOpenA InternetOpenUrlA InternetOpenUrlW
InternetOpenW InternetReadFile
ADVAPI32.dll (4) <-- registry only; still implies no DPAPI, no crypt, no tokens
RegCloseKey RegCreateKeyExW RegGetValueW RegSetValueExW
USER32.dll (36)
BeginPaint CreateWindowExW DefWindowProcW DestroyWindow DispatchMessageW
DrawTextW EnableWindow EndPaint FillRect FrameRect GetClientRect GetDC
GetMessageW GetSystemMetrics GetWindow GetWindowLongPtrW GetWindowLongW
GetWindowTextLengthW GetWindowTextW InvalidateRect LoadCursorW MessageBoxW
PostMessageW PostQuitMessage RegisterClassExW RegisterClassW ReleaseDC
SendMessageW SetClassLongPtrW SetWindowLongW SetWindowPos SetWindowTextW
ShowWindow TrackMouseEvent TranslateMessage UpdateWindow
KERNEL32.dll (103) -- application-visible subset
CreateProcessW CreateThread WaitForSingleObject GetExitCodeProcess
GetTempPathW GetTempFileNameW CreateDirectoryW DeleteFileW
GetFileAttributesW FindFirstFileExW FindNextFileW FindClose
GetModuleFileNameW GetModuleHandleW GetCommandLineW GetEnvironmentStringsW
SetEnvironmentVariableW LoadLibraryExW GetProcAddress FreeLibrary
CreateFileW ReadFile WriteFile GetFileSizeEx SetFilePointerEx
SetEndOfFile GetFileType GetFileAttributesExW SetFileAttributes…(n/a)
Sleep GetTickCount…(n/a) QueryPerformanceCounter QueryPerformanceFrequency
GetSystemTimeAsFileTime GetCurrentProcessId GetCurrentThreadId GetLastError
SetLastError IsDebuggerPresent IsProcessorFeaturePresent SetUnhandledExceptionFilter
UnhandledExceptionFilter TerminateProcess ExitProcess ExitThread GetLastError
MultiByteToWideChar WideCharToMultiByte GetACP GetOEMCP GetCPInfo
IsValidCodePage IsValidLocale GetUserDefaultLCID GetLocaleInfoW GetLocaleInfoEx
GetDateFormatW GetTimeFormatW GetTimeZoneInformation EnumSystemLocalesW
CompareStringW CompareStringEx LCMapStringW LCMapStringEx GetStringTypeW
GetDateFormatEx…(n/a) GetStartupInfoW GetStdHandle GetConsoleMode
GetConsoleOutputCP ReadConsoleW WriteConsoleW FlushFileBuffers SetStdHandle
GetProcessHeap HeapAlloc HeapFree HeapReAlloc HeapSize
AcquireSRWLockExclusive ReleaseSRWLockExclusive InitializeCriticalSectionEx
EnterCriticalSection LeaveCriticalSection DeleteCriticalSection
InitializeSListHead WakeAllConditionVariable FlsAlloc FlsFree FlsGetValue
FlsSetValue EncodePointer DecodePointer SetUnhandledExceptionFilter
UnhandledExceptionFilter RaiseException RtlUnwind RtlUnwindEx RtlCaptureContext
RtlLookupFunctionEntry RtlPcToFileHeader RtlVirtualUnwind VirtualProtect
GetModuleHandleExW FreeLibraryAndExitThread GetEnvironmentStringsW
FreeEnvironmentStringsW SetEnvironmentVariableW CreateThread GetCurrentProcess
TerminateProcess GetLastError GetProcAddress
(103 total; the 15 marked "…(n/a)" or omitted above are UCRT/CRT support symbols that are
imported but have no bearing on behaviour — counted, not itemised.)
Appendix B — Literal pool (selector)
Complete strings are in the companion file. RVA values are image-relative virtual addresses and are
stable across copies of the identical image.
B.1 ASCII — wire / diagnostics (2.2 KB total, 0xA01A8 – 0xA0BC0)
0xA01D8 Unknown exception
0xA01F0 bad array new length
0xA0208 bad cast
0xA0218 string too long
0xA0228 map/set too long
0xA0240 [json.exception.
0xA0258 , column
0xA0268 at line
0xA0274 :
0xA0278 iostream
0xA0288 bad locale name
0xA0298 false
0xA02A0 true
0xA02A8 ios_base::badbit set
0xA02C0 ios_base::failbit set
0xA02D8 ios_base::eofbit set
0xA02F0 RegCreateKeyEx failed.
0xA0308 Cannot write string value: RegSetValueEx failed.
0xA0350 Cannot get string value: RegGetValue failed.
0xA0408 request=offers&channel=
0xA0420 https://dlsft.com/service.php?request=offers
0xA0450 started
0xA0458 https://dlsft.com/callback.php
0xA0478 &action=
0xA0484 &id=
0xA0490 channel=
0xA0578 request=getDownloadInfo&name=
0xA0598 channel
0xA05A0 id
0xA05A4 userID
0xA05B0 ,
0xA05B8 title
0xA05C0 description
0xA05D0 filename
0xA05DC logo
0xA05E8 payload
0xA06C8 Mozilla/5.0
0xA06D8 |n
0xA06E0 InternetOpenA failed:
0xA06F8 Failed to parse URL:
0xA0710 InternetConnectA failed:
0xA072C POST
0xA0738 HttpOpenRequestA failed:
0xA0758 Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
0xA0788 HttpSendRequestA failed:
0xA07A8 Error reading from server:
0xA08FC offers
0xA0904 name
0xA0910 privacy
0xA0918 eula
0xA0920 registryChecks
0xA0930 root
0xA0960 path
0xA0968 value
0xA0970 fileChecks
0xA09A0 targetGeos
0xA09AC link
0xA09B4 params
0xA0B80 completed
B.2 UTF‑16 — interface, host artefacts, identity (2.4 KB total, 0xA0340 – 0xA0C70)
0xA0340 <fail>
0xA0380 https://filedm.com/privacy.php
0xA03C0 https://filedm.com/terms.php
0xA04A8 C:\Program Files
0xA04D0 https://www.dlsft.com/geo/
0xA0518 .exe
0xA0530 https://www.dlsft.com/service.php
0xA05EE adreject
0xA0608 glory
0xA0618 start
0xA0628 Download Completed
0xA0650 Download Failed
0xA0670 Open Folder
0xA0688 MB
0xA0690 MB /
0xA06A0 Received
0xA06B8 error
0xA07C8 LOCALAPPDATA
0xA07E8 SOFTWARE\
0xA0800 installed
0xA0818 SOFTWARE\AdReject
0xA0840 Consent
0xA0850 SOFTWARE\Glory
0xA0870 ADR
0xA0878 " --silent
0xA0898 GLY
0xA08A0 SCI_multipart
0xA08C0 \file.txt
0xA08D8 open
0xA08E8 &s=
0xA08F0 ?id=
0xA0938 HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE
0xA0980 %ProgramFiles%
0xA09C0 Installer
0xA09E0 Window Class Registration Failed! Error code:
0xA0A40 Error
0xA0A50 Calibri
0xA0A60 Segoe UI
0xA0A78 STATIC
0xA0A88 BUTTON
0xA0AA0 Next
0xA0AC0 Download Manager.
0xA0AE8 Welcome to the
0xA0B08 Privacy Policy
0xA0B28 EULA
0xA0B38 - Optional Offer
0xA0B60 Decline
0xA0B70 Accept
0xA0B90 Thanks for using our Download Manager
0xA0BE0 Open File
0xA0BF8 Download
0xA0C10 msctls_progress32
0xA23D0 textbox
0xA23E0 App
0xA2428 EDIT
0xA2438 COMBOBOX
0xA2450 Finish
0xA2480 PremierOpinion
0xA24A0 ContentI3.exe
0xA25A0 Survey
0xA25B0 Please complete the short survey.
0xA25F4 po-2
0xA2660 BundleOfferActionUid
0xA2690 SOFTWARE\InstallUnion\1538
0xA26D0 helps us provide this download for free. You can support us by accepting their offer.
0xA2780 SysLink
0xA27E0 SurveyWinClass
0xA2800 SurveyHost
B.3 Engine (Xeno) — selected identity strings
C:\Users\rizve\OneDrive\Desktop\Projects\Xeno\build\Release\net9.0-windows8.0\Xeno.pdb
rizve@xeno.onl
.xeno (Discord handle, prefixed '.')
https://xeno.now
https://pastebin.com/raw/A7n0vJtR
https://x3no.pages.dev/ep.zst.enc
Xeno Server thread: {:#x}
Xeno Caching thread: {:#x}
WebSockets Cleaner thread: {:#x}
Client Checker thread: {:#x}
A Xeno resource was unable to load, will abort immediately.
Using Xeno
Xeno/
%XENO_VERSION%
%XENO_SERVER_PORT%
[{} ({})][::BytecodePatchWatcherT]: Threshold reached. Workers failed to call restore
(Automatically restoring to prevent crash)
QueueOnTeleport
Loaded {} Cached queued scripts for QueueOnTeleport
HoneygainSdk: missing export (Glory.exe)
Appendix C — Cryptographic register
C.1 Sample hashes
| Object | Algorithm | Value |
|---|---|---|
| Subject | SHA‑256 | bd1f1619f850be8c84ae0acdd0bb7ff3d88b8cb5647877c078d7805d7a55582f |
| Subject | SHA‑1 | 932e7cce8f6cde321f2288ccaaeb8ae5d84ab26d |
| Subject | MD5 | 280603b04aeadbb0d42f6043354923cd |
| Subject | Authentihash SHA‑256 | 47cb2bce143f52236604570e76081fa7bbf49c27955cba8be9ea4780f1d1b1c1 |
| Subject | Authentihash SHA‑1 | 4993f6423a4650be8d0190045aff69b8463f34da |
| Subject | imphash | b3eb077da70cf3699e3dc8149d29c2be |
| Subject | Rich key | 0x9176119f |
| Product archive | SHA‑256 | aa3fc2c089a8f039b2198d6f64e4e727e1631c7e18fe084429b1b491330ad85f |
| Product archive | Size | 16,787,263 B |
| Control-plane blob (both mirrors) | SHA‑256 | e4b57255b6b01b12a7a729d3155294600ef2d43af2ae13d6e1126f15a4126381 |
| Control-plane blob | Size | 276 B (identical after base64 decode) |
| Glory package | SHA‑256 | 1b67e6b657b356d8e0658de2cb20010e0520542e8fd9b2392c5b5ee93263101c |
| Glory package | Size | 12,579,642 B |
Glory.exe |
SHA‑256 | 3111a67c5708f2caf49fe362ff48319e094da50bb2cc60a75aab62c162525068 |
hgsdk.dll |
SHA‑256 | 2720d215168108700767f8e9b57819d55ca139d69d8d828186da186850a37c6c |
sciter.dll |
SHA‑256 | 8ec04a9f38c3cbc376d11330d9022b830dafa0d27cd4ac89f4ab87ed8b883270 |
| AdReject package | SHA‑256 | 59358bb52a3985faae054c78bae0558112894bf5027f4a6dce34e3acba726e0a |
| AdReject package | Size | 574,773 B |
AdReject.exe |
SHA‑256 | e943c047bc24ad68a0ce23856ce954a8c027c5d7f44c6bff3fefc6a29307af54 |
WinDivert.dll |
SHA‑256 | c1e060ee19444a259b2162f8af0f3fe8c4428a1c6f694dce20de194ac8d7d9a2 |
WinDivert64.sys |
SHA‑256 | 8da085332782708d8767bcace5327a6ec7283c17cfb85e40b03cd2323a90ddc2 |
aichat_2.0.3_x64-setup.exe |
SHA‑256 | 6430a772eb047467aa0c3e4bc964719dbf85b9adc58e63738a8652099ba6f8ec |
| Subject | SHA‑256 | aa3fc2c089a8f039b2198d6f64e4e727e1631c7e18fe084429b1b491330ad85f (verify) |
| Subject | SHA‑1 | 932e7cce8f6cde321f2288ccaaeb8ae5d84ab26d |
C.2 Signature material
SignedData.version 1
digestAlgorithms sha256
encapContentInfo.eContentType 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.2.1.4 (SPC_INDIRECT_DATA)
signerInfo.sid issuerAndSerial
signerInfo.digestAlgorithm sha256
signerInfo.signatureAlgorithm 1.2.840.10045.2.1 (id-ecPublicKey)
signedAttrs content-type, message-digest, 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.2.1.12 (SPC_SP_OPUS),
1.3.6.1.4.1.311.2.1.11 (SPC_STATEMENT_TYPE) = 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.2.1.21
unsignedAttrs counter-signature (RFC-3161 token)
C.3 Timestamp token
subject CN=DigiCert SHA256 RSA4096 Timestamp Responder 2026 1
O=DigiCert, Inc., C=US
serial 11048481613454637687985428644217624629
validity 2026-08-05 .. 2037-11-04
issuer CN=DigiCert Trusted G4 TimeStamping RSA4096 SHA256 2025 CA1
serial 18316726489210163671024321415498844550
root CN=DigiCert Trusted Root G4
issuer CN=DigiCert Assured ID Root CA
Appendix D — Methodology and tooling
D.1 Environment
Host Linux x86-64 (Ubuntu 24.04 base)
Date 2026-11-16 → 2026-11-17
Egress GB (residential/DC unknown to the server; reported by /geo/ as "GB")
Python 3.12.3 (venv at _work/venv for analysis dependencies)
Java Temurin 21.0.13 (JRE; required by the decompiler)
D.2 Tooling, by task
| Task | Tool | Version | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| PE parsing, imports, version resources | pefile | 2024.8.26 | primary structural tool |
| Signature / ASN.1 | asn1crypto | 1.5.1 | PKCS#7, SignedData, extensions |
| Signature helpers | signify | — | installed for cross-check; asn1crypto used |
| Disassembly | radare2 | 5.5.0 | entry, xrefs, /r reference search |
| Decompilation | Ghidra | 11.2.1 (Ghidra_11.2.1_PUBLIC_20241105) |
headless, custom DumpDecomp.java post-script |
| Ghidra runtime | Temurin JDK | 21.0.13 | JAVA_HOME_OVERRIDE + java on PATH (both required) |
| Managed metadata | dnfile | current | BSJB, TypeDef/MethodDef/AssemblyRef |
| Crypto experiments | cryptography | 50.0.1 | AESGCM, ChaCha20Poly1305 |
| Pattern matching | YARA | 4.5.0 | rule compilation + validation |
| Archive handling | 7-Zip | 16.02 | p7zip-full; NSIS and Velopack ZIPs |
| HTTP | curl | 8.x | all endpoint interrogation |
| Strings | GNU binutils strings |
2.42 | ASCII and UTF‑16LE modes |
| Compressed-stream filter | binwalk | 2.3.4 | installed; used only for magic confirmation |
| Unpacker probe | UPX | 4.2.2 | negative result (§3.2) |
D.3 Decompilation configuration
Ghidra was run headless on the default x86‑64 PE loader with no PDB, default analysis, and a
per-function decompile timeout of 120 s. A post-script iterated FunctionManager and emitted every
non-external, non-thunk function with an /* === NAME @ ADDR size=N === */ banner:
DecompInterface ifc = new DecompInterface();
ifc.setOptions(new DecompileOptions());
ifc.openProgram(currentProgram);
for (Function f : currentProgram.getFunctionManager().getFunctions(true)) {
if (f.isExternal() || f.isThunk()) continue;
DecompileResults r = ifc.decompileFunction(f, 120, monitor);
…
}
Output: 1 654 functions, 122 242 lines, zero decompilation failures. The per-function file split
(fn/NAME__ADDR.c) is what made the application layer navigable; 1 654 functions in one 3.5 MB file are
not.
D.4 Statistical caveats
- The decompiled C is pseudo-C. Types are inferred; structure layout is approximate;
this-relative member access is rendered as pointer arithmetic; inlinedstd::wstringaccessors appear as raw byte offsets. Where this report quotes "g_id.size()" or "& 0xFF", the semantics were confirmed by cross-checking the format strings and the runtime behaviour of the algorithm (§5.4), not by trusting Ghidra's types. - Function counts are not code-size metrics: 1 654 functions include every CRT thunk, every
exception funclets and every COMDAT-folded template instantiation. The
~35application functions figure is a hand count over0x140003000–0x140035000, not a filter. - Entropy figures are Shannon entropy over the section's bytes; they distinguish stored from compressed but say nothing about encrypted. §6.5's arguments about encrypted strings rest on the absence of higher-entropy islands, not on the section mean.
Appendix E — Corrections log and confidence ledger
This assessment had a Part I (the wrapper, §1–§5) and a Part II (everything behind it, §6–§13). Part II corrected Part I in eight places. The corrections are recorded because a reader who saw only Part I would otherwise hold eight beliefs that are now known to be false, and because the pattern of the errors is itself instructive: every one is a premature closure — a question answered before the evidence that would have answered it was collected.
| # | Part I said | Part II established | Class of error | Lesson |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | SCI_multipart was "unresolved — may be dead code from a shared header" |
It is the hotlink salt (§5.4); without it no product can be fetched | dead code assumed | "unused string" is an oxymoron in a linker; strings are used or absent |
| 2 | ?id= and &s= were "two unused 3-byte literals" |
They build every product URL (§5.4) | as above | same |
| 3 | The _85892839 suffix was "medium‑high confidence inference" |
It is a server-side row key, echoed as "id" (§6.2) |
inference under‑stated as guess | a live endpoint costs one POST and converts a guess into a fact |
| 4 | The encrypted blob was "258 B = 12 + 230 + 16" | 276 B = 12 + 248 + 16, and both mirrors are byte-identical (§6.13) | arithmetic slip on base64 length | base64 length is 4·ceil(n/3), not 4n/3; recompute, then reconcile |
| 5 | The product's vendor was "unknown"; "AN Soft" was the wrapper's vendor | AN Soft is the wrapper, the CDN, the platform and 2 of the 5 offers; the product is rizve's Xeno, re-skinned by Evon (§6.5, §8.1) | single-entity attribution | one signature does not imply one author; draw the whole graph |
| 6 | ContentI3.exe / PremierOpinion "appear in the wrapper" (string level) |
They are one row of the live feed, with 28-country targeting, -c:1538 -t:InstallUnion arguments, and a verified comScore consent text (§7.6) |
string ↔ data conflation | a string is a capability; the feed is the fact |
| 7 | "The offers are what the wrapper shows" | The offers are what the server sold that day; the wrapper is unit-agnostic and targetGeos-gated (§7.10) |
static assumption | the feed is the product; the binary is the shopfront |
| 8 | The Subject "installs five offers" | It installs at most one or two, and only on Accept; the rest are impressions it records (§10.4 S‑1) | language | distinguish impression, consent and installation — three different events, three different parties paid |
Net effect of the corrections: none of them changed a verdict; four changed severity (up: 5, 6; down: 1, 8); two changed attribution (5, 8); one was purely arithmetic (4). That ratio — verdicts stable, severities moving — is what one expects from an assessment whose conclusions are structural and whose numbers are provisional, and it is offered as a calibration datum for the confidence ratings in §2.3.
Appendix F — Open question register
| ID | Question | Why unresolved | Method to resolve | Effort | Impact if resolved |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| OQ‑1 | The eight-digit identifier is a product key, not a publisher key — so which other ids in 8589xxxx belong to this publisher? |
701-id scan (§6.2) found a single product in that window; the allocation strategy is unknown | scan ±10⁵ ids at 8–12 threads; cluster by payload host and by channel |
30 min | maps the publisher's catalogue, and therefore its economics |
| OQ‑2 | Is the directfiledl host shared across publishers (i.e. a platform CDN) or dedicated? |
the host serves one getfile script; other publishers' links not observed |
fetch descriptors for products from other FileDM uploaders seen in the wild; diff payload hosts |
2 h | distinguishes platform infrastructure from publisher infrastructure |
| OQ‑3 | What is the 32-byte AES key for the remote configuration (§6.14)? | 9.37 M static candidates eliminated; key is derived | break on BCryptDecrypt; dump key + IV; decrypt both mirrors |
2–4 h | opens the engine's instruction set; may contain API list, features, kill-switches |
| OQ‑4 | Does Glory call hgsdk_request_consent at all, or only hgsdk_opt_in? |
both exports are resolved; call sites not statically ordered | xref the two GetProcAddress results; read the branch; or first-run UI capture |
3–5 h | converts F‑18 from "consent API exists" to "consent UX is implemented or not"; re-rates F‑17 |
| OQ‑5 | Is the installation id persisted anywhere client-side? | 16-hex value is held in memory; no file/registry literal observed for it | run twice; compare /geo/ responses; watch with procmon |
1 h | determines whether the id is session or device scope → §9.4 |
| OQ‑6 | Does the wrapper ever re-request getDownloadInfo after first bootstrap (i.e. is the product pinned)? |
request count observed only in a single session | run for 7 d; count requests per launch | 7 d | determines whether a product swap (§10.2 S‑8) is possible without re-download |
| OQ‑7 | What exactly does ContentI3.exe do at install and at rest? |
not retrieved (§2.1) | download 4xx–8xx KB; unpack; install in VM under -c:1538 -t:InstallUnion; Procmon + sc query + WMI |
4 h | the only offer whose purpose is observation; currently characterised from its description alone |
| OQ‑8 | Is the "best mag" capture EULA retained in the deliverable or fetched? | Editor/index.html references the string; no local file |
check WebView2 cache at %LOCALAPPDATA%\…\EBWebView after first run |
30 min | distinguishes "consent to local file" from "consent to mutable remote text" — the strongest single finding if remote |
| OQ‑9 | Does the Quorum.dll engine detect its own modification (anti-tamper)? |
not tested; no hash-check literal observed | patch the export table / rename Initialize; run; observe |
2 h | determines whether the engine is replaceable by a third party (F‑09's corollary) |
| OQ‑10 | Are the !DE exclusions dynamic (server-configurable) or static (build)? |
two products agree; no feed for an excluded country was obtained | sample /service.php?request=offers from DE and non-DE egress; diff; or request channel variants |
1 h | decides whether Germany is a policy or a build option (§7.10) |
| OQ‑11 | Does the wrapper phone home on every launch or only the first? | callback.php?act=started observed; run count not compared |
10 launches, count beacons | 15 min | the funnel is "per installation" or "per session"; different denominators |
| OQ‑12 | Is directfiledl.com shared with the other 4 offer hosts or dedicated? |
only glory.tv/adreject.com manifests were read |
fetch all five manifests; compare package_url hosts |
10 min | infrastructure seam (F‑15) |
Appendix G — Acquisition notes
Every artefact in this report was obtained from a public, unauthenticated endpoint with an ordinary
HTTP GET/POST and a Mozilla/5.0 user agent. Nothing was purchased, registered, gated, rate-limited
(until the 701-id scan) or supplied by a third party. Reproduction commands are in §35 of the companion
file; this appendix records only the provenance of each artefact and the local size, so that a reader
can confirm the same object was in hand.
| Artefact | Acquired from | Method | Size (B) | SHA‑256 (prefix) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Subject ByteBreaker V1_85892839.exe |
provided | — | 775,048 | bd1f1619… |
| Offer bundle | POST dlsft.com/service.php?request=offers |
form | 8 887 | — |
| Product descriptor | POST …&request=getDownloadInfo&name=ByteBreaker V1_85892839 |
form | 232 | — |
bytebreakerV1.zip |
GET http://directfiledl.com/getfile?id=85892839&s=6f75a7cd |
GET | 16,787,263 | aa3fc2c0… |
ep.zst.enc (mirror A) |
GET https://x3no.pages.dev/ep.zst.enc |
GET | 276 | e4b57255… |
A7n0vJtR (mirror B) |
GET https://pastebin.com/raw/A7n0vJtR → b64 |
GET | 344 → 276 | e4b57255… |
PO.jpg |
GET https://dlsft.com/PO.jpg |
GET | 32,755 | — |
privacy.php / terms.php |
GET https://filedm.com/… |
GET | 9 235 / 7 635 | — |
Glory-1.0.7-windows-x64.zip |
GET https://glory.tv/releases/windows-x64/Glory-1.0.7-windows-x64.zip |
GET | 12,579,642 | 1b67e6b6… |
AdReject-1.0.9-windows-x64.zip |
GET https://adreject.com/releases/windows-x64/AdReject-1.0.9-windows-x64.zip |
GET | 574,773 | 59358bb5… |
aichat_2.0.3_x64-setup.exe |
GET https://github.com/aichatdl/…/aichat_2.0.3_x64-setup.exe |
GET | 3,807,352 | 6430a772… |
latest.manifest ×2 |
GET https://{glory.tv,adreject.com}/releases/windows-x64/latest.manifest |
GET | 1 077 / 1 300 | — |
latest.json (Tauri) |
GET https://github.com/aichatdl/…/releases/latest/download/latest.json |
GET | 1 200 | — |
All retrieval was read-only and idempotent except:
- 701
getDownloadInfoprobes (a global hit count, not per-install — so they cannot be attributed to a host in any publisher-facing statistic); - 49 requests to
directfiledl.com/getfilewith candidatesvalues, of which 1 succeeded and returned the archive; - 6,000 candidate
svalues computed locally, not requested (the strap-line sweep is arithmetic, not HTTP); - 27 DNS resolutions.
The first three are worth stating in a report because they define the observation footprint the analysis leaves on the vendor's side. That footprint is:
dlsft.com : ~760 requests in ~30 h (1 IP, 1 UA, 1 ASN)
directfiledl.com: 49 requests in ~1 h
filedm.com : 2 requests
pastebin.com : 1 request
x3no.pages.dev : 2 requests
For a service that measures installs, 760 requests from one ASN in thirty hours is noise. No analysis in this report was distorted by self-observation, and the vendor did not react to the probing during the window.
Analyst's disclosure. No conflict of interest. The Subject was not executed on the analyst's host. All remote endpoints were fetched over a residential United Kingdom connection; no VPN, proxy or geo-spoofing was used for any measurement reported in this document, and where the egress location matters to a conclusion (country filtering, §5.3) the value
GBis stated with the result.
End of report. Companion working notes, decompilation (decomp.c, fn/), literal dumps, rules and
machine-readable indicators are in ByteBreaker_V1_85892839_ANALYSIS.md and _work/.
-
COMCTL32.dllord_410, ord_413, InitCommonControlsEx -
KERNEL32.dllGetModuleHandleW, SetEndOfFile, WriteConsoleW, HeapSize, CreateFileW, SetStdHandle, GetProcessHeap, SetEnvironmentVariableW, FreeEnvironmentStringsW, GetEnvironmentStringsW, GetCommandLineW, GetCommandLineA, FindNextFileW, FindFirstFileExW, FindClose, GetFileAttributesW, HeapReAlloc, GetACP, IsValidCodePage, ReadConsoleW, ReadFile, GetFileAttributesExW, EnumSystemLocalesW, GetUserDefaultLCID (+79 more) -
USER32.dllMessageBoxW, SetWindowPos, DestroyWindow, PostMessageW, DefWindowProcW, CreateWindowExW, GetWindowTextW, EnableWindow, EndPaint, BeginPaint, InvalidateRect, SendMessageW, PostQuitMessage, DrawTextW, GetClientRect, SetWindowLongW, LoadCursorW, TranslateMessage, FrameRect, TrackMouseEvent, DispatchMessageW, ShowWindow, RegisterClassExW, GetWindowLongPtrW (+12 more) -
GDI32.dllGetTextExtentPoint32W, SelectObject, CreateFontW, GetStockObject, SetTextColor, SetBkMode, LineTo, CreatePen, MoveToEx, SetBkColor, DeleteObject, CreateSolidBrush, RoundRect -
ADVAPI32.dllRegGetValueW, RegSetValueExW, RegCloseKey, RegCreateKeyExW -
SHELL32.dllSHGetKnownFolderPath, ShellExecuteExW, ShellExecuteW -
ole32.dllCoTaskMemFree -
urlmon.dllURLDownloadToFileW, URLOpenBlockingStreamA -
gdiplus.dllGdiplusStartup, GdiplusShutdown, GdipGetImageHeight, GdipCloneImage, GdipAlloc, GdipLoadImageFromStream, GdipGetImageWidth, GdipDeleteGraphics, GdipCreateFromHDC, GdipFree, GdipDisposeImage, GdipDrawImageRectI -
WININET.dllHttpOpenRequestA, InternetCrackUrlA, InternetOpenUrlA, InternetOpenA, InternetCloseHandle, HttpSendRequestA, InternetReadFile, InternetOpenUrlW, InternetOpenW, InternetConnectA
| Type | Indicator | Context |
|---|---|---|
| sha256 | bd1f1619f850be8c84ae0acdd0bb7ff3d88b8cb5647877c078d7805d7a55582f |
Subject wrapper (sample) |
| sha1 | 932e7cce8f6cde321f2288ccaaeb8ae5d84ab26d |
Subject wrapper |
| md5 | 280603b04aeadbb0d42f6043354923cd |
Subject wrapper |
| authentihash-sha256 | 47cb2bce143f52236604570e76081fa7bbf49c27955cba8be9ea4780f1d1b1c1 |
signature-independent hash |
| authentihash-sha1 | 4993f6423a4650be8d0190045aff69b8463f34da |
signature-independent hash |
| imphash | b3eb077da70cf3699e3dc8149d29c2be |
family pivot |
| sha256 | aa3fc2c089a8f039b2198d6f64e4e727e1631c7e18fe084429b1b491330ad85f |
delivered product archive bytebreakerV1.zip (16,787,263 B) |
| sha256 | e4b57255b6b01b12a7a729d3155294600ef2d43af2ae13d6e1126f15a4126381 |
276 B engine remote-config blob (identical on both mirrors) |
| sha256 | 1b67e6b657b356d8e0658de2cb20010e0520542e8fd9b2392c5b5ee93263101c |
Glory-1.0.7-windows-x64.zip (12,579,642 B) |
| sha256 | 3111a67c5708f2caf49fe362ff48319e094da50bb2cc60a75aab62c162525068 |
Glory.exe 1.0.7 (AN Soft) |
| sha256 | 2720d215168108700767f8e9b57819d55ca139d69d8d828186da186850a37c6c |
hgsdk.dll 1.5.0 (Honeygain SDK) |
| sha256 | 8ec04a9f38c3cbc376d11330d9022b830dafa0d27cd4ac89f4ab87ed8b883270 |
sciter.dll (Glory UI) |
| sha256 | 59358bb52a3985faae054c78bae0558112894bf5027f4a6dce34e3acba726e0a |
AdReject-1.0.9-windows-x64.zip (574,773 B) |
| sha256 | e943c047bc24ad68a0ce23856ce954a8c027c5d7f44c6bff3fefc6a29307af54 |
AdReject.exe 1.0.9 (AN Soft) |
| sha256 | c1e060ee19444a259b2162f8af0f3fe8c4428a1c6f694dce20de194ac8d7d9a2 |
WinDivert.dll (as shipped) |
| sha256 | 8da085332782708d8767bcace5327a6ec7283c17cfb85e40b03cd2323a90ddc2 |
WinDivert64.sys (as shipped) |
| sha256 | 6430a772eb047467aa0c3e4bc964719dbf85b9adc58e63738a8652099ba6f8ec |
aichat_2.0.3_x64-setup.exe |
| filename | ByteBreaker V1_85892839.exe |
convention: <product> V<major>_<8-digit server id>.exe |
| filename | bytebreakerV1.zip |
product archive (nullsoft 7-zip wrapper of Xeno) |
| filename | Quorum.dll / QuorumAPI.dll |
engine / managed bridge inside archive |
| filename | decompiler.exe |
Medal (Rust) Luau decompiler inside archive |
| filename | version.json / current_version.txt / lastKey.txt |
1.4.816 / 1.2.0 / "keysystemremoved" |
| path | %TEMP%\ADR<hex4>.exe |
brand-A staged installer (GetTempFileNameW, deleted after run) |
| path | %TEMP%\GLY<hex4>.exe |
brand-B staged installer |
| path | %LOCALAPPDATA%\adreject\file.txt |
brand-A state |
| path | %LOCALAPPDATA%\glory\file.txt |
brand-B state |
| path | %ProgramFiles%\Glory\ |
Glory.exe + hgsdk.dll + sciter.dll |
| path | %ProgramFiles%\AdReject\ |
AdReject.exe + WinDivert.dll + WinDivert64.sys + blocklist.txt + lists\ |
| path | %ProgramFiles%\PremierOpinion\ |
comScore panel (pmropn.exe) |
| path | %ProgramData%\Glory\ |
capture library (SQLite), thumbnails, logs |
| path | %APPDATA%\aichat\ |
Tauri AI client |
| path | %LOCALAPPDATA%\Google\Chrome\User Data\ |
NOT accessed by this family |
| registry | HKCU\SOFTWARE\InstallUnion\1538\BundleOfferActionUid |
REG_SZ offer URL/uid; best single family pivot |
| registry | HKCU\SOFTWARE\AdReject\Consent |
REG_DWORD 1, written before child launch |
| registry | HKCU\SOFTWARE\Glory\Consent |
REG_DWORD 1, written before child launch |
| registry | HKCU\SOFTWARE\Classes\OperaGXStable / OperaStable (HKCU+HKLM, value "URL Protocol") |
suppression checks, read-only |
| registry | HKCU\SOFTWARE\OperaGX\installed ; HKCU\SOFTWARE\AIChat\installed |
suppression checks, read-only |
| process | "%TEMP%\ADR<hex4>.exe" --silent |
CREATE_NO_WINDOW, cwd %TEMP%, parent blocks until exit |
| process | "%TEMP%\GLY<hex4>.exe" --silent -c:1538 -t:InstallUnion |
server-supplied params appended unquoted |
| process | "<product>V<n>_<8digits>.exe" |
parent wrapper name, 8-digit numeric suffix |
| window | class "Installer" / title "Installer" 692x492 WS_POPUP |
no icon, generic default application icon |
| named-object | Global\AdReject.Update.Request.v1 |
AdReject CLI<->GUI control channel |
| named-object | WinDivert 2.x / WinDivert64.sys service |
kernel packet-divert driver |
| url | https://dlsft.com/service.php?request=offers |
POST, body request=offers&channel=<c> |
| url | https://dlsft.com/service.php?request=getDownloadInfo&name=<name> |
POST, resolves by trailing 8-digit id |
| url | https://dlsft.com/callback.php?channel=<c>&act=started |
completed&id=<i> | vendor funnel receipt |
| url | https://www.dlsft.com/geo/ |
returns "<16 hex>,<ISO-3166>" |
| url | http://post.securestudies.com/TapAction.aspx?&uid=<id>campaign_id=1538&tpi=InstallUnion&action_id=<n> |
cleartext HTTP; action_id 0,1,2,3,4,8,9,17 |
| url | https://dpd.securestudies.com/dpdv3.aspx?campaignid=1538&co=<v |
<Blocked>> | post-download pixel |
| url | https://dlsft.com/PO.jpg |
413x30 "promo offer" strip, EXIF 2019-10-04 Photoshop CC 2019 (Mac) |
| url | https://filedm.com/privacy.php ; https://filedm.com/terms.php |
linked legal pages (FileDM/AN Soft brand) |
| url | http://directfiledl.com/getfile?id=85892839&s=6f75a7cd |
product archive; s = crc32(id XOR "SCI_multipart") |
| url | https://glory.tv/releases/windows-x64/latest.manifest |
Velopack/Squirrel-style update index |
| url | https://adreject.com/releases/windows-x64/latest.manifest |
same |
| url | https://github.com/aichatdl/aichat-app-tauri/releases/download/v2.0.3/aichat_2.0.3_x64-setup.exe |
offer payload |
| url | https://post.securestudies.com/packages/PI1032/ContentI3.exe |
PremierOpinion installer |
| url | https://raw.githubusercontent.com/ShadowWhisperer/BlockLists/master/Lists/Ads |
AdReject managed blocklist |
| url | https://pastebin.com/raw/A7n0vJtR |
Xeno engine remote-config mirror A (base64) |
| url | https://x3no.pages.dev/ep.zst.enc |
mirror B (276 B, byte-identical) |
| url | https://xeno.now |
product site; currently HTTP 451 |
| url | http://my.aichat.rocks:9005 |
AIChat cleartext backend, non-standard port |
| url | https://www.ovardu.com/6R9H6BD/KMZXBTT/?sub1=FileDM&sub=default |
OperaGX CPA redirect |
| domain | dlsft.com, www.dlsft.com |
Cloudflare; control plane |
| domain | filedm.com |
Cloudflare; brand/legal/analytics |
| domain | directfiledl.com |
Hetzner; data plane, plain HTTP only |
| domain | glory.tv, adreject.com |
Cloudflare; first-party offers |
| domain | securestudies.com |
ad/measurement network (post., dpd.) |
| domain | x3no.pages.dev |
Cloudflare Pages; engine config mirror |
| domain | connect.sdk.honeygain.com |
honeygain UAB SDK endpoint (proxyware) |
| domain | ovardu.com |
affiliate tracker |
| domain | aichat.rocks |
Tauri app backend |
| ip | 116.202.13.47 |
directfiledl.com A record (Hetzner, AS24940) |
| ip | 2a01:4f8:c012:42ca::1 |
directfiledl.com AAAA record (Hetzner IPv6) |
| cert | CN=AN Soft, O=AN Soft, L=Bergen op Zoom, ST=North Brabant, C=NL; serial 158467513303841965040394699300328354453; SSL.com Code Signing Intermediate CA ECC R2; 2026-06-11 -> 2027-06-11 |
shared by wrapper, Glory.exe, AdReject.exe |
| cert | CN=Honeygain UAB, O=Honeygain UAB, L=Vilnius, C=LT, SERIALNUMBER=306103177; DigiCert Trusted G4 Code Signing RSA4096 SHA384 2021 CA1 |
hgsdk.dll |
| tsa | CN=DigiCert SHA256 RSA4096 Timestamp Responder 2026 1 |
2037 validity, keeps wrapper verifiable long-term |
| pdb | C:\Users\Samim\Desktop\Installer\x64\Release\Installer.pdb |
wrapper build provenance |
| pdb | C:\Users\rizve\OneDrive\Desktop\Projects\Xeno\build\Release\net9.0-windows8.0\Xeno.pdb |
engine identity -> Xeno |
| pdb | C:\Users\Samim\Desktop\Glory\x64\Release\Glory.pdb |
first-party offer, same developer |
| pdb | C:\Users\Samim\Desktop\Glory\Recorder.cpp ; ScreenshotCapture.cpp |
source-file leakage |
| guid | 40261B86-E57C-4ACB-BC2F-99184C3D8202 (age 3) |
RSDS, wrapper |
| richkey | 0x9176119f |
linker fingerprint |
| string | SCI_multipart |
hotlink salt (also a family anchor) |
| string | campaign_id=1538&tpi=InstallUnion |
ad-network campaign |
| string | SOFTWARE\InstallUnion\1538 |
campaign registry root |
| string | BundleOfferActionUid / ContentI3.exe / PremierOpinion |
offer vocabulary |
| string | "Security code is not matching: carefully copy and do not change the link." |
file-host validator response |
| string | HoneygainSdk: missing export |
Glory/SDK integration error string |
| string | "Your device may function as a network exit node" |
proxyware consent copy |
| ssdeep | 6144:... |
withheld — recompute on corpus before publishing |
| file-size | 775048 |
wrapper |
| file-size | 16787263 |
product archive |
import "pe"
rule ANSoft_FileDM_InstallUnion_Downloader
{
meta:
description = "AN Soft / FileDM white-label PPI download wrapper (InstallUnion campaign 1538)"
family = "AN Soft Downloader"
author = "Elera"
date = "2026-11-17"
reference_hash = "bd1f1619f850be8c84ae0acdd0bb7ff3d88b8cb5647877c078d7805d7a55582f"
reference_size = 775048
imphash = "b3eb077da70cf3699e3dc8149d29c2be"
tlp = "CLEAR"
scope = "file"
note = "family rule: survives re-brand, re-sign and new 8-digit id"
strings:
/* control plane */
$u_offers = "https://dlsft.com/service.php?request=offers" ascii
$u_callback = "https://dlsft.com/callback.php" ascii
$u_po = "https://dlsft.com/PO.jpg" ascii
$u_geo = "https://www.dlsft.com/geo/" ascii
$u_service = "https://www.dlsft.com/service.php" ascii
/* request shapes */
$q_offers = "request=offers&channel=" ascii
$q_dlinfo = "request=getDownloadInfo&name=" ascii
/* telemetry */
$t_tap = "post.securestudies.com/TapAction.aspx?" ascii
$t_dpd = "dpd.securestudies.com/dpdv3.aspx?campaignid=1538&co=" ascii
$t_camp = "campaign_id=1538&tpi=InstallUnion" ascii wide
/* persistent state */
$r_campaign = "SOFTWARE\\InstallUnion\\1538" wide
$r_receipt = "BundleOfferActionUid" wide
$r_adr = "SOFTWARE\\AdReject" wide
$r_gly = "SOFTWARE\\Glory" wide
/* distinctive literals */
$s_salt = "SCI_multipart" wide
$s_po = "PremierOpinion" wide
$s_content = "ContentI3.exe" wide
$s_po_slot = "po-2" wide
/* interface copy */
$w_class = "Installer" wide fullword
$w_regfail = "Window Class Registration Failed! Error code: " wide
$w_dlmgr = " Download Manager." wide
$w_optional = " - Optional Offer" wide
$w_thanks = "Thanks for using our Download Manager" wide
condition:
uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and
pe.is_pe and
filesize < 5MB and
(
pe.imphash() == "b3eb077da70cf3699e3dc8149d29c2be"
or
/* offer pipeline + at least one endpoint */
( $q_offers and $q_dlinfo and 1 of ($u_*) )
or
/* campaign state: registry root + receipt (+ a brand) */
( $r_campaign and $r_receipt and 1 of ($r_adr, $r_gly) )
or
/* salt is high-precision: never observed outside this family */
( $s_salt and 1 of ($w_*) )
or
/* two independent telemetry strings */
( $t_camp and ( $t_tap or $t_dpd ) )
or
/* stripped/de-duplicated rebuild: count the unique literals */
( 3 of ($u_*, $q_*, $r_*, $s_*, $w_*) )
)
}